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Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 82 (2004); United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). We have repeatedly said that the “reasonable probability” standard is not the same as the “more likely than not” or “preponderance of the evidence” standard; it is a qualitatively lesser standard. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434 (1995) (collecting cases); see also Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S., at 83, n. 9; Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, it is “contrary to” our precedent to equate the “‘reasonable probability’” materiality standard with the more-likely-than-not standard. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 405–406 (2000).

The Sixth Circuit did not appropriately apply the materiality standard. Although the Sixth Circuit purported to recognize that the two standards were different, it simultaneously claimed that “‘reasonable probability’ for Brady’s purposes is as a more-probable-than-not standard.” Chinn v. Warden, 24 F. 4th 1096, 1103 (2022) (emphasis added). It further said that “[t]he Brady question now” before the court was “whether it is more probable than not that the withheld evidence would have created a different result.” Ibid. That reasoning violated the spirit, if not the letter, of our many cases holding that the two standards are not the same and that “reasonable probability” is a lower standard. Indeed, it is unclear why Strickland would have spent the time it did considering but rejecting the “more likely than not” standard in favor of the “reasonable probability” standard for prejudice, 466 U. S., at 693–694, if courts could treat them as “effectively the same,” 24 F. 4th, at 1103.

Because Chinn’s life is on the line, and given the substantial likelihood that the suppressed records would have changed the outcome at trial based on the Ohio courts’ own representations, see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 112 (2011), I would summarily reverse to ensure that the Sixth Circuit conducts its materiality analysis under the proper standard.