Page:Celebration of the Five Hundredth Anniversary of Foundation, University of St. Andrews.djvu/157

 Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY. The terms " Akt," " Inhalt " and " Gep^enstand " are the keywords of a certain theory of knowledge which constitutes, in my opinion, the most important recent development of philosophical thought in Germany. L^Among its leading representatives I may refer to Me ino ng, Husserl and Lipps, Kiilpe and Messer. In spite of manifold divergences in detail, these writers agree in adopting a certain fundamental scheme as expressing the fundamental nature of mental life and mental development. They agree in sharply distinguishing between what the mind means or intends in perceiving, thinking, or having ideas, and the actual experiences or " Erlebnisse " which belong to its own particular existence as a psychical individual. What t he mind means or intend s is called by them an object or " Gegenstajxd-" The meaning or intending of something as distinguished from what is meant or intended is called by them an ' ^Akt." An act is a mode of being conscious, and is therefore an actual experience or " Erlebnis s " forming part of the existence of the iildividual mind. But it is an experience which has the distinctive character of intending or • being or directed towards an object. Hence it is often described, as " intentional " experience. Inasmuch as there are various modes of being conscious in relation to objects, it is necessary to dis- tinguish different qualities of intentional experience. In this way mere supposing is distinguished from believing, and both from- desiring or willing. But whether we merely suppose or believe or desire or will, the acts of supposing, believing, desiring, or willing are essentially relative to something other than themselves which is % "i^'Vi q3