Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 7.djvu/273

 HENRY

233

HENRY

dissensions in his empire b}- a treaty of peace. But he failed to achieve tliis until the Diet of Wiirzburg, in 1121. Preliminary negotiations here resulted in an agreement that final peace should depend on a treaty between pope and emperor. Thus was the way pre- pared for the important Diet of Worms, which assem- bled in September, 1122. The distinction between the conferring of an ecclesiastical office and the conferring of temporal possessions was relied on at Worms to bring about peace. Henry's skill as a dip- lomat proved particularly notable at this juncture, and was not the least influential factor in bringing about the concordat of 23 September, 1122 (see Callistus II). This famous agreement provided that the emperor should surrender his right to the selection of l^ishops and abbots in the empire, but that he should be authorized to send a representative to the ecclesiastical elections. Accordingly, the German sovereign was furthermore to abandon the symbolical ring and crosier at an investiture; but he retained the right to confer their temporal possessions on the ecclesiastical princes by investing them with a sceptre, and this was to be done before the bishop-elect received the papal con- secration. In Burgundy and in Italy alone was this investiture to follow within six weeks of the conse- cration. This just and natural solution of the great controversy could, with the proper good will, have been brought about at a much earlier date. Like all compromises it had its defects, and was oliscvire in cerrain respects. To this day, the learned do not agree as to the important question whether or not the concordat was a personal agreement with Henry or with the empire as such. It is assumed, however, that the rights which it created were to be permanent. Was it a victory for the papacy or for the empire? To answer this question one must bear in mind, so far as the empire is concerned, that the Ottonic system of government, a principle of which was the depend- ency of the German episcopate on the Crown, and which made use of the German Church in striving to keep down the particularistic elements, was now se- riously undermined. The subordination of the princes was already virtually done away with, and could only be enforced with difficulty. It is well to consider that in these protracted struggles between Church and State, in which rebellion often assumed the garb of religion, the power of the German princes was vitally strengthened. It was also significant that the bishops were henceforth no longer to be named by the king, whose relations with the episcopate had hitherto been almost those of lord and vassals. A new community of interests bound together for the future the eccle- siastical and temporal princes. The crown found itself face to face with a closed phalanx of territorial magnates, so that the termination of the controversy brought no advantage to the German imperial power. Henry, nevertheless, secured all that was possible under the circumstances, and he saved for the royal power the possibility of future recovery.

The Concordat of Worms did not eliminate alto- gether the differences existing between the empire and the territorial princes. King Henry's marriage had lirought him no issue, and the Cierman princes now claimed their right to elect his successor. How they would use this right could not be foretold. In 112.3, Henry was compelled once more to enter the hsts against Lothair and the Saxons. The emperor's capacity as a ruler again appeared when, towards the close of his reign, he laid bare the weakest point in the constitution of the Empire, and earnestly tried to heal It by perfecting a plan for levying necessary taxes. But any effort to improve the finances of the central royal authority was opposed by the territorial princes. Henry was the last of the Salic kings.

Cf. literature on HenhyIII; Henry IV; Paschal II- Inves- titures, Conflict of. Guleke, DeulsMands inner'e Kirch- enpohtik ion UOS-1111 (Dorpat Dissertatioa. IS82)- Peiser Uer deulsche InvesUturstreit unter K. Heinr. V. bis zu dem pcipst-

Seal of Henry VI

"Hemric[us] D[e]i Grattia] Romanor[um]

Imp[erato]r e[t] semp[er] Augustus"

From a document in the niuuicipal

archives at Frankfort

lichen Prvdrq vom 13. April i/;/ iBerhn. 18S3); Gernandt, Die erstt: Romfahrt Heinriclis V. (Heidelberg Dissertation, 1890); Bernheim, Zut Geschichte des Womiser Konkordats (GottingeQ, 1878); Schaefer, Zur Beurteilung des Wormser Konkordats in AhhandUingen der Bert. Akademie (1905). Ber.vheim, Das Wormser Konkordat und seine Vorurkunden (1906). and Rd- DORFF, Zur Erklarung des Wormser Konkordats (1906), take issue with the last mentioned work.

Franz Kampers.

Henry VI, German King and Roman Emperor, son of Frederick Barbarossa and Beatrice of Bur- gundy ; b. in 116.5; d. 28 September, 1197. He became German King on 15 August, 1169. In many ways he afforded a strong contrast to his father. Whereas the latter, even in his old age, was an impos- ing figure on ac- count of his pow- erful frame and the impressiveness of his actions, his son, pale and slender, was of a more quiet and serious dis- position; the for- mer a man of ac- tion, experienced, and idolized by his people, the latter a somewhat solitary, positive character, not easy to pene- trate, who took his measures accord- ing to well-con- sidered and states- manlike views. Henry VI was great in his conceptions, great also in the energy with which he pursued his aims, clearly conscious of passing failures but never daunted by them. The restlessness which led him ever to ad- vance his aims, and the ambition that ever impelled him to enlarge his empire (semper Augustus), often make him appear nervous and not less frequently hard and unfeeling. It is natural that such a man living in such an age should aim at world-empire. And the key to this ambitious policy of Henry's lay in Sicily. Having married Constance, daughter of Roger II of Sicily, Henry became the heir of William II upon the latter's death without issue (18 Novem- ber, 1189).

Henry was the legitimate heir, but the Neapolitan princes were in no humour to tolerate a German em- peror over them. Precarious as the conditions were for him in Germany, Henry was determined to act at once and with vigour. Henry the Lion had re- turned from exile in violation of his oath. His father- in-law, Richard Coeur de Lion of England, abetted him in his revolt. After fighting with varying suc- cess, both parties were inclined to make peace. This was especially true of the king, who wished to have his hands free for his Italian projects. The peace was a sham. It provided that Duke Henry should be left undisturbed and should have half of the reve- nues of Liibeck, while on the other hand Brunswick and Liibeck were henceforth to be open cities and two of the duke's sons were to remain at the king's court as hostages. Meanwhile the nationalist party in Sicily had placed the able Tancred of Lecce on the throne. Pope Clement gladly ratified the election of this national king and absolved all the Sicilian nobles from the oath they had sworn to the German king. His successor on the papal throne, Celestine III, thought that he might safely refuse the imperial crown to the German king though his power was steadily growing. By skilful diplomatic methods, and especially by taking advantage of the local conditions in the city of Rome that were the cause of so much trouble to the papacy, Henry finally managed to change the pope's mind.