Page:China in Revolt (1926).pdf/45

 is clear from the whole history of its preparations for war on the Pacific. But even here the offensive of American imperialism takes on special forms. The military-strategic situation, the naval forces, and the coast defenses of the United States are for the time being still such as to serve only a defensive war. On the Pacific coast, all the way from the most important naval base in Puget Sound down to the border fortress at San Diego, a whole series of important points of naval importance are fortified, including the important harbor of San Francisco. These forts and naval bases guard the United States from attacks that might be made upon it from the Pacific.

The American navy is worse off, however, when it comes to offensive operations. Modern naval warfare demands, for successful operations on the seas, naval bases be not more than 500 miles apart. Nevertheless America has points of naval support on the Pacific, such as the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, etc., which because of the vast distances separating them from one another cannot insure the fighting efficiency of the American fleet. Sufficient to point out that the Philippines lie 7000 miles away from San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor 2100 miles from San Francisco and 4800 miles from the Philippines. Tm addition Japan would probably take possession of the Philippines, so close to the Asiatic coast, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Everybody knows this—that the capture of the Philippines will be the first task of the Japanese fleet. On this question America entertains no illusions whatever. Japan is furthermore irresistible on its strategic naval front, from the northern entrance to the Sea of Japan down to the southern section of the East China Sea.

Japan is much worse off on its flanks. In America there is being considered a project whereby, simultaneously with naval operations, a land army is to