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 or to turn them into genuine adherents of the Kuomintang by intensifying the political work and by organizing revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done, the army may get into a most difficult position.

Secondly, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, must make a special study of things military, they must not regard military questions as something of secondary importance, for military questions in China are at present the most important factor in the Chinese revolution. The Communists must, with this object in view, study militarism in order to advance gradually and to be able to occupy some leading post or other in the revolutionary army. This will guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will follow the right path, will keep its eye steadily fixed on its aim. Unless this is carried out, it is inevitable that there should be vacillations in the army.

These are the tasks which the Chinese Communist Party has to fulfill with regard to the question of the revolutionary army.

The third remark concerns the fact that, in the theses, the question as to the character of the future revolutionary power in China is hardly dealt with at all or altogether disregarded. Comrade Mif, to his credit, has closely approached this question in his thesis. But, when he was on the threshold of it, he failed to carry it out to the end, as though he had been frightened and did not dare to go farther. Comrade Mif believes that the future revolutionary power in China will be a power of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletariat. What does this mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Mensheviki and social revolutionaries were also petty bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionaries. Does this mean that the future. revolutionary power in China will be a social revolutionary Menshevist power? No, it does not mean this.