Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 7.djvu/839

 INDIFFERENTISM

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INDIFFERENTISM

Indifferentism, Religious, is the term given, in general, to all those theories, which, for one reason or another, deny that it is the duty of man to worship God by believing and practising the one true religion. This religious Indifferentism is to be distinguished from political indifferentism, which is applied to the policy of a state that treats all the religions within its borders as being on an equal footing before the law of the country. Indifferentism is not to be confounded with religious indifference. The former is primarily a theory disparaging the value of religion; the latter term designates the conduct of those who, whether they do or do not believe in the necessity and utility of religion, do in fact neglect to fulfil its duties.

I. Absolute Indifferentism. — Under the above general definit ion come those philosophic systems which reject the ultimate foundation of all religion, that is, man's acknowledgment of his dependence on a per- sonal creator, whom, in consequence of this depend- ence, he is bound to reverence, obey, and love. This error is common to all atheistic, materialistic, panthe- istic, and agnostic philosophies. If there is no God, as the Atheist professes to believe, or if God be but the sum of material forces, or if the Supreme Being is an all-embracing, all-confounding totality in which human individuality is lost, then the personal rela- tionship in which religion takes its rise does not exist. Again, if the human mind is incapable of attaining certitude as to whether God exists or not, or is even unable to form any valid idea of God, it follows that religious worship is a mere futility. This error is shared also by the Deists, who, while they admit the existence of a personal God, deny that He demands any worship from His creatures. These systems are answered by the apologist who proves that every one is bound to practise religion as a duty towards God, and in order that he may attain the end for which he has been called into existence.

II. Restricted Indifferentism. — In distinction from this absolute Indifferentism, a restricted form of the error admits the necessity of religion on account, chiefly, of its salutary influence on human life. But it holds that all religions are eqvially worthy and profit- able to man, and equally pleasing to God. The classic advocate of this theory is Rousseau, who maintains, in his "Emile", that God looks only to the sincerity of intention, and that everybody can serve Him by re- maining in the religion in which he has been brought up, or by changing it at will for any other that pleases him more (Emile, III). This doctrine is widely ad- vocated to-day on the grounds that, beyond the truth of God's existence, we can attain to no certain reli- gious knowledge; and that, since <jod has left us thus in uncertainty. He will be pleased with whatever form of worship we sincerely offer Him. The full reply to this error consists in the proof that God has vouch- safed to man a supernatural revelation, embodying a definite religion, which He desires that all should em- brace and practise. Without appealing to this fact, however, a little consideration suffices to lay bare the inherent absurdity of this doctine. All religions, indeed, may be said to contain some measure of truth; and God may accept the imperfect worship of ignorant sincerity. But it is injurious to God, Who is truth it- self, to assert that truth and falsehood are indifferent in His sight. Since various religions are in disagree- ment, it follows that, wherever they conflict, if one possesses the truth the others are in error. The con- stitutent elements of a religion are beliefs to be held by the intellect, precepts to be observed, and a form of worship to be practised. Now — to confine ourselves to the great religions of the world — Judaism, Mohamme- danism, Christianity, and the religions of India and the Orient are in direct antagonism by their respective creeds, moral codes, and cults. To say that all these irreconcilable beliefs and cults are equally pleasing to God is to say that the Divine Being has no predilection

for truth over error; that the true and the false are alike congenial to His nature. Again, to hold that truth and falsehood equally satisfy and perfect the human intellect is to deny that reason has a native bent towards, and affinity for, truth. If we deny this we deny that any trust is to be placed in our reason. Turn to the ethical side of the question. Here again there is conflict over almost all the great moral issues. Let an illustration or two suffice. Mohammedanism ap- proves polygamy, Christianity uncompromisingly con- demns it as immoral. If these two teachers are equally trustworthy guides of life, then there is no such thing as fixed moral values at all. If the obscene orgies of phallic worship are as pure in the sight of God as the austere worship that was conducted in the temple of Jerusalem, then we must hold the Deity to be destitute of all moral attriljutes, in which case there would be no grounds for religion at all. The fact is that this type of Indifferentism, though verljally ac- knowledging the excellence and utility of religion, nevertheless, when pressetl by logic, recoils into abso- lute Indifferentism. " AH religions are equally good '" comes to mean, at bottom, that religion is good for nothing.

III. Liberal or Latitudinahian Indifferentis.m. — (a) Origin and Growth. — The foregoing types of In- differentism are conveniently called infidel, to distin- guish them from a third, which, while acknowledging the unique Divine origin and character of Christianity, and its consequent immeasurable superiority over all rival religions, hokls that what particular Christian Church or sect one belongs to is an indifferent matter; all forms of Christianity are on the same footing, all are equally pleasing to God and serviceable to man. On approaching this third error one may advantageously inquire into the genesis of Imlifferentism in general. In doing so we shall find that lil)cral Indifferentism, as the third type is called, altho\iKh it arises in belief, is closely akin to that of infidelity: and this community of origin will account for the tendency which is to-day working towartls the union of lioth in a common mire of scepticism. Indifferentism springs from Rational- ism. By Rationalism here we understand the princi- ple that reason is the sole judge and discoverer of religious truth as of all other kinds of truth. It is the antithesis of the principle of authority which asserts that God, by a supernatural revelation, has taught man religious truths that are inaccessible to our mere unaided reason, as well as other truths which, though not absolutely beyond the native powers of reason, yet could not by reason alone be Ijrought home to the generality of men with the facility, certitude, and freedom from error required for the right ordering of life. From the earliest ages of the Chiu'ch the ration- alistic spirit manifested itself in various heresies. During the Middle Ages it infected the teachings of many notable philosophers and theoloj^ians of the schools, and reigned unchecked in the Moorish centres of learning. Its influence may be traced through the Renaissance to the rise of the Reformation (see R.^tionahsm).

From the beginning of the Reformation the ration- alistic current flowed with ever-increasing volume through two distinct channels, which, though rising apart, have been gradually approaching each other. The one operated through purely philosophic thought which, wherever it set itself free from the authority of the Church, has on the whole served to display what has been justly called the "all-corroding, all-dissolv- ing scepticism of the intellect in religious matters". Rationalistic speculation gave rise successively to the English Deism of the eighteenth century, to the school of the French Encyclopaedists and their descendants, and to the various German systems of anti-Christian thought. It has culminated in the prevalent materi- alistic, monistic, and agnostic philosophies of to-day. When the Reformers rejected the dogmatic authority