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 so to speak, of its peasant policy in the eyes of the peasants. For this reason the Communists and the Chinese revolutionaries as a whole must take all possible measures to neutralize the elements in the army which are hostile to the peasants, to preserve the revolutionary spirit in the army and to direct things in such a way that the army helps the peasants and mobilizes them for the revolution. It is said that the revolutionary army in China is welcomed with open arms, but that later, after it has established itself, there is certain disillusionment. The same thing happened with us in the Soviet Union during the civil war. This is explained by the fact that the army, when it has liberated new provinces and established itself in them, is compelled to maintain itself in some way or other at the expense of the population of the district. We Soviet revolutionaries, usually succeeded in making up for these disadvantages by endeavoring to help the peasants against the landowners by means of the army. It is essential that the Chinese revolutionaries should also learn to make up for these disadvantages by carrying out a correct peasant policy with the help of the army.

These are the methods and the points of contact through which it will be possible to carry out a correct peasant policy in China.

The fifth remark concerns the question of the Chinese proletariat. It seems to me that in the theses sufficient emphasis has not been laid on the role of the Chinese working class and its importance. Comrade Rafes asks: Towards whom should the Chinese Communists orientate—towards the left or the center of the Kuomintang? A strange question. I believe that the Chinese Communists should orientate themselves according to the proletariat and to those who are active in the freedom movement in China and in