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 EDUCATION

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EDUCATION

tics, the former including history, poetry, the drama, oratory, and science, along with music in the narrower sense; while the latter comprised games, athletic exer- cises, and the training for military duty. That music was no mere " accomphshment " and that gj^mnastics had a higher aim than bodily strength or skill is evi- dent from what Plato tells us in the " Protagoras ". The Greeks indeed laid stress on courage, temperance, and obedience to law; and if their theoretical disquisi- tions could be taken as fair accounts of their actual practice, it would be difficult to hnd. among the prod- ucts of human thinking, a more exalted ideal. The essential weakness of their moral education was the failure to provide adequate sanction for the principles they formulated and for the counsels they gave to youth. The practice of religion, whether in public services or in household worship, exerted but Uttle in- fluence upon the formation of character. The Greek deities, after all, were no models for imitation; some of them could scarcely have been objects of reverence, since they were endowed with the weaknesses and pas- sions of men. Religion itself was mechanical and ex- ternal; it did not touch conscience nor awaken the sense of sin. As to the future life, the Greeks believed in the immortalitj' of the soul; but this belief had little or no practical significance. Thus the motive for vir- tuous action was found, not in respect for Divine law nor in the hope of eternal reward, but simply in the de- sire to temper in due proportion the elements of hu- man nattu'e. Virtue is not self-repression for the sake of duty, but, as Plato says, "a kind of health and beauty and good hal)it of the soul"; while vice is "a disea.se and deformity and sickness of it". The ji:st man " will so regulate his own character as to be on good terms with himself, and to set those three princi- ples [reason, passion, and desire] in tune together, as if they were verily three chords of a harmonj-, a higher, and a lower, and a middle, and whatever may he be- tween these; and after he has bound all these together and reduced the many elements of his nature to a real unity as a temperate and duly harmonized man, he will then at length proceed to do whatever he may have to do" (Republic, IV, 443). This conception of virtue as a self-balancing was closely bound up with that idea of personal worth which has already been mentioned as the central element in Greek life and education. But the personality referred to was not that of man for the sake of his humanity, nor even that of the Greek for the sake of his nationality; it was the personality of the free citizen, and from citi- zenship the artisan and the slave were excluded. The mechanical arts were held in bad repute; and Aristotle declares that " they render the body and soul or intel- lect of free persons unfit for the exercise and practice of virtue" (Politics, V, 13.37). A still more serious limitation, affecting not only their concept of human dignity, but their regard for human life as well, con- sisted in the exposure of children. This was practised at Sparta by the public authority, which destroyed the child that was unfit for the service of the State; while at .\thens the fate of his offspring was committed to the father and might be decided in accordance with purely personal interests. The mother's position was not much better than it had been in the Orient. Women were generally regarded as inferior beings, " impotent for good, but clever contrivers of all evil " (Euripides, Medea, 406). At best she was a means to an end, the bearing of children and the care of the household; her education consequently was of the scantiest sort. The only exceptions were the helwrtr, i. e. the women who were outside the home circle and who with greater frecclom of living combined higher culture than the legitimate wife could hope for. Under such circumstances marriage implied for woman a lowering of personal worth that was in marked contrast with the ideals set up for the educa- tion of men.

These ideals, again, underwent a decided change diu'ing the fifth century B. c. In one respect at least it was a change for the better; it extended the rights of citizenship. The constitution of Solon was set aside and that of Clisthenes adopted in its stead (509 B. c). The democratic character of the latter, with the increase in prosperity at home and the widening of foreign relations, afforded new opportunities for in- dividual ability and endeavour. This heightened activity, however, was not put forth in behalf of the common good, but rather for the advancement of per- sonal interests. At the same time morality was de- prived of even the outward support it had formerly drawn from religion; philosophy gave way to scepti- cism; and education, while it became more intellectual, laid emphasis on form rather than on content. The most influential teachers were the Sophists, who sup- plied the growing demand for instruction in the art of public discussion and offered information on every sort of subject. Developing in practical directions the principle that "man is the measure of all things", they carried indi\-idualism to the extreme of subjec- tivism alike in the sphere of speculative thought and in that of moral conduct. The purposes of education were correspondingly modified, and new problems arose. Now that the old standards and basis of mor- ality had been rejected, the main question was to re- place them by others in which due allowance would be made on the one hand for individuality and on the other for social needs. The answer of Socrates was: "Know thyself" and "Knowledge is ^^rtue", i. e. a knowledge drawn from personal experience, yet pos- sessing universal validity; and the means prescribed by him for obtaining such knowledge was his maieu- tics, i. e. the art of giving birth to ideas through the method of question and answer, by which he devel- oped the power of thinking. As an intellectual dis- cipline, this scheme had undoubted value; but it left unsolved the chief problem: how is knowledge, even of the highest kind, to be translated into action? Plato offered a twofold solution. In the "Republic", set- ting out from his general theorj- that the idea alone is real, and that the good of each thing consists in har- mony with the idea whence it originated, he reaches the conclusion that knowledge consists in the per- ception of this harmony. The aim of education, therefore, is to develop knowledge of the good. So far, this scheme contains little more promise of prac- tical results than that of Socrates. But Plato adds that society is to be ruled by those who attain to this knowledge, i. e. by the pliilosophers ; the other two classes, soldiers and artisans, are subordinate, yet each individual, being assigned to the class for which his abilities fit him, reaches the highest self-development and contributes his share to the social weal. In the "Laws", Plato attempts to revise and combine cer- tain elements of the Spartan and of the Athenian sys- tem; but this reactionary scheme met with no success.

This problem, finally, was taken up by Aristotle in the " Ethics" and the " Politics". As in his philoso- phy, so in his educational theory, he departs from Plato's teaching. The goal for the individual as well as for society is happiness: " What we have to aim at is the happiness of each citizen, and happiness con- sists in a complete activity and practice of virtue" (Politics, IV). More precisely, happiness is " the con- scious activity of the highest part of man according to the law of his own excellence, not unaccompanied by adequate, external conditions". Merely to know the good does not constitute virtue; this knowledge must issue in practice, the goodness of the intellect (knowl- edge of universal truth) must be combined with good- ness of action. The three things which make men good and virtuous — nature, habit, and reason — " must be in harmony with one another (for they do not always agree) ; men do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them that they ought.