Page:Charles Robert Anderson - Tunisia - CMH Pub 72-12.djvu/27



If American commanders and troops thought their brief combat experience in French Morocco and Algeria in November 1942 was adequate preparation to face hardened Axis units in a lengthy campaign, the fighting in Tunisia brought about a harsh reappraisal. With few exceptions, French units in North Africa had been more intent on upholding national honor than inflicting casualties and damage; those that offered determined resistance were at a marked disadvantage in terms of weapons, equipment, supplies, and numbers. In Tunisia, however, American soldiers found themselves faced with well-trained, battle-tested units skillfully using the most advanced weapons and innovative combined arms tactics repeatedly to frustrate Allied plans. The result was painful to Army units involved and a shock to the American public: five months of almost continuous setbacks with commensurably high casualties.

The fighting in Tunisia underlined both the strengths and weaknesses of the Western Alliance and the United States Army. On the political level the successful conclusion of the Tunisia Campaign left one Allied problem unsolved: factionalism among the French. Followers of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud were still unable to unite in a common cause. In the victory parade in Tunis on 20 May Gaullist troops refused to march with those loyal to Giraud. Until some basis for political cooperation was found, the French would likely remain unable to make more of a military contribution to Allied operations than their two-division XIX Corps. But that was perhaps not so bleak a prospect when considered against enemy losses in Tunisia: nearly 200,000 battle casualties (an entire field army), 275,000 prisoners of war, tons of equipment and supplies, and the mortal wounding of Italy as an Axis partner.

On the tactical level the Allies were slow to amass the naval and air forces necessary to stop the flow of Axis supplies from Sicily. Not until the last month of the campaign did the Allies push enemy supply levels below the minimum tonnages Kesselring needed to continue offensive operations. Of more immediate concern to Allied ground commanders, theater-level air forces were unable to neutralize enemy airfields on Sicily despite frequent attacks. In addition, enemy airfields in Tunisia, even those outside the Tunis bridgehead, remained operational well into April.

The last weeks of the campaign also saw troubling, and somewhat unexpected, problems arise between American and British ground