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Some of these differences are merely formal and accidental and do not affect the substance of the theistic thesis, but others are of substantial im- portance, as, for instance, whether we can validly rstablisli llic truth of (lod's existence by the game kind (if rati(in:d infcicncc (c. r. from effect to cause) or whether, in order to justify our belief in this truth, we must not rather rely on some transcendental
 * us we employ in other departments of knowledge,

f>rinciple or axiom, superior and antecedent to dia- ectical reasoning; or on immediate intuition; or on some moral, sentimental, emotional, or aesthetic in- stinct or perception, which is voluntary rather than intellectual. Kant denied in the name of "pure rea- son" the inferential validity of the classical theistic proofs, while in the name of "practical reason" he postulated God's existence as an implicate of the moral law; and Kant's method has been followed or imitated by many Theists — by some who fully agree with him in rejecting the classical arguments; by others, who, without going so far, believe in the apolo- getical expediency of trying to persuade rather than convince men to be Theists. A moderate reaction against the too rigidly mathematical intellectualism of Descartes was to be welcomed, but the Kantian reaction by its excesses has injured the causeof Theism and helped forward the cause of anti-theistic philos- ophy. Herbert Spencer, as is well known, bor- rowed most of his arguments for Agnosticism from Hamilton and Mansel, who had popularized Kantian criticism in England ; while in trying to improve on Kant's reconstructive transcendentalism his German disciples (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) drifted into Pan- theism. Kant also helped to prepare the way for the total disparagement of hiunan reason in relation to religious truth, which constitutes the negative side of Traditionalism (q . v.), while the appeal of that system on the positive side to the common consent and tra- dition of mankind as the chief or sole criterion of truth and more especially of religious truth — its author- ity as a criterion being traced ultimately to a positive Divine revelation — is, like Kant's refuge in practical reason, merely an illogical attempt to escape from Agnosticism. Again, though Ontologism (q. v.), e. g. that of Malebranche (d. 1715), is older than Kant, its revival in the nineteenth century (by Gioberti, Ros- mini, and others) has been inspired to some extent by Kantian influences. This system maintains that we have naturally some immediate consciousness, how- ever dim at first, or some intuitive knowledge of God — not indeed that we see Him in His essence face to face, but that we know Him in His relation to crea- tures by the same act of cognition, according to Ros- mini, as we become conscious of being in general, and therefore that the truth of His existence is as much a datum of philosophy as is the abstract idea of being. Finally, the philosophy of Modernism (q. v.), about which there has recently been such a stir, is a some- what complex medley of these various systems and tendencies; its main features as a system are, nega- tively, a thoroughgoing intellectual Agnosticism, and, positively, the assertion of an immediate sense or experience of God as immanent in the life of the soul — an experience which is at first only subconscious, but which, when the requisite moral dispositions are pres- ent, becomes an object of conscious certainty.

Now all these varying types of Theism, in so far as they are opposed to the classical and traditional type, may be reduced to one or other of the two following propositions; (a) that we have naturally an immedi- ate consciousness or intuition of God's existence and may therefore dispense with any attempt to prove this truth inferentially; (b) that, though we do not know this truth intuitively and cannot prove it infer- entially in such a way as to satisfy the speculative reason, we can, nevertheless, and must conscien- tiously believe it on other than strictly intellectual VI— 39

groimds. But an appeal to experience, not to men- tion other objections, is sufficient to negative the first proposition; and the second, which, as history has already made clear, is an illogical compromise with Agnosticism, is best refuted by a simple statement of \he theistic proofs. It is not the proofs that are foimd to be fallacious but the criticism which rejects them. It is true of course — and no Theist denies it — that for the proper intellectual appreciation of theistic proofs moral dispositions are required, and that moral consciousness, the i^sthetic faculty, and whatever other powers or capacities belong to man's spiritual nature, constitute or supply so many data on which to base inferential proofs. But this is very different from holding that we possess any faculty or power which assures us of God's existence and which is independent of, and superior to, the intellectual laws that regulate our assent to truth in general ; that in the religious sphere we can transcend those laws without confessing our belief in God to be irrational. It is also true that a mere barren intellectual assent to the truth of God's existence — and such an assent is conceivable — falls very far short of what religious assent ought to be; that what is taught in revealed religion about the worthlessness of faith uninformed by charity has its counterpart in natural religion ; and that practical Theism, if it pretends to be adequate, must appeal not merely to the intellect but to the heart and conscience of mankind and be capable of winning the total alle- giance of rational creatures. But here again we meet with exaggeration and confusion on the part of those Theists who would substitute for intellectual assent something that does not exclude but presupposes it, and is only required to complement it. The truth and pertinency of these observations will be made clear by the following summary of the classical arguments for God's existence.

(2) Theistic Proofs. — The arguments for God's ex- istence are variously classified and entitled by different writers, but all agree in recognizing the distinction between a priori, or deductive, and a posteriori, or in- ductive, reasoning in this connexion. And while all admit the validity and sufficiency of the latter method, opinion is divided in regard to the former. Some maintain that a valid a priori proof (usually called the ontological) is available; others deny this in toto; while some others maintain an attitude of compromise or neutrality. This difference, it should be observed, applies only to the question of proving God's actual existence, for, His self-existence being admitted, it is necessary to employ a priori or deductive inference in order to arrive at a knowledge of His nature and attri- butes; and as it is impossible to develop the argu- ments for His existence without some working notion of His nature, it is necessary to some extent to antici- pate the deductive stage and combine the a priori with the a posteriori method. But no strictly a priori con- clusion need be more than hypothetically assumed at this stage.

(a) A Posteriori Proofs. — St. Thomas (I, Q. ii, a. 3; Cont. Gent., I, xiii) and after him many scholastic writers advance the five following arguments to prove the existence of God. (i) Motion, i. e. the passing from power to act, as it takes place in the universe, implies a first immoved Mover (primmn movens immo- bile), who is God ; else we should postulate an infinite series of movers, which is inconceivable, (ii) For the same reason efficient causes, as we see them operating in this world, imply the existence of a First Cause that is uncaused, i. e. that possesses in itself the sufficient reason for its existence; and this is God. (iii) The fact that contingent beings exist, i. e. beings whose non-existence is recognized as possible, implies the existence of a necessary being, who is God. (iv) The graduated perfections of being actually existing in the universe can be understood only by comparison with an absolute standard that is also actual, i. e. an in-