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 FORTITUDE

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FORTITUDE

him, but only in general "seilitiun and refusing alle- giance". The same attainder, however, went on to decree death against Cardinal Pole and several others because they " adhered themselves to the Bishop of Rome ". Catholic tradition has always held that Sir Adrian died for the same cause, and modern Protes- tant critics have come to the same conclusion. His cultus has always flourished among the Knights of St. John, and he was beatified by Leo XIII in 1895.

Camm, Lii'es of the Englifh Marti/r.s, I, 41U-461: FoRTESCUE (Lord Clermont), Family of Forlescue (1880), 255-311; G. K. FoRTESCUE, in Diet, Nat. Biog.t s, v.

J. H. Pollen.

Fortitude. — (1) JIanliness is etymologically what is meant by the Latin word virtiis and by the Greek dvSpela, with which we may compare dper^ (virtue), ipLffTos (best), and av-Z/p (man). Mas (male) stands to Mars, the god of war, as dpff-qv (male) to the corres- ponding Greek deity 'ApTjs. While avSpela (manliness) has been specialized to signify valour, rirtus has been left in its wider generality, and only in certain con- texts is it limited, as by Caesar when he says: " Helvetii reliquos Gallos virtute prseceilunt". Here the writer was certainly not taking the pious outlook upon virtue, except in so far as for primitive peoples the leading vir- tue is bravery and the skilful strength to defend their lives and those of their fellow-tribesmen. At this stage of culture we may apply Spinoza's notion that virtue is the conservatory force of life. " In propor- tion as a man aims at and is successful in pursuing his utile, that is his esse, so much the more is he endowed with virtue; on the other hand, in proportion as he neglects to cultivate his utile or his esse, so much the greater is his impotence" (Eth., IV, prop. 20). " Virtue is that human faculty, which is defined only by the essence of man, that is, which is limited only by the efforts of man to persevere in his esse" (prop. 22). The idea is continued in Propositiones 23, 24, 25, 27. The will to live — der Wille zu leben — is the root virtue. Of course Spinoza carries his doctrine higher than does the savage warrior, for he adds that the power preservative and promotive of life is ade- quacy of ideas, reasonable conduct, conformity to intelligent nature: finally that "the highest virtue of the intellect is the knowledge of God" (lib. V, prop, xlii). Spinoza usually mixes the noble with the ignoble in his views: for a rude people his philosophy stops short at virtue, the character of the strong man defending his existence against many assaults.

Aristotle does not say that fortitude is the highest virtue; but he selects it first for treatment when he describes the moral virtues: eliriifiev TrpHrov Tcpl avdpetas (Eth. Nic, III, 6); whereas St. Thomas is at pains to say explicitly that fortitude ranks third after pru- dence and justice among the cardinal virtues. The braves in a warrior tribe and the glamour of braverie in knight-errantry, the display of pomp by modern arm- ies on parade, were not objects to disturb the sense of proportion in the mind of the Friar Preacher. Still less could etymology deceive his judgment into think- ing that the prime virtue was the soldier's valour com- mended on the Victoria Cross. Neither would he de- spise the tribute " For Valour" in its own degree.

(2) To come now to definitions. If we consult Plato and Aristotle we find the former comparing man to the ^od Glaucus who from dwelling in the sea had his divine limbs encrusted beyond recognition with weeds and shells: and that represents the human spirit disguised by the alien body which it drags about as a penalty. The soul in its own rational nature (for our present purpose we fuse together the two terms i/'ux'i and vovs, distinguished by Aristotle, into one — the soul) is simple: man is compound, and, being confiict- ingly compounded, he has to drive a pair of steeds in his body, one ignoble — the concupiscences — the other relatively noble — the spiritual element, in which is "go", "dash", "onslaught", "pluck", "endurance".

Upon the latter element is based fortitude, but the animal spirit needs to be taken up and guided by the rational soul in order to become the virtue. It is in the breast that 6 fluyuAs, rb dupxieiSh (courage, passion) dwells, midway between reason in the head and con- cupiscence in the abdomen. Plato's high spirituality kept him from speaking too exaltedly of fortitude which rested on bodily excellence: consequently he would have wise legislators educate their citizens rather in temperance than in courage, which is separa- ble from wisdom and may be found in children or in mere animals (Laws, I, 630, C, D, E; 631, C; 667, A).

Although Aristotle makes animal courage only the basis of fortitude — the will is courageous, but the ani- mal spirit co-operates (6 U evfibs avvipy^i.) — he has not a similar contempt for the body, and speaks more honourably of courage when it has for its prime object the conquest of bodily fear before the face of death in battle. Aristotle likes to narrow the scope of his vir- tues as Plato likes to enlarge his scope. He will not with his predecessor (Lackes, 191, D, E) extend forti- tude to cover all the firmness or stability which is need- ful for every virtue, consequently Kant was able to say: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obey- ing the dictates of duty" (Anthropol., sect. 10, a). The Platonic Socrates took another limited view when he said that courage was the iTn<7Tifip.ri tSiv SeiyQi' Kal fi-/j (Laches, 199); hence he inferred that it could be taught. Given that in themselves a man prefers vir- tue to vice, then we may say that for him every act of vice is a failure of fortitude. Aristotle would have ad- mitted this too; nevertheless he chose his definition: "Fortitude is the virtue of the man who, being con- fronted with a noble occasion of encountering the dan- ger of death, meets it fearlessly" (Eth. Nic, III, 6). Such a spirit has to be formed as a habit upon data more or less favourable; and therein it resembles other virtues of the moral kind. Aristotle would have con- troverted Kant's description of moral stability in all virtue as not being a quality cultivatable into a habit: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obeying the dictates of duty, never developing into a custom but always springing freshly and directly from the mind" (Anthropol., I, 10, a). Not every sort of dan- ger to life satisfies Aristotle's condition for true forti- tude: there must be present some noble display of prowess — iXxij Kal Ka\6v. He may not quite posi- tively exclude the passive endurance of martyrdom, but St. Thomas seems to be silently protesting against such an exclusion when he maintains that courage ia rather in endurance than in onset.

As a commentator on Aristotle, Professor J. A. Stewart challenges the friends of the martyrs to make a stand for their cause when he says: " It is only when a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can show courage" (p. 283). Here the disjunctive " or" may save the situation: but there is no such reserve on p. 286, where he adds: "Men show courage when they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (^) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realized without the lat- ter, in w-hich case the avSpda would be of a spurious kind: the latter condition, however, cannot be realized without the former. Death in a good cause which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist, could not be )taX6s ddvaros" (a glorious death). Does Aristotle positively make this exclusion? If so, St. Thomas corrects him very needfully, as Britons would admit on behalf of their soldiers who, off the coast of S. Africa in 1852, nobly stood in their ranks and went unresistingly down in the sinking ship, Birkenhead, that they might give the civilians a better chance of being saved. As specimens of courage not in the higher order .\ristotle gives the cases of soldiers whose skill enables them to meet without much apprehen- sion what others would dread, and who are ready to flee as soon as grave danger is seen: of animally cour-