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 IMAGINATION

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IMAGINATION

olic bishops. The four answers, nos. 184-187, sum up the whole position exactly: (184) "It is forbidden to give divine honour or worship to the angels and saints, for this belongs to God alone." (185) " We should pay to the angels and saints an inferior honour or worship, for this is due to them as the servants and special friends of Ciod." (186) "We should give to rehcs, crucifixes and holy pictures a relative honour, as they relate to Christ and his saints and are memo- rials of them." (187) "We do not pray to relics or images, for they can neither see nor hear nor help us."

Le clercq, Manuel d'arch^ologie Chretienne depuis Us origines jusqu'au VIII' allele (2 vols., Paris. 1907J; Kraus, Geschie/tte der ekristlichen Kunst, I (Freiburg im Br., 1S96); Kacfma.nn, Handbuck der chrisllichen Archaologie (Paderbom, 1905); Palmer (ed. Brownlow and Northcote), An Introduction to Early Christian Symbolism (London, 1900): Beissel, Bilder aus der Geschichte der altchristlichen Kunst und Liturgie in Italien (Freiburg ini Br., 1S99) : Frotringham, The Monuments of Christian Rome (New York, 1908) : Gass, Symbolik der grieeh- ischen Kirche (1872), pp. :ii5 sqq.: Kattenbusch, Konfes- aionakunde, 1 (Freiburg im Br., 1892), pp. 467 sqq.: Harnack, Dogmengeschichte (4th ed., Tiibiiigen — ), pp. 478-90; K.\do- wiTZ, Ikonographie der Heilif/en (Berlin, 1852); Idem, Christ- liche Kunstsymbolik u. Ikonographie (Frankfurt, 18.39): ScHWARZLosE, Dcr Bilderstreit (Gotha, 1890), ch. i, pp. 1-35.

Adman Fortescce.

Imagination. — Its Nature. — Imagination is the faculty of representing to oneself sensible objects in- dependently of an actual impression of those objects on our senses. It is, according to scholastic psychol- ogy, one of the four internal senses, distinct, on the one hand, from the sen^us intimus, the sensus ceslimalivus, and the memory, and, on the other hand, distinct from the spiritual intellect. The last distinction is to be specially noted on account of the similarity between the operations of the imagination and certain acts of the intellect. We acquire knowledge of our different faculties only from a study of their operations, and the nature of image is the object of endless contro- versy. Is it psychologically identical with percep- tion, being differentiated only by lesser intensity? Or, on the contrary, has itaspccitic nature of itsown? It would be hard to say. The prolilem is very com- plex and perhaps insoluble. The analogy and the points of contact between the image and the percep*- tive representation are evident; but they hardly seem to justify an identification of the image with the com- plete perception, and the opinion which rcgartls them as distinct still seems to us the more probable. The imagination is a psycho-physical faculty. To think it can be reduced to the physiological functioning of the brain is an unwarranted and misleading assump- tion, though it is quite clear that its operations postu- late a material basis. Cerebral fatigue, mental dLs- ease, and the necessarily quantitative character of its objects leave no room for doubt on this point.

Object. — Although the imagination is independent of actual impression by sensible objects, yet it can represent only what has in some way passed through the senses. There is in this regard, however, a very marked difference between the different external senses. In the case of normal subjects visual images are the most numerous and the most perfect. Those derived from the sense of hearing are also very com- mon ; but the images arising from the senses of taste, smell, and touch are much rarer, and many persons, normally constituted, declare that they never have them unless perhaps in almost imperceptible degree. There has been much discussion of late in regard to "affective" images. Ribot believes we can unhesi- tatingly assert their existence; they are constituted, he claims, by the revival of an affective state, inde- pendent of the mental representation of the object which first occasioned it. But the question is not settled; many persons emphatically deny the exist- ence of such images, and the question may be raised whether the so-called "affective image" is not the mere imaginative representation of a past affection,

or the actual affective re-echo of an unusually im- pressive image.

DivLsiONs. — Imagination is two-fold, retentive (re- productive) and creative (productive). The object of the first is a sensible reality, which we have pre- viou.sly perceived as such. The creative forms its object by combining elements which were separately perceived. The analysis of the creative imagination IS of considerable importance for the psychology of invention, and of artistic and intellectual initiative. It brings us in contact with that as yet mysterious region, which is designated by the verj' indefinite and certainly collective name of "subconsciousness". Judged by their relative perfection, images are com- plete or incomplete, generic or schematic. The com- plete image approaches, in riciiness and precision, objective perception. It occurs most frequently among the passive images w'hich will be discussed farther on. The incomplete image, as its name indi- cates, is less rich, less precise. Certain details of the object escape consciousness, but what is represented is still sufficient to characterize an individual object. Of course, its complete or incomplete character is relative and, consequently, susceptible of innumer- able gradations. The generic image results from the fusion of several more or less analogous images, with the incompatible differences eliminated. It corre- sponds to the ensemble of all the Individual objects of one kmd that the subject has ever perceived. This is why materialists and even per.'^ons incapable of psychological observation confound it with an abstract idea, from which, however, it is absolutelv distinct. The generic image is evidently very incomplete. The schematic image is still more summary. It is hardly ever sought for its own sake; it gives only the schema of the object, that is to say certain characteristic outlines sufficient to support the intellect in its proper functions. .\s a rule the schematic image alone would be insufficient for this purpo.se; it is, for instance, impossible to imagine a multitude of 40,000 objects, in a manner sufficiently preci.se to supply the intellect with the sensible factors, indispen.sabic for the mathe- matical operations to which this number lends it- self. Hence the irresistible tendency to complete the schematic image by the verbal imape, and the part which the word thus comes to play m the process of thought has given rise to serious errors. Not a few psychologists have mistaken the verbal image, which adds precision to the schematic image, for the idea itself, and it is evident that such a psychological error leads directly to nominalism.

As regards genesis, images are either voluntary or spontaneous. Voluntary images are produced freely. We will to imagine our home, our parents, or some familiar place we have left. These images are usually incomplete, vague, and dull; we render them some- what more definite bj' fixing the attention on each part in turn, the grouping of all the parts into a unit being the work of memorj'. Spontaneous, or passive images are entirely different. Without the slightest impulse or direction of our will, they spring u|) sud- denly in consciousness, representing at times an ol> ject which has no apparent connexion with the trend of our thoughts. Images occurring in a dream are a good example, but sleep is by no means necessary for their production; any one who is accustomed to introspection will readily acknowledge that there are constantly arising from the depths of the soul passive images which often become the starting-point of new associations. However, they are best ob.served in the state of reverie. When this is brought on by fatigue, the most surprising images appear, and they are so well defined and so perfect that they might well pass for pseudo-hallucinations.

The Exterxalizin'g of Images. — The relation ex- isting between the image and the "consciousness of presence" is highly complex. The main point is to