Page:Charles Robert Anderson - Algeria-French Morocco - CMH Pub 72-11.pdf/5

 would have to continue efforts there. Both would also have to deal with the question hanging over the entire theater: would overseas French forces fight with the Axis or Allies?

The issue of Allied action in the Mediterranean challenged the American-British partnership that underlay the Western Alliance. While the Allies agreed on the strategic priority of their war effort—Europe would be liberated before Asia—they deadlocked on a method of achievement. American members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) wanted to strike at Nazi Germany with an amphibious assault from England in 1942 or 1943, thereby forcing the Germans to divert units from the east and easing pressure on the Soviet Union. But believing the American proposal premature, British CCS members favored an Allied thrust into either Norway, where a linkup with Soviet armies could be effected, or northwest Africa in conjunction with a Red Army advance to the west in Europe.

The friendship and trust which had developed between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill finally broke the impasse at the Combined Chiefs. The President agreed to send American troops to North Africa in late 1942, and the Prime Minister agreed to support a major cross-Channel attack in 1943 or 1944. Their differences resolved, American and British CCS members in London began planning the entrance of the United States Army into the Mediterranean area, an operation named

With the Allies committed to the Combined Chiefs took up the question of leadership. After receiving the views of both sides, President Roosevelt selected Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to be Commander in Chief, Allied Force. Prime Minister Churchill quickly approved. The planning staff was filled out in accordance with the principle of international counterparts: a section chief of one nationality would have a deputy of the other. Selection of task force and support commanders would have to await final decision on landing sites. planners studied the terrain of northwest African coasts and surveyed forces available. Amid another extended CCS debate, Roosevelt and Churchill intervened in favor of simultaneous landings at three points: Casablanca, 190 miles south of Gibraltar on the Atlantic coast; Oran, 280 miles east of Gibraltar; and Algiers, 220 miles farther east. But French animosity toward the British dating from the aftermath of the fall of France in June 1940