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ttututaU-aeeLoK eye looking At one monad could see hit philtwophy. His opposition to "immodenl^ Cu^

reflect«d in it Kirthe leet of creation. Of course, this tesiBnismwasopenly acknowledged in his pbilosoph-

representation is difFerent in different kinds of mo- ical treatises aa well as in his lectures. He looked upon

nads. liie uncroated monad, God, nurrors all tbin^ Spinoia's conclusions aa being the logical outcome uf

clearly and adequately. The created monad which is Deacartes's eironeouB delinition of sulwlance. "8pi-

the liuman soul — the " queen-monad ""representB noia", he wrote, " simply ooiU out loud whnt Descarte*

consciously but not with perfect clearness. And, ac- was thinking, hut did not dare to express". But,

cording as we descend the scale from man to the while he had in view the refutation of extreme Car-

iowest mineral substance, the region of clear represen- tesianism, he must have intended also by means of bii

tation diminishes and the r^ion of obscure represen- doctrine of monads to stem the current of material

tation increases. The extent of clearrepreaeatation in ismwhichhadsAinin England and was soon to sweep

the monad is an index of its immateriality. Every before it in France many of the ideas which he cher-

monod, except the uncreated monad, is, therefore, ished. partly material and partly immaterial. The material (2) The Doctrine of Prf-etlablUhed Harmony. —

element in the monad corresponds to the passivity "Every present stato of a simple substance is a oat- oF maleria prima, and the immaterial element to the ural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way activity of the fom\a svbsUmtialia. Thus, Lelbnic that its present is always the cause of its future imagined, the Scholastic doctrine of matter and form (" Monadologic," thesis xxii). "The soul follows ita is reconciled with modern science. At the same time, own laws, and the body has its laws. They are fitted he imagined, the doctrine of monads emhodies what is to each other in virtue of the pre-eirtablished harmony true in the atomism of Democritus and doea not ex- among all substances, since they are all represent*- elude what is true in Plato's immaterial ism. tions of one and the same universe" (op. cit., theaia The universe, therefore, as I^eibniz represented it, Ixxviii). From Descartes's doctrine that matt«rise«- ismadeupof an infinite number of indivisible monads sentiaily inert, Malcbranche (q. v.) had drawn the which rise in a scale of ascending immaterial ism from conclusion that material substances cannot be truo the lowest particle of mineral dust up to the highest causes, but only occasions of the effects produced by created intellect. The lowest monad has only a most God (Occaaionalism). Leibniz wished to avoid this imperfect glimmering of immateriality, and fho hi^h- conclusion. At liie same time, he had reduced all the . eat haa still some remnant of materiality attached to activity of the monad to immanent activity. That is, it. In this way, the doctrine of nuinads strives to rec- ho had defined substance aa action, and explained that oncile materialism and idealism by teaching that the essential action of substance is representation, everythingcreated is partly material and partly unma- He saw dearly, then, that there can be no interaction terial. For matter is not separated from spirit by an among monads. The monad, he said, has "no win- abrupt difference, such as Descartes imagined to exist dows" through which the activity of other monads between body and mind. Neither arc the functions can enter it. The only recourse iett him it "^ '-

of the immaterial gcnerlcally diftcrent from the funo- tain that each monad unfolds its own activity, pur-

tions of mal«rial substance. The mineral, which at- sues, as it were, its career uf representation independ-

tracts and is attracted, has an incipient or inchoate ently of other monads. This would make each monad

power of perception; the plant, which in so many amonarcli. If, however, there were no control of the

dilTcrent ways adapts itself to its environment, is in a activities of the monad, the world would be a chaos,

sense aware of its surroundings, though not conscious not the cosmos that it is. We must, therefore, con-

of them. The animal by its power of sensation rises by ceivethat God at the beginning of creation so arranged

impereeptible steps alrove the mentality of the plant, things that the changes in one monad correspond per-

and iictwecn the highest or most " intelligent ani- fectlytothose in theothermonadswliichbelongtoits

mala and the lowest savases there is no very violent system. Inthecaseof the soul and body, for instance,

break in the continuity of the development of mental neither has a real influence on the other: but, iust as

power. All this Leibniz maintains without any two clocks may be so perfectly constructed and so ao-

thought, apparently, of genetic dependence of man on curately adjusted that, though independent of each

animal.animalon plant, or plantonmjncral. Hehaa other, they keep exactly the same time, bo it is »r-

no theory of descent orascent. He merelj; records the ranged that the monads of the body put forth their

absence of "breaks" in the plan of continuity, as it activity in such away that to each physical activity

presents itself to his mind. lie is not concerned with of the monads of the body there corresponds a p«y-

the problem of origins, but rather with the Cartesian ohical activity of the monad of the soul. This lb the

problem of the alleged antithesis between mind and famous doctnna of pre-established harmony. "Ao-

matter. How to bridge the imaginary chasm between cording to this system ", says Leibnii, " bodies act m

mind which thinks, and matterwhich is extended, was if (to suppose the imoomible) there were no souls at

the problem to which all the philosophers of the all, and aouls act as S there were no bodies, and yet

eighteenth century addressed themselves. Spinoxa both body and eoul act aa if the one were influeaeuig

merged mind and matter in the one infinite substance; the other" (op. dt., thesis buorii). Thus the numid

the materialists merged mind in matter: the im- ia not really a monnroli, but a subject ot God's Kin^

materialists merged matter in mind; Hume denied the dom, which is the universe, " the true city of God ". terms of the problem, when he reasoned away both If we take this doctrine literally, and deny aH fa-

mtttcr and mind and left only appearances. LeibniB, fluence of one monad on another, we are fornxl at onoe

diplomot and peacemaker, toned matter up and toned toa-ik: How, then, is it possible for the monad toicn-

mind down until they gave forth what he considered resent, if it is not acted uponT Leibnii 's answer •loilM

unison. Or, if we are to go back to the original figure be that he denied to the monad siU oomnrani "^

of speech, he spanned the chasm by his definition of from without, lie affirmed that the monad t

substance as action. Representation is action; repre- -windows on the oufaidc, but ho did not d

sentation is a function ot so-called roat«rial things as the heart of the monad is a door that <4

well as of those which are generally called immaterial, finite, and from that side it is in c

Representation, rising from the most rudimentary all other monads. Here Lcibnii pi

"little perception" {nelile perceptum) in the mineral Icm from metaphysics to mysticii. „

upto"appereeption in the human soul, is the bond unity in diversity, the unity in the p»>HW*''

ol substantial continuity, the bridge that joina to- harmony is not so much a unity of *

gethcr the two kinds of substances, matter and mind, of final destiny. All thiogs "^

which Descartes so inconsiderately separated. There verse not only because God "

is no doubt that Leibnis was oooadinia of tbU aim of they all spring, but ~"" ~'