Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 6.djvu/689

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solute necessity and would be infinite in every kind of perfection; but of nothing are we more certain than that the world as we know it, in its totality as well as in its parts, realizes only finite degrees of perfection. It is a mere contradiction in terms, however much one may try to cover up and conceal the contradiction by an ambiguous and confusing use of language, to pred- icate infinity of matter or of the human mind, and one or the other or both must be held by the Pantheist to be infinite. In other words the distinction between the finite and the infinite must be abolished and the principle of contradiction denied. This criticism applies to every variety of Pantheism strictly so called, while crude, materialistic Pantheism involves so many additional and more obvious absurdities that hardly any philosopher deserving of the name will be found to maintain it in our day. On the other hand, as re- gards idealistic Pantheism, which enjoys a consider- able vogue in our day, it is to be observed in the first place that in many cases this is a tendency rather than a formal doctrine, that it is in fact nothing more than a confused and perverted form of Theism, based es- pecially upon an exaggerated and one-sided view of Divine immanence (see below, iii). And this con- fusion works to the advantage of Pantheism by en- abling it to make a specious appeal to the very argu- ments which justify Theism. Indeed the whole strength of the pantheistic position as against Atheism lies in what it holds in common with Theism; while, on the other hand, its weakness as a world theory be- comes evident as soon as it diverges from or contra- dicts Theism. Whereas Theism, for example, safe- guards such primary truths as the reality of human personality, freedom, and moral responsibility. Pan- theism is obliged to sacrifice all these, to deny the existence of evil, whether physical or moral, to destroy the rational basis of religion, and, under pretence of making man his own God, to rob him of nearly all his plain, common-sense convictions and of all his highest incentives to good conduct. The philosophy which leads to such results cannot but be radicall.y unsound, (ii) The special argument based on the existence of order or design in the imiverse (also called the telco- lofjical argument) proves immediately the existence of a supramundane mind of vast intelligence, and ulti- mately the existence of God. This argument is capable of being developed at great length, but it must be stated here very briefly. It has always been a favourite argument both with philosophers and with popular apologists of Theism; and though, during the earlier excesses of enthusiasm for or against Darwin- ianism, it was often asserted or admitted that the evolutionary hypothesis had overthrown the teleo- logical argiunent, it is now recognized that the very opposite is true, and that the evidences of design which the univeree exhibits are not less but more impressive when viewed from the evolutionary standpoint. To begin with particular examples of adaptation which may be appealed to in countless number — the eye, for instance, as an organ of sight is a conspicuous em- bodiment of intelligent purpose — and not less but more so when viewed as the product of an evolution- ary process rather than the immediate handiwork of the Creator. There is no option in such cases be- tween the hypothesis of a directing intelligence and tliat of blind chance, and the absurdity of supposing that the eye. originated suddenly by a single blind chance is augmented a thousand-fold by suggesting that it may be the product of a progressive series of such chances. "Natural selection", "survival of the fittest", and similar terms merely describe certain phases in the supposed process of evolution without helping in the least to explain it ; and as opposed to teleology they mean nothing more than blind chance. The eye is only one of the countless examples of adaptation to particular ends discernible in every part of the universe, inorganic as well as organic;

for the atom as well as the cell contributes to the evidence available. Nor is the argument weakened by our inability in many cases to explain the partic- ular purpose of certain structures or organisms. Our knowledge of nature is too limited to be made the measure of nature's entire design, while as against our ignorance of some particular purposes we are en- titled to maintain the presumption that if intelligence is anywhere apparent it is dominant everywhere. More- over, in our search for particular instances of design we must not overlook the evidence supplied by the harmonious unity of nature as a whole. The universe as we know it is a cosmos, a vastly complex system of correlated and interdependent parts, each subject to particular laws, and all together subject to a common law or a combination of laws, as the result of which the pursuit of particular ends is made to contribute in a marvellous way to the attainment of a common pur- pose; and it is simply inconceivable that this cosmic unity should be the product of chance or accident. If it be objected that there is another side to the picture, that the universe abounds in imperfections — mal- adjustments, failures, seemingly purposeless waste — the reply is not far to seek. For it is not maintained that the existing world is the best possible, and it is only on the supposition of its being so that the imper- fections referred to would be excluded. Admitting without exaggerating their reality — admitting, that is, the existence of physical evil — there still remains a large balance on the side of order and harmony, and to account for this there is required not only an intelli- gent mind but one that is good and benevolent, though so far as this special argument goes this mind might conceivably be finite. To prove the infinity of the world's Designer it is necessary to fall back on the general argument already explained and on the de- ductive argument to be explained below by which infinity is inferred from self-existence. Finally, by way of direct reply to the problem suggested by the objection, it is to be observed that, to appreciate fully the evidence for design, we must, in addition to partic- ular instances of adaptation and to the cosmic unity observable in the world of to-day, consider the histori- cal continuity of nature throughout indefinite ages in the past and indefinite ages to come. We do not and cannot comprehend the full scope of nature's design, for it is not a static universe we have to study but a universe that is progressively unfolding itself and moving towards the fulfilment of an ultimate purpose under the guidance of a master mind. And towards that purpose the imperfect as well as the perfect — apparent evil and discord as well as obvious good order — may contribute in ways which we can but dimly discern. The well-balanced philosopher, who realizes his own limitations in the presence of nature's Designer, so far from claiming that every detail of that Designer's purpose should at present be plain to his inferior intelligence, will be content to await the final solution of enigmas which the hereafter promises to furnish.

(iii) To Newman and others the argument from conscience, or the sense of moral responsibility, has seemed the most intimately persuasive of all the argu- ments for God's existence, while to it alone Kant allowed an absolute value. But this is not an inde- pendent argument, although, properly imderstood, it serves to emphasize a point in the general a posteri- ori proof which is calculated to appeal with particular force to many minds. It is not that conscience, as such, contains .a direct revelation or intuition of God as the author of the moral law, but that, taking man's sense of moral responsibility as a phenomenon to be explained, no ultimate explanation can be given except by supposing the existence of a Superior and Law- giver whom man is bound to obey. And just as the argument from design brings out prominently the attribute of intelligence, so the argument from con-