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LOGOS

ogy in the Oreek language designates the Word of God, or Second Person of the Ble^d Trinitv. Before St. John had consecrated this term by adopting it, the Greeks and the Jews had used it to express religious eoncept'ons which, under divers titles, have exercised a certain influence on Christian theology, and of which it is necessary to say something.

I. Tbe Logos in Hellenism. — ^It is in Heraclitus that the theory of the Lo^os appears for the first time, and it is doubtless for this reason that, first among the Greek philosophers, Heraclitus was regarded by St. Justin (Apol. I, 46) as a Christian before Christ. For him the Logos, which he seems to identify with fire, is that univenal principle which animates and rules the world. This conception could onlv find place in a ma- terialistic monism. The philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries before Cnrist were dualists, and con- ceived of God as transcendent, so that neither in Plato (whatever may have been said on the subject) nor in Aristotle do we find the theory of the Logos.

It reappears in the writings of the Stoics, and it is especially by them that this theory is developed. God, according to them, " did not make the world as an ar- tisan does lus work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe'' (Galen, "De oual. incorp." in Fr. Stoic", ed. von Amim, 11, 6); He penetrates the world '* as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, *'Adv. Hermogenem", 44); this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle con- trolling the universe. He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He IS the g^erm from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (AAyos aTrtpfiarucdt). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistiole force ^diich bears aJong the entire world and all creat- ures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Clean- thus, " Hymn to Zeus" in " Fr. Stoic", I, 527-cf. 537). Conformably to their exeeetical habits, the Stoics made of the different gods personifications of the Logos, e. g. of Zeus and aoove all of Hermes.

At Alexandria, Hermes was identified with Thoth, the god of Hermopolis, known later as the great Her- mes, "Hermes Tnsmegistus", and represented as the revealer of all letters and all religion. Simultane- ously, the Logos theory conformed to the current Neo- platonistic dualism in Alexandria: the Logos is not con- caved of as natiu^ or immanent necessity, hut as an intermediary agent by which the transcendent God governs the world. This conception appears in Plu- tarch, especially in his " Isis and Osiris "; from an early date in the &rst centiuy of the Christian era, it influ- enced profoundly the Jewish philosopher Philo.

II. THE Word in Judaism. — Quite frequently the Old Testament represents the creative act as the word of (3od (Gen., i, 3;Ts. xxxii, 9; Ecclus., xlii, 15);. some- times it seems to attribute to the word action of itself, although not independent of Jahvch (Is., Iv, 11; Zach., V, 1-4; Ps. ovi, 20; cxlvii, 15). In all this we can see only bold figures of speech: the word of creation, of salvation, or, in Zacharias, the word of malediction, is personifiedi but is not conceived of as a distinct Divine nypostasis. In the Book of Wisdom this personifica- tion is more directly implied (xviii, 15 sq.), and a par- idlel is established (ix, 1, 2) between wisidom and the WonL ,

In Palestinian Rabbinism the Word (Memra) is very often mentioned, at least in the Targums: it is the Memra of Jahveh which lives, speaks, and acts; but, if one endeavour to determine precisely the meaning of the ezpressiony it appears very often to be only a para-

Sihraae substituted by the Targumist for the name of ahveh. The Memra resembles the Logos of Philo as little as the workings of the rabbinical mind in Pales- tine rosembled the specxilations of Alexandria: the ntbbiB are ohiefly concerned about ritual and observ-

ances; from religious scruples they dare not attribute to Jahveh actions such as the Sacred Books attribute to Him; it is enough for them to veil the Divine Maj- esty imder an aratraot paraphrase, the Word, the Glory, the Abode, and others. Philo s problem was of the philosophic order; God and man are infinitely dis- tant from each other, and it is necessary to establish between them relations of action and of prayer; the Logos is here the intermediary.

Leaving aside the author of the Book of Wisdom, other Alexandrian Jews before Philo had speculated as to the Logos; but their works are known only through the rare fragments which Christian authors and Philo himself have preserved. Philo alone is fully known to us; his writings are as extensive as those of Plato or Cicero, and throw light on every as- pect of his doctrine; from him we can best learn the theory of the Logos, as developed by Alexandrian Juda- ism. The character of his teaching is as manifold as its sources : sometimes, influenced by Jewish tradition. Philo represents the Logos as the creative Word of Grod (**De Sacrific. Ab. et Cain", ed. Cohn and Wendland, 65— cf. '' De Somniis". 1. 182; " De Opif. Mundi", 13); at other times he describes it as the revealer of Grod, symbolized in Scripture by the angel of Jahveh (** De Somniis", 1, 228-39; "De Cherub.^ 3; "De Fuga", 5; he accepts the language of Hellenic speculation; the Lo^os is then, after a Platonistic concept, the simi total of ideas and the intelligible world C De Opif. Mundi", 24, 25; "I.eg. Alleg.", I, 19; III, 96), or. agreeably to the Stoic theory, the power that upholds the world, the bond that assures its cohesion, the law that deter- mines its development (" DeFuga", 110; " DePlantat. Noe," 8-10; "C^uis rer. di vin. haercs sit", 188,217; "Quod Deus sit immut.", 176; "De Opif. Mundi", 143).
 * * Quis rer. di vin. hseres sit ", 201 , 205) . Of tener again

Throughout so many diverse concepts may be recog- nized a nindaniental doctrine: the Logos is an inter- mediary between God and the world; through it God created the world and governs it; through it also men know God and pray to Him ("De Cherub.", 125; "Quis rcrum divin. hajres sit ", 205-06. In three pas- sages the Logos is called God ("Leg. Alleg.", 111,207; "De Somniis", I, 229; "In Gen.'" II, 62, cited by Eusebius, "Praep. Ev.", VII, 13); but, as Pliilo him- self explains in one of these texts (De Somniis), it is an improper appellation and wrongly employed, and he uses it only oecause he is led into it by the Sacred Text which he comments upon. Moreover, Philo does not regard the Logos as a person; it is an idea, a power, and, though occasionally identified with the angels of the Bible, this is by symbolic personification (cf. Drum- mond, " Philo Judseus", II, London, 1888, 222-73).

III. The Logos in the New Testament. — ^Tho term Logos is found only in the Johannine writings: in the Apocalypse (xix, 13), in the Gospel of St. John, i, 1-14, and in his First Epistle (i, 1; cf. v, 7-Viilg.). But already in the Epistles of St. Paul the theology of the Lo^os had made its influence felt. This is seen in the Epistles to the Corinthians, where Christ is called " the pov.'er of God, arfd the wisdom of God" (I Cor., i, 24; cf. Lightfoot, "Notes on Epistles of St. Paul from Unpublished Commentaries", London, 1904, 164), " the ima^e of God" (II Cor., iv, 4); it is more evident in the Epistle to the Colossians (i, 15 sqc}.); above all in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the theology of the Logos lacks only the term itself, that finally appears in St. John. In this epistle we also notice the pro- noimced influence of the Book of Wisdom, especially in the description which is given of the relations be- tween the Son and the Father: "the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance" (cf. Wis., vii, 26). This resemblance suggests the way by which the doctrine of the Logos entered into Christian theology; another clue is furnished by the Apocalypse, where the term Logos appears for the first time (xix, 13), and not