Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 5.djvu/634

 ETHICS

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ETHICS

which He wished to rule the world and direct it to its end. This ordination existing in the mind of God from all eternity, and depending on the nature and essential relations of rational beings, is the eternal law of God (lex aierna Dei), the source from which all temporal laws take their rise. God does not move and govern His creatures by a mere external directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but by means of internal impulses and inclinations, which he has bound up with their natures. Irrational creatures are urged, by means of physical forces or natural impulses and in- stincts, to exercise the activity peculiar to them and keep the order designed for them. Man, on the other hand, Ls a being endowed with reason and free will ; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses and instincts in a manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend upon practical principles and judgments, which point out to him how he is to order his conduct. These principles must somehow or other be mani- fested to him by nature. All created things have im- planted in their natures certain guiding principles, necessarj' to their corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule. He must be led by a natural, inborn light, manifesting to him what he is to do or not to do. This natural light is the natural law. When we speak of man as possessing a natural, inborn light, it is not to be understood in the sense that man has innate ideas. Innate ideas do not exist. It is true, nevertheless, that the Creator has endowed man with the ability and the inclination to form many concepts and develop principles. As soon as he comes to the use of reason, he forms, by a natural necessity, on the basis of experience, certain general concepts of theoretical reason — e. g. those of being and not being, of cause and effect, of space and time — and so he ar- rives at universal principles, e. g. that "nothing can exist and not exist at the same time", that "every effect has its cause", etc. .\s it is Ln the theoretical, so also in the practical order. As soon as reason has been sufficiently developed, and the individual can somehow or other practically judge that he is some- thing more than a mere animal, by an intrinsic neces- sity of his nature he forms the concept of good and evil, i. e. of something which isproper to the rational nature which distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore worth striving for, and something which is unbecoming and therefore to be avoided. And, as by nature he feels himself attracted by what is good and repelled by what is evil, he naturally forms the judgments, that "good is to be done and evil avoided", that "man ought to live according to the dictates of reason", etc. From his own reflections, 3specially when assisted by instruction from others, he 3asily comes to the conclusion that in these judgments the will of a superior being, of the Creator and Designer oi nature, has its expression. Around about him he perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is verj- easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and all-wise power. He himself has been appointed to occupy in the domain of nature the posi- tion of lord and master; he, too, must lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational being, not merely because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedi- ence to his Creator. Man did not give himself his nature with all its faculties and inclinations; he re- ceived it from a superior being, whose wisdom and power are everj^where manifest to him in Creation.

The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoid evil", "Lead a life regu- lated according to reason", etc., from which all the Commandments of the Decalogue are derived, are the ba-sisof the natural law.of which St. Paul (Rom.,ii. II) says, that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an emanation of the Divine law, made known to all men by nature herself; it is the expression of the will of nature's .\uthor, a participation of the created rational being in the eternal law of God. Hence the

obligation it imposes does not arise from man's own autonomy, as Kant held, nor from any other human authority, but from the Will of the Creator ; and man cannot violate it without rebelling against God, his master, offending Him, and becoming amenable to His justice. How deeply rooted among all nations this conviction of the higher origin of the natural law was, is shown by the fact that for various violations of it (as murder, adulterj-, perjurj', etc.) they did their ut- most to propitiate the angered deity by means of prayers and sacrifices. Hence they looked upon the deity as the guardian and protector of the moral order, who would not allow the contempt of it to go unpun- ished. The same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have attached to the moral order, a value far surpassing that of all other earthly goods. The noblest among the nations maintained that it was better to undergo any hardship, even death itself, rather than prove recreant to one's duty. They under- stood, therefore, that, over and above earthly treasures, there were higher and more lasting goods whose attain- ment was dependent upon the observance of the moral order, and this not by rea.son of any ordinance of man, but because of the law of God. This being premised, it is clearly impossible to divorce morality from religion without robbing it of its true obligation and sanction, of its sanctity and inviolability and of its importance as transcending even,' other earthly consideration.

The natural law consists of general practical princi- ples (commands and prohibitions) and the conclusions necessarily flowing therefrom. It is the peculiar func- tion of man to formulate these conclusions himself, though instruction and training are to assist him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take these principles as the guide of his conduct and apply them to his particular actions. This, to a certain extent, everybody does spontaneously, by virtue of an innate tendency. As in the case of all practical things, so in regard to what concerns the moral order, reason uses syllogistic processes. When a person, e. g., is on the point of telling a lie, or saying what is contrary to his convictions, there ri.ses before his mental vision the general precept of the natural law: "Lying is WTong and forbidden." Hence he avails himself, at least virtuall}-, of the following syllogism: "Lying is for- bidden; what you are about to say is a lie ; therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." 'The conclu- sion thus arrived at is our conscience, the proximate norm of our conduct. Conscience, therefore, is not an obscure feeling or a sort of moral instinct, but a prac- tical judgment of our rea.son on the moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice of conscience, our reward is peace and calm of soul ; if we resist this voice, we experience disquiet and remorse.

The natural law is the foundation of all human laws and precepts. It is only because we recognize the necessity of authority for himian society, and because the natural law enjoins obedience to regularly consti- tuted authority, that it is possible for a himian supe- rior to impose laws and commands binding in con- science. Indeed all human laws and precepts are fundamentally the conclusions, or more minute de- terminations, of the general principles of the natural law, and for this very reason every deliberate infrac- tion of a law or precept binding in con.science is a sin, i. e. the violation of a Divine commandment, a rebel- lion against God, an offence against Him, which will not escape punishment in this life or in the next, un- less duly repented of before death.

The problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical, ethics, and their investigations in nearly all cases bear upon the natural law, whose origin, nature, subject-matter, obligation, and properties it is the scope of ethics to explain thoroughly and verify. The general philosophical doctrine of right is usually treated in general ethics. Under no circumstances may the example of Kant and others be imitated in