Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 8.djvu/807

 LABOUR

727

LABOUR

refuses, ho may rightfully be made the object of a secondary boycott until he is ready to act reasonably. A clothing merchant who obstinately continues to buy his supplies from a boycotted manufacturer of "sweat- shop" goods would seem to be a case in point. For the merchant can with no great inconvenience pur- chase his goods elsewhere, the manufactvirer, it is assumed, rightly deserves to be boycotted, and the sec- ondary boycott will not only tend to induce the mer- chant to assist the original boycott, but will directly and in itself increase the scope of the latter. Conse- quently the secondary boycott is not essentially and always wrong. Lawyers, and occasionally j udges, con- demn it on the ground that it involves threats, or that it causes injury to a man's business, or that it implies a conspiracy, but every one of these features is con- tained in a strike. Whatever may be the legal aspect of the matter, a threat is not morally wrong per se. Its morality depends upon what is threatened, and how, and why. Injuries indirectly caused, which is the case in strikes and boycotts, are justified wlienever all the conditions are present which render morally lawful the performance of an action not bad in itself, but which produces both good and bad effects. The morality of a conspiracy is determined on the same principle. .\lthough the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission de- nounced the secondary boycott unreservedly, the par- ticularly immoral and cruel instances cited show that the commission had in mind the abuses of the practice rather than the practice itself. Nevertheless, the abuses seem to be so frequent in actual life that we cannot wonder at the attitude of those who wish to have the practice forbidden by positive law.

C. The Closed Shop, or the Union Shop. — These phrases point to that method or policy of the unions by which their members refuse to work with non- unionists in the same establishment or employment. Now, if, as sometimes happens, the unions refuse to admit non-unionists to membership on reasonable terras, in order to monopolize the trade or employ- ment, their action will, generally speaking, be unchar- itable, if not unjust. But if the union is willing to ad- mit all capable workers, and if it has a sufficient reason for pursuing the closed-shop policy, the latter will be neither unj ust nor uncharitable. Among the consider- ations advanced in justification of the policy are the following: The non-unionist ought to help to defray the expenses of organization, from which he derives so much benefit; the presence of non-unionists in an establishment often prevents that peace and discipline which is one of the aims and results of an agreement between the union and the employer, and provokes constant bickering between the two classes of work- ers, and, most important of all, the average employer strives to supplant gradually the unionist employees or to reduce their wages to the lower level accepted by the non-unionists. In a word, the general defence of the closed-shop policy is that it is indispensable to effective organization. The employment inevitably tends to become all union, or all non-union. This de- fence may not be fully justified liy the vital facts, but if it does give a true account of the situation, the closed- shop policy is justifiable; for, as a general rule, organi- zation is necessary to obtain just conditions for la- bour. Of course there are exceptions to this rule. We speak here only of what generally happens, with- out incjuiring into the frequency of the exceptions. In so far as the closed shop is necessary as a means to reasonable conditions of employment, it will not be immoral, as against either the non-unionist or the employer. Neither is deprived of his right to enter eco- nomic relations and pursue his livelihood on reason- able conditions. It is reasonable that the non-imion- ist should comply with that condition which alone makes justice possible for the mass of his fellow- workers, and it is unreasonal)le that he should desire to work as a non-unionist when such action tends to

produce unjust circumstances for all. There are, in- deed, cases in which the inconvenience of joining the union is great, as compared with the harm that would be done to the class through the opposite course. Membership in the union woukl then be an unreason- able pre-requisite to employment.

The closed-shop policy is often objected to, on the ground that it deprives the non-unionist of his natural right to work. In this assertion the right to work, which no one denies, and which cannot possibly be violated except by physical restraint, is confounded with the right to work in certain conditions and re- lations. The specific demand of the non-unionist is that he shall be permitted to work beside members of the union. If this were an unconditional right it would contradict and annul a similar right of the unionist, namely, the right not to work beside the former. One of these rights is no better than the other. In point of fact neither is genuine, for there can be no such prerogative as an unconditional right to a social relation. The right of a non-unionist to work in the same shop with a unionist is no more un- conditional than the right to strike, to boycott, or to enter any social relation which requires the consent of the other party. It is conditioned by the circum- stances, and it is valid only when these are reasonable. In the hypothesis that we are considering, membership in the union is such a reasonable condition, while re- fusal to enter is unreasonable. Hence, if the closed- shop policy is necessary in order to obtain proper con- ditions of employment for the body of the labourers, it will not violate the right of the non-unionist, even if it prevents him from obtaining any employment; for the right in question is dependent upon the contin- gency that it be exercised within reasonable limits. To deny this is implicitly to assert that the unionists are obliged to work in conditions that are unreas- onable. Finally, the policy under discussion may properly be opposed by an employer who otherwise treats his employees fairly. Contrary to the impres- sion that seems to be prevalent, the closed shop is not an innovation. It was enforced for centuries by the guilds, and for a long time in many places it was sanc- tioned and prescribed by civil legislation (Cf. Ashley, "English Economic History", I, 82). Practically speaking, the law forbade a man to work at his trade unless he belonged to the guild. What the civil law could then command, individuals can now with rea- son seek to obtain by persuasion, bargaining, and contract.

The methods and policies discussed in the foregoing pages exhibit all the more important moral aspects of the labour union. All these practices involve eco- nomic relations which are a means of obtaining ma- terial goods. If the relations were not necessary to this end, they could not become the basis of rights. Since they are necessary, they give rise to a right, which, like all other rights, is limited by the end to which it is a means, and is sufficiently realized when it can be exercised on reasonable terms. On this principle, and on this principle only, we justify every kind of right, whether to life, property, or liberty. And all that has been said in connexion with the strike, the boycott, and the closed shop, was merely an at- tempt to apply this general and far-reaching principle. To forestall misunderstantling, it may be well to note that every violation of justice through labour-union methods is also a violation of charity, and that charity may sometimes be offended without any breach of strict justice.

D. Limitation of Outpvt and of Apprentices. — The practice of restricting the amount of work to be per- formed, or the quantity of product to be turnetl out, by its members seems to be more frequent than (he union is gcMcrally willing to admit. But it is probably less frciiuc-nt tliaii the opponents of the union assert. In itself this method is not wrong, and it may even be