Page:Charles Robert Anderson - Algeria-French Morocco - CMH Pub 72-11.pdf/31

 the ships to hold fire for the moment, since their troops were nearing the impact zone. Safety concerns dictated a halt of fire support missions but at the cost of delay in the advance ashore.

The Center and Eastern Task Force landings highlighted several operational differences between the two leading Western Allies. Most striking was the British preference for antisabotage thrusts directly into objective areas, a tactic Americans considered suicidal. The failure of Operations and  confirmed fears of those American planners who were wary of some British operational concepts, a suspicion dating from World War I. On the American side, much work remained to be done before airborne operations could exercise decisive influence on the battlefield.

Despite the problems it exposed, Operation gave the U.S. Army a hopeful sign for the future: American troops would soon close the experience gap with their British comrades and enable the Allies to field well-coordinated forces of overwhelming power.