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 EVODITTS

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EVODIUS

ture of good (II, Q. ii, a. 19). But the evil of sin (culpa), though permitted by God, is in no sense due to Him (I, Q. xlix, a. 2) ; its cause is the abuse of free will by angels and men (I-II, Q. Ixxiii, a. 6; II-II, Q. X, a. 2; I-II, Q. ix, a. 3). It should be observed that the universal perfection to which evil in some form is necessary, is the perfection of this universe, not of ani/ universe: metaphysical evil, that is to say, and indirectly, moral evil as well, is included in the design of the universe which is partially known to us; but we cannot say without denying the Divine omnipo- tence, that another equally perfect universe could not be created in which evil would have no place.

St. Thomas also provides explanations of what are now generally considered to be the two main difficul- ties of the subject, viz., the Divine permission of fore- seen moral evil, and the ([uestion finally arising thence, why God chose to create anything at all. First, it is asked why God, foreseeing that His creatures would use the gift of free will for their own injury, did not either abstain from creating them, or in some way safeguard their free will from misuse, or else deny them the gift altogether? St. Thomas replies (C. G., II, xxviii) that God cannot change His mind, since the Divine will is free from the defect of weakness or mutability. Such mutability would, it should be re- marked, be a defect in the Divine nature (and there- fore impossible), because if God's purpose were made dependent on the foreseen free act of any creature, God would thereby sacrifice His own freedom, and would submit Himself to His creatures, thus abdicating His essential supremacy — a thing which is, of cour.se, utterly inconceivable. Secondly, to the question why God should have cho.sen to create, when creation was in no way needful for His own perfection, St. Thomas answers that God's object in creating is Himself; He creates in order to manifest His own f;oodness, power, and wisdom, and is pleased with that reflection or simil- itude of Him-self in which the goodness of creation consists. God's pleasure is the one supremely perfect motive for action, alike in God Himself and in His creatures; not because of any need, or inherent neces- sity, in the Divine nature (C. G., I, xxviii; II, xxiii), but because God is the source, centre, and object, of all existence. (I, Q. Ixv, a. 2; cf. Prov., 26, and Cone. Vat., can. i, v; Const. Dogm., 1.) This is accordingly the sufficient reason for the existence of the univer.se, and even for the suffering which moral evil has intro- duced into it. God has not made the world primarily for man's good, but for His own pleasure ; good for man lies in conforming himself to the supreme purpose of creation, and evil in departing from it (C. G., Ill, xvii, cxliv). It may further be understood from St. Thomas, that in the diversity of metaphysical evil, in which the perfection of the universe as a whole is embodied, God may see a certain similitude of His own threefold unity (cf. I, Q. xii); and again, that by permitting moral evil to exist He has provided a sphere for the manifestation of one aspect of His essential justice (cf. I, Q. Ixv, a. 2; and I, Q. xxi, a. 1, 3).

It is obviously impossible to suggest a reason why this universe in particular should have been created rather than another; since we are necessarily incapa- ble of forming an idea of any other universe than this. Similarly, we are imable to imagine why God chose to manifest Himself by the way of creation, instead of, or in addition to, the other ways, whatever they may be, by which He has, or may have, attained the same end. We reach here the utmost limit of speculation; and our inability to conceive the ultimate reason for crea- tion (as distinct from its direct motive) Ls paralleled, at a much earlier stage of the enquiry, by the inability of the non-creationist schools of thought to assign any ultimate cause for the existence of the order of nature. It will be ob.served that St. Thomas's account of evil is a tr\ie Theodicy, taking into consideration as it does every factor of the problem, and leaving unsolved only

the mystery of creation, before which all schools of thought are equally helpless. It is as impossible to know, in the fullest sense, why this world was made as to know how it was made; but St. Thomas has at least shown that the acts of the Creator admit of complete logical justification, notwithstanding the mysterj- in which, for himian intelligence, they can never wholly cease to be involved. On Catholic principles, the amelioration of moral evil and its consequent suffering can only take place by means of individual reforma- tion, and not so much through increase of knowledge as through stimulation or re-direction of the will. But since all methods of social improvement that have any value must necessarily represent a nearer approach to conformity with Divine laws, they are welcomed and furthered by the Church, as tending, at least indi- rectly, to accomplish the purpose for which she e.xists.

For ancient views of evil, see: Histories of philosophy by Zeller and I'eberweg; Darmesteter and Mills, The Zend- Avesla (London, 1SS7); Monier-Williams, Buddhism, Brah- manism and Hinduism (London, 1SS9): .\lzog, Univ. Church Hisl. (Dublin, 1900); Copleston, Buddhism (London, 1908), 2nd ed.

Modern writers; Malebranche, Entr^tiens sur la meta- physique (Paris, 1688, tr., London, 1712); Joachim, Ethics o/ Spinoza (Oxford. 1901); Leibnitz, Thiodicce (Paris. 1846, etc.); CuDWORTH, InteUectunl system of the universe (London, 1678, 1845); Ray, Three Phi/sico-theol. Discourses (London, 1721); Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane AND Kemp (London. 1906); Hartmann, Philosophy of the Un- conscious, tr. CocPLAND (London, 1893); Sully. Pessimism (London, 1901); Card, Le Pessimisme au A'/A'« siecle (Paris, 1S7S); Wenley, Aspects of Pessimism (London and Edin- burgh, 1894); Huxley, Essays and Lectures (London, 1902); Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, tr. (London, 1904); Metchni- KOFF, The Nature of Man, and Prolongation of Life, tr. (London, 1904 and 1908); Carus, The Religion of Science (Chicago, 1899); Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, tr. (London, 1907); Mamiani, Confessioni di un Metafisico (Turin, 1865); Re- NOUViER, Nouvelle Monadologie (Paris, 1907).

Catholic writers, besides those already referred to: Migne in Encycl. Theol., XXXV, a. v. mal (Paris, 1851); Rosmini, Theodicy, tr. (London, 1886); Billot, De Deo Trino el Uno (Rome, 1900); Reinstadler. Elem. Phil. Schol. (Freiburg, 1904); Mehcier, Couts de Philosophie (Louvain, 1905), IT; R. F. Clarke, The existence of God; a Dialogue (London, 1887); BoEDDER, Natural Theology, tr. (New York. 1901); J. Rickaby, Moral Phil. (London, 1903), chap. 6; Idem, Evil and Necessity in Month (London, Nov., 1898); Smith, The Problem of Evil (London, 1906).

A. B. Sharpe.

Evodius, first Bishop of Antioch after St. Peter. Eusebius mentions him thus in his " History": "And Evodius having been established the first [bishop] of the Antiochians, Ignatius flourished at this time" (III, 22). The time referred to is that of Clement of Home and Trajan, of whom Eusebius has just spoken. Ilarnack has shown (after discarding an earlier theory of his own) that Eusebius possessed a list of the bishops of Antioch which did not give their dates, and that he was obliged to synchronize them roughly with the popes. It seems certain that he took the three episcopal lists of Rome, Alexandria, and .\ntioch from the " Chronography " which Julius Africanus pub- lished in 221. 'The "Chronicle of Eusebius" is lost; but in Jerome's translation of it we find in three suc- cessive years the three entries (1) that Peter, having founded the Church of Antioch, is sent to Rome, where he perseveres as bishop for 25 years; (2) that Mark, the interpreter of Peter, preaches Christ in Egypt and Alexandria; and (3) that Evodius is ordained first Bishop of Antioch. This last year is given as Claudius III by the Codex Freherianus, but by the fifth-century Bodleian Codex (not used in Schoene's edition) and the rest as Claudius IV (a. d. 44). The Armenian translation has Claudius II. We have no mention of Evodius earlier than that by Africanus; but the latter is confirmed by his contemporary, Origen, who calls Ignatius the second bishop after Peter (Hom. IV, in Luc, III, 938A). It is curious that the ordination of Evodius should not have been given in the " Chronog- raphy" in the same year as the founding of the Anti- ochian Church by Peter, and Ilort supposed that the three entries must have belonged to a single year in