Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 5.djvu/633

 ETHICS

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ETHICS

tc emancipate morality from religion. In France religious instruction was banished from the schools in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This tendency manifests a lively activity in what is known as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly speaking, is in the United States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City. Similar societies were formed in other cities. These were consolidated in 1887 into the " Union of the Societies for Ethical Culture". Besides Adler, the chief propagators of the movement by word of mouth and writing, were W. M. Salter and Stanton Coit. The purpose of these societies is declared to be " the improvement of the mora! life of the members of the societies and of the community to which they belong, without any regard to theological or philo- sophical opinions". In most of the European coun- tries ethical societies were founded on the model of the American organization. All these were combined in 1894 into the "International Ethical Association". Their purpose, i. e. the amelioration of man's moral condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneous to suppose that any such moral improvement can be brought about without taking religion into consider- ation. In fact many members of the ethical societies are openly antagonistic to all religions, and would therefore do away with denominational schools and supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction. Even upon purely ethical considerations such attempts must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that even in the case of adults moral instruction without religion, without any higher obligation or sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so is it in the case of the young? It is evident that, judged from the standpoint of Christianity, these efforts must meet with a still more decided condem- nation. Christians are bound to observe not only the prescriptions of the natural law, but also all the pre- cepts given by Christ concerning faith, hope, love. Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. The Christian, moreover, knows that without Divine grace and, hence, without prayer and the frequent reception of the sacraments, a morally good life for any con- siderable length of time is impossible. From their earliest years, therefore, the young must not only re- ceive thorough instruction in all the Commandments, but must be exercised and trained in the practical use of the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and atmosphere in which education develops and flourishes. While, among non-Catholics ever since the Refor- mation, and especially since Kant, there has been an increasing tendency to divorce ethics from religion, and to dissolve it into countless venturesome and frequently contradictory systems. Catholics for the most part have remained free from these errors, be- cause, in the Church's infallible teaching authority, the guardian of Christian Revelation, they have al- ways found secure orientation. It is true that to- wards the end of the eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth centurj-, Illuminism and Rational- ism penetrated here and there into Catholic circles and attempted to replace moral theology by purely philosophical ethics, and in turn to transform the latter according to the Kantian autonomy. This movement, however, was but a passing phase. With a reawakening of the Church's activity, fresh impetus was given to Catholic science, which was of benefit to ethics also and produced in its domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again had to the illustrious past of Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and verification of principles of the moral order. Taparelli d'Azeglio led the way with his great work " Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto" (1840-4.3). Then followed, in Italy, Audisio, Ros- mini, Liberatore, Sanseverino, Roselli, Zigliara, Sig- V.— 36

noriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo, and others. In Spain this revival of ethics was due to, among others, J. Balmes, Donoso Cortes, Zefirio Cionzalez, Slendive, R. de Cepeda; in France and Belgium, to de Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair, Ath, Vallet, Charles Perin, Piat, de Pascal, Moulart, Castelein ; in England and .America, to Joseph Rickaby, Jouin, Russo, HoUaind, J.J. Ming. In German-speak- ing countries the reawakening of Scholasticism in general begins with ICleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853; Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsatze der Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis seu philosophise moralis universae, ISSo- 1900). After them came A. Stockl, Ferd. Walter, Moy de Sons,C.Gutberlet,Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Ros- setti, A. M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen, Willems, V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerous Catholic writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and political economy.

IV. Outlines of Ethics. — It is clear that the fol- lowing statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the most important prob- lems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment. Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical ethics, and spe- cial, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds and verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral order; special ethics applies these general prin- ciples to the various relations of man, and determines his duties in particular.

Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation to the certain knowledge of the exist- ence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this fundamental truth the structure of ethics must be based. God created man, as He created all things else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper motive of the will's activity. If God were not the ultimate object and end of His own activ- ity. He would depend upon His creatures, and would not be infinitely perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that He can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to an infinitely perfect being, but for His glorj-. They are to manifest His goodness and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of themselves directly glorify f!od, for they are inca- pable of knowing Him They are intended as means to the end for which rationa.1 man was created. The end of man, however, is to know God, to love Him and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unending happiness. Every man h.as within him an irresistible, indestructible desire for perfect happiness; he seeks to be free from every evil and to possess everj' obtain- able good. This impulse to happiness is foimded on man's nature; it is implanted there by his Maker; and hence will be duly realized, if nothing is wanting on the part of man's own individual endeavour. But perfect happiness is unattainable in the present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an early end to all earthly happiness There is reserved for man a better life, if he freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject to God and keeps His Commandments. Only from the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and the moral order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does man, considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence of su|)eniatural revelation, come to know what God retjuiros of him here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in order to arrive at eternal happiness? — By means of the natural law.

From etcrnitv there existed in the min<l of God the idea of the world, which He freely determined to cre- ate, as well as the plan of government according to