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 EXEGESIS

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EXEGESIS

merely by the use of words, but also by disposing out- ward things in such a way that one is the figure of the other. In the former case we have the literal sense; in the latter, the typical (cf. St. Thomas, Quodl., vii, Q. vi, a. 14).

(I) Literal Sense. — (i) What is the Literal Sense? — The literal sense of Sacred Scripture is the truth really, actually, and immediately intended by its author. The fact that the literal sense must be realli/ intended by the author distinguishes it from the truth conveyed by any mere accommodation. This latter applies a writer's language, on the ground of analogy, to some- thing not originally meant by him. Again, since the literal sense is actually intended by the writer, it differs from the meaning conveyed only virtually by the text. Thus the reader may come to know the literary capac- ity of the author from the style of his writing; or he may draw a number of logical inferences from the writer's direct statements; the resultant information is in neither case actually intended by the writer, but it constitutes the so-called derivative or consequent sense. Finally, the literal sense is limited to the meaning immediately intended by the writer, so that the truth mediately expressed by him does not fall within the range of the literal sense. It is precisely in this point that the literal sense differs from the typi- cal. To repeat briefly, the literal sense is not an ac- commodation based on similitude or analogy; it is not a mere inference drawn by the reader; it is not an antitype corresponding to the immediate contents of the text as its type; but it is the meaning which the author intends to convey really, not by a stretch of the imagination; actually, not as a syllogistic potency; and immediately, i. e., by means of the language, not by means of the truth conveyed by the language.

(ii) Division of the Literal Sense. — What has been said about the immediate character of the literal sense must not be misconstrued in such a way as to exclude figurative language from its range. Figurative lan- guage is really a single, not a double, sign of the truth it conveys. When we speak of "the arm of God", we do not imply that God really is endowed with such a bodily member, but we directly denote his power of action (St. Thomas, Summa, I, Q. i, a. 10, ad 3""). This principle applies not merely in the metaphor, the syn- ecdoche, the metonymy, or the irony, but also in those cases in which the figure extentls through a whole sen- tence or even an entire chapter or book. The very name allegory implies that the real sense of the expres- sion differs from its usual verbal meaning. In Matt., V, 13 sqq., e. g., the sentence, " You are the salt of the earth" etc., is not first to be understood in its non- figurative sense, and then in the figurative; it does not first class the Apostles among the mineral king- dom, and then among the social and religious reform- ers of the world, but the literal meaning of the passage coincides with the truth conveyed in the allegory. It follows, therefore, that the literal sense comprises both the proper and the figurative. The fable, the para- ble, and the example must also be classed among the allegorical expressions which signify the intended truth immediately. It is true that in the passage according to which the trees elect a king (Judges, ix, 6-21), in the parable of the prodigal son (Luke, xv, 11 sqq.), and in the history of the Good Samaritan (Luke, x, 25-37) a number of words and sentences are required in order to construct the fable, the parable, and the example respectively; but this does not interfere with the literal or immediate sense of the literary devices. As such they have no meaning independent of, or prior to, the moral lesson which the author intends to convey by their means. It is easily granted that the mechanical contrivance we call a watoli immediately indicates the time in spite of the subordinate action of its spring and wheels; why, then, should we question the truth that the literary device called fable, or para- ble, or example, immediately points out its moral

lesson, though the very existence of such a device pre- supposes the use of a number of words and even sen- tences ?

(iii) Ubiquity of the Literal Sense. — The Fathers of the Church were not blind to the fact that the literal sense in some Scripture passages appears to imply great incongruities, not to say insuperable difficulties. On the other hand, they regarded the language of the Bible as truly human language, and therefore always endowed with a literal .sense, whether proper or figura- tive. Moreover, St. Jerome (in Is., xiii, 19), St. Au- gustine (De tent. Abrah. serm. ii, 7), St. Gregory (Moral., i, 37) agree with St. Thomas (Quodl., vii, Q. vi, a. 14) in his conviction that the typical sense is always based on the literal and springs from it. Hence if these Fathers had denied the existence of a literal sense in any passage of Scripture, they would have left the passage meaningless. Where the patristic writers appear to reject the literal sense, they really exclude only the proper sense, leaving the figurative. Origen (De princ, IV, xi) may be regarded as the only exception to this rule; since he considers some of the Mosaic laws as either absurd or impossible to keep, he denies that they must be taken in their literal sense. But even in his case, attempts have been made to give to his words a more acceptable meaning (cf. Vincenzi, " In S. Gregorii Nysseni et Origenis scripta et doc- trinam nova recensio", Rome, 1864, vol. II, cc. xxv- xxLx). The great Alexandrian Doctor distinguishes between the body, the soul, and the spirit of Scripture. His defendants believe that he understands by these three elements its proper, its figurative, and its typical sense respectively. He may, therefore, with impunity deny the existence of any bodily sense in a passage of Scripture without injury to its literal sense. But it is more generally admitted that Origen went astray on this point, because he followed Philo's opinion too faithfully.

(iv) Is the Literal Sense One or Multiple? — There is more solid ground for a diversity of opinion concerning the unicity of the literal sense contained in each pas- sage of Sacred Scripture. This brings us face to face with a double question: (a) Is it posxible that a Scrip- ture passage has more than one literal sense? (b) Is there any Biblical text which actually has more than one literal meaning? It must be kept in mind that the literal sense is taken here in the strict meaning of the word. It is agreed on all sides that a multiple consequent sense or a multiple accommodation may be regarded as the rule rather than the exception. Nor is there any difficulty about the multiple literal sense found in various readings or in different versions of the same text; we ask here whether one and the same genuine Scripture text may have more than one literal sense.

(a) Possibility of a Multiple Literal Sense. — Since a word, and a sentence too, may have more meanings than one, there is no a priori impossibility in the idea that a Scriptural text should have more than one literal sense. If the author of Scripture really intends to convey the truth contained in the various possible meanings of a text, the multiple literal sense will be the natural resultant. Some of the expressions found in the writings of the Fathers seem to emphasize the possiliility of having a multiple literal sense in Sacred Scripture.

(b) .\ctual Occurrence of a Multiple Literal Sense. — The subject becomes more complicated if we ask whether a multiple literal sense is not merely possible, but is actuidly found anywhere in Scripture. There is no good authority for its frequent occurrence; but does it really e.xist even in the few Scriptural passages which seem to contain it, such as Ps. ii, 7; Is., liii, 4, 8; Dan., ix, 27; John, xi, 51; ii, 19? Did God wish in tliese texts toconvey a multiple literal sense? Revela- tion, as coming down to us in Scripture and tradition, furnishes the only clue to tlie solution of the question.