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HELL

readily, however, if we take into consideration the pecuhar spirit of the Church's hturgy; sometimes she refers her prayers not to the time at which they are said, but to the time for which they are said. Thus the offertory in question is referred to the moment when the soul is about to leave the body, although it is actually said some time after that moment ; and as if he were actually at the death-beds of the faithful, the priest implores God to preserve their souls from hell. But whichever explanation be preferred, this much remains certain, that in saying that offertory the Church intends to implore only those graces which the soul is still capable of receiving, namely, the grace of a happy death or the release from purgatory.

IV. Impenitence of the Damned. — The damned are confirmed in evil ; every act of their will is evil and inspired by hatred of God. This is the common teach- ing of theology; St. Thomas sets it forth in many passages. Nevertheless, some have held the opinion that, although the damned cannot perform any super- natural action, they are still able to perform, now and then, some naturally good deed; thus far the C^hurch has not condemned this opinion. The author of this article maintains that the common teaching is the true one; for in hell the separation from the sanctifying power of Divine love is complete. Many assert that this inability to do good works is physical, and assign the withholding of all grace as its proximate cause; in doing so, they take the term grace in its widest mean- ing, i. e. every Divine co-operation both in natural and in supernatural good actions. The damned, then, can never choose between acting out of love of God and virtue, and acting out of hatred of God. Hatred is the only motive in their power; and they have no other choice than that of showing their hatred of God by one evil action in preference to another. The last and the real cavise of their impenitence is the state of sin which they freely chose as their portion on earth and in which they passed, unconverted, into the next life and into that state of permanence {stdlus termini) by nature due to rational creatures, and to an un- changeable attitude of mind. Quite in consonance with their final state, God grants them only such co- operation as corresponds to the attitude which they freely chose as their own in this life. Hence the damned can but hate God and work evil, whilst the just in heaven or in purgatory, being inspired solely by love of God, can but do good. Therefore, too, the works of the reprobate, in as far as they are inspired by hatred of God, are not formal, but only material, sins, because they are performed without the liberty requisite for moral imputability. Formal sin the reprobate commits then only, when, from among sev- eral actions in his power, he deliberately chooses that which contains the greater malice. By such formal sins the damned do not incur any essential increase of pimishment, because in that final state the very possi- bility and Divine permission of sin are in themselves a punishment; and, moreover, a sanction of the moral law would be quite meaningless.

From what has been said it follows that the hatred which the lost soul bears to God is voluntary in its cause only ; and the cause is the deliberate sin which it committed on earth and by which it merited reproba- tion. It is also obvious that God is not responsil)le for the reprobate's material sins of hate, because by granting His co-operation in their sinful acts as well as by refusing them every incitement to good. He acts quite in accordance with the nature of their state. "Therefore their sins are no more imputable to God than are the blasphemies of a man in the state of total intoxication, although they are not uttered without Divine assistance. The reprobate carries in himself the primary cause of impenitence; it is the guilt of sin which he committed on earth and with which he passed into eternity. The proximate cause of impeni- tence in hell is God's refusal of every grace and every

impulse for good, it would not be intrinsically inv possible for God to move the damned to repentance; yet such a course would be out of keeping with the state of final reprobation. The opinion that the Divine refusal of all grace and of every incitement to good is the proximate cause of impenitence, is upheld by many theologians, and in particular by Molina. Suarez considers it probable. Scotus "and \'as- quez hold similar views. Even the Fathers and St. Thomas may be understood in this sense. Thus St. Thomas teaches (De verit., Q. xxiv, a. 10) that the chief cause of impenitence is Divine justice which refuses the damned every grace. Nevertheless many theologians, e. g. Suarez, defend the opinion that the damned are only morally incapable of good ; they have the physical power, Ijut the difficulties in their way are so great that they can never be surmounted. The damned can never divert their attention from their frightful torments, and at the same time they know that all hope is lost to them. Hence despair and hatred of God, their just Judge, is almost inevitable, and even the slightest good impulse becomes morally impossible. The Church has not decided this ques- tion. The present author prefers Molina's opinion.

But if the damned are impenitent, how can Scrip- ture (Wisdom, v) say they repent of their sin? They deplore with the utmost inten.sity the pvmishment, but not the malice of sin; to this they cling more tena- ciously than ever. Had the}' an opportunity, they would commit the sin again, not indeed for the sake of its gratification, which they found illusive, but out of sheer hatred of God. They are ashamed of their folly which led them to seek happiness in sin, but not of the malice of sin itself (St. Thomas, Theol. comp., c. cxxv).

V. PcENA Damni. — The pirna damni, or pain of loss, consists in the loss of the beatific vision and in so com- plete a separation of all the powers of the soul from God that it cannot find in Him even the least peace and rest. It is accompanied by the loss of all super- natural gifts, e. g. the loss of faith. The characters impressed by the sacraments alone remain to the greater confusion of the bearer. The pain of loss is not the mere absence of superior bliss, but it is also a most intense positive pain. The utter void of the soul made for the enjoyment of infinite truth and in- finite goodness causes the reprobate immeasurable anguish. Their consciousness that God, on Whom they entirely depend, is their enemy forever is over- whelming. Their consciousness of having by their own deliberate folly forfeited the highest lilessings for transitory and delusive pleasures humiliates and depresses them beyond measure. The desire for hap- piness inherent in their very nature, wholly unsatis- fied and no longer al)le to find any compensation for the loss of God in dclusix'e pleasure, renders them utterly miserable. Moreover, they are well aware that God is infinitely happy, and hence their hatred and their impotent desire to injure Him fills them with extreme bitterness, .^nd the same is true with regard to their hatred of all the friends of God who enjoy the bliss of heaven. The pain of loss is the very core of eternal punishment. If the damned beheld God face to face, hell itself, notwithstanding its fire, wo\ild be a kind of heaven. Had they but some union with God, even if not precisely the vmion of the beatific vision, hell would no longer be hell, but a kind of purgatory. And yet the pain of loss is but the natural consequence of that aversion from (_!od which lies in the nature of every mortal sin.

Vi. PcENA Sensus. — The pana sensus, or pain of sense, consists in the torment of fire so frequently men- tioned in Holy Writ. According to the greater num- ber of theologians the term fire denotes a material fire, and so a real fire. We hold to this teaching as absolutely true and correct. However, we must not forget two things: from Catharinus (d. \oh'',) to our times there have never been wanting theologians who