Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 6.djvu/717

 GOOD

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GOOD

useful good is that which is desired merely as a means to something else; the delectable or pleasurable good is any good regarded raerelj- in the light of the pleasure it produces. The moral good (honum honestum) con- sists in the due ordering of free action or conduct according to the norm of reason, the highest faculty, to which it is to conform. This is the good which determines the true valuation of all other goods sought by the activities which make up conduct. Any lower good acquired to the detriment of this one is really but a loss (Ijonum apparens). \\'hile all other kinds of good may, in turn, be viewed as means, the moral good is good as an end and is not a mere means to other goods. The pleasurable, though not in the order of things an indej^endent end in itself, may be deliberately cho.sen as an entl of action, or object of pursuit. Now let us apply these distinctions. Good being the object of an}' tendenc)', man has as many kinds of goods as he has appetites, needs, and facul- ties. The normal exercise of his powers and the acquisition thereby of any good is followed by satis- faction, which, when it reaches a certain degree of intensity, is the feeling of pleasure. He may and sometimes does pursue things not on account of their intrinsic worth, but simply that he may obtain pleas- ure from them. On the other hand, he may seek a good on account of its intrinsic power to satisfy a need or to contribute to the [perfection of his nature in some respect. This may be illustrated in the case of food; for as the old adage has it, " the wise man eats to live, the epicure lives to eat".

The faculty which is distinctively human is reason; man lives as a man properly speaking, when all his activities are directed by reason according to the law which reason reads in his very nature. This conform- it}' of conduct to reason's dictates is the highest nat- ural perfection that his activities can possess; it is what is meant by rectitude of conduct, righteousness, or the moral good. "Those actions", says St. Thomas, "are good which are conformable to reason. Those are bad which are contrary to reason" (I-II, Q. xviii, a. 5). "The proximate rule of free action is reason, the remote is the eternal law, that is, the Divine Nature" (Ibid., Q. xxi, a. 1 ; Q. xix, a. 4). The motive impelHng us to seek the moral good is not self- interest, but the intrinsic worth of righteousness. Why does a just man pay his debts? Ask him and he will reply, perhaps, in the first instance, "Because it is my duty". But ask him further: " Why do you fulfil this dut}-?" He will answer: " Because rt i's rig/i( to do so". When other goods are pursued in ^^olation of the rational order, action is deprived of its due moral perfection, and, therefore, becomes wrong or bad, though it may retain all its other ontological goodness. The good which is the object of such an action, although it retains its particular relative good- ness with regard to the want which it serves, is not a good for the whole personality. For example, if, on a dav when flesh meat is forbidden, a man dines on roast-beef, the food is just as good physicall}' as it would be on any other day, but this goodness is out- weighed, because his action is a violation of reason which dictates that he ought to obey the command of lawful authority.

^^^lile the moral good is fixed by the Author of na- ture, yet, because man is endowed with free will or the power of electing which good he shall make the goal of action, he can, if he pleases, ignore the dictates of right reason and seek his other goods in a disorderly manner. He may pursue pleasure, riches, fame, or any other desirable end. though his conscience — that is, his reason — tells him that tlie means which he takes to satisfy his desire is wrong. He thereby frustrates his rational nature and deprives himself of his highest perfection. He cannot change the law of things, and this privation of his highest good is the immediate es- sential punishment incurred by his ".-iolation of the

moral law. Another punishment is that the loss is at- tended, generally speaking, by that peculiar painful feeling called remorse; but this effect may cease to be perceived when the moral impulses of reason have been habitually disregarded.

In order that an action may possess in an essential degree — no action is absolutelj^ perfect^ — its moral perfection, it must be in conformity with the law in three respects: (a) The action, con.sidered under the character by which it ranks as an element of conduct, must be good. The physical act of gi\-ing another person money may be either an act of justice, when one pays a debt, or it may be an act of mercy or benev- olence, as it is if one gives the money to relieve dis- tress. Both of these actions possess the fundamental element of goodness {bonum ex objecto). (b) The mo- tive, if there is a motive beyond the immediate object of the act, must also be good. If one pays a man some money that one owes him with the purpose, indeed, of paying one 's debt, but also with the ulterior purpose of enabling him to carry out a plot to murder one's enemy, the end is bad, and the action is thereby viti- ated. The end which is the motive must also be good (boinim ex fine). Thus, an action, otherwise good, is spoiled if directed to an immoral end; conversely, however, an action which in its fundamental character is bad is not rendered good by directing it to a good end. Theenddoesnot justify the means, (c) The cir- cumstances imder which the action is performed should be in entire conformity with reason, otherwise it lacks something of moral completeness, though it may not be thereby rendered totally immoral. We frequently say thatsomething which a person has done was right enough in itself, but he did not do it in the proper place or season. This triple goodness is ex- pressed in the axiom: bomun ex Integra eousa, malum ex quocumque defectu ("An action is good when good in everj' respect; it is wrong when wrong in any re- spect").

(B) The Ultimate Good— God— Beatitude. — The perfection of life, then, is to realize the moral good. But now arises the question: "Is life its own end?" Or, in other words: "What is the ultimate end ap- pointed for man?" To answer this question we must consider the good first under the aspect of end. " We not alone act", says St. Thomas, "for an immediate end, but all our actions converge towards an ultimate end or good, otherwise the entire series would be aim- less". The test by which we may determine whether any object of pursuit is the ultunate end is: " Does it satisfy all desire?" If it does not, it is not adequate to complete man's perfection and establish him in the posse.s.sion of his highest good and consequent happi- ness. Here St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, ex- amines the various objects of hvmian desire — pleasure, riches, power, fame, etc. — and rejects them all as in- adequate. ^^^lat then is the highest good, the ulti- mate end? St. Thomas appeals to Revelation which teaches that in the life to come the righteous shall pos- sess and enjoy God Himself in endless fruition. The arginnent is siunmed up in the well-known words of St. Augustine: " Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thy- self, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee." The moral condition necessarj- to this future consum- mation is that our -n-ills be here conformed to the Di- ^^ne will as expressed in the moral law and in His re- vealed positive law. Thus the attainment of the proximate good in this life leads to the possession of the Supreme Good in the next. Another condition indispensable is that our actions be viWfied by Di\'ine grace (see Gr.vce). ^^Tlat precisely will be the act by which the soul will apprehend the Sovereign Good is a disputed question among theologians. The Thomist theorj' is that it will be an act of the intellect, while the Scotist opinion is that it will be an act of the vnW. However this may be, one thing is dogmatic- ally certain: the soul in this assimilation shall not lose