Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 5.djvu/267

 DYNAMISM

223

DTSIBOD

Herbart, Lotze, von Hartmann, Renouvier, to men- tion only a few names among many, also hold dynamic theories modified by their special points of view and philosophical systems. To these may be added some Catholic philosophers, e. g. the Sulpician Branchereau, and the Jesuits Carbonnelle and Palmieri. Among scientists, Ampere, Cauchy, Faraday, and others are also in favour of dynamism. Faraday's theory is sub- stantially the same as that of Boscovich. That theory, namely, that " atoms . . . are mere centres of forces or powers, not particles of matter in which the powers themselves reside ' ', has " a great advantage over the more usual notion". "A mind just entering on the subject may consider it difficult to think of the powers of matter independent of a separate something to be called tJie matter, but it is certainly far more difficult, and indeed impossible, to think of or imagine that matter independent of the powers. Now the powers we know and recognize in every phenomenon of the creation, the abstract matter in none ; why, then, as- sume the existence of that of which we are ignorant, which we cannot conceive, and for which there is no philosophical necessity?" (A Speculation touching Electric Conduction and the Nature of Matter, pp. 290, 291).

To-day there is a tendency to substitute the concept of energj' for that of force. Hence Professor Ostwald's "energetic theory". Matter is to be looked upon as a complex of energies arranged together in space. The concept of matter resolves itself into that of energy, since the manifestations of energy are all we know of the external world. Energy is the common substance, for it is that which exists in space and time; it is also the differentiating principle of whatever exists in space and time. Recent scientific discoveries, espe- cially those in the field of radio-activity, seem to strengthen philosophical reason and lead to a more .specific djTiamism. The atom (q. v.) can no longer be considered as being what its name implies, namely indivisible. Atoms of different chemical elements are spheres of positive electrification enclosing a number of corpuscles, all homogeneous, having identical prop- erties, and negatively electrified. Some physicists still attribute to these corpuscles a real, though infini- tesimal, extension; they admit a nucleus or carrier of the electric charge, and this nucleus alone is what we call matter. But this is denied by others for whom the corpuscle contains nothing material in the sense in which we commonly use that term. It is all electricity and nothing but electricity. Indeed the only reason for admitting anything else would be the necessity of explaining the mass and inertia of the corpuscle. But electricity itself possesses mass and inertia; or rather the mechanical inertia of matter is identical with the self-induction of the electric current, and the mass results from the velocity of the current. It has been calculated that the whole mass and inertia of the cor- piisde are accounted for by its electrical charge alone and its velocity. Hence the name "electron" given to the corpuscle; it is the ultimate unit of so-called mat- ter. This is known as the electronic theory of matter.

II. The preceding outline shows that the term ibina- miftm, like all other general names of philosophical systems, is very vague, and applies to a number of widely different views originating from different con- siderations and supported by different arguments, namely: (1) Extension being essentially divisible, the ultimate unit must lack extension, otherwise it would be itself composed of parts, divisible and not one. (2) Matter is essentially active; to reduce it to mere exten- sion is to ignore one of its fundamental aspects. (3) Even extension manifests itself exclusively through forces, and (4) matter as such is unknowable and un- thinkable. (.5) Scientific facts lead to an electronic theory. (6) flatter is, therefore, to say the least, abso- lutely useless, and dj-namism, being a simpler, yet ade- quate, explanation, is ])refcrable. Without entering

into a discussion of the system, we may note briefly that the extension which is infinitely divisible is abstract, not concrete, mathematical, not physical, ex- tension. For Aristotle and the Scholastics, physical matter is composed of two essential and inseparable principles, primary matter and substantial form (q. v.), the latter being the principle of unity and activity. Moreover, to admit the essential activity of matter does not necessarily imply that matter is nothing but activity. And if matter does not manifest itself to the senses except through forces and energies, it does not follow that it is not the necessary subject and carrier of these forces. In order to establish dynamism, it is not sufficient to overthrow materialism. If there is no matter, it is difficult to understand the forces them- selves; for then, what is attracted? what moves, ro- tates, vibrates, etc.? Do not forces require a subject? It is clear that simple elements cannot give real exten- sion. Can they even explain the phenomenon itself of extension, when not only physical bodies but the or- ganism itself and the sense-organs are denied real extension? The facts and nature of radio-activity are not as yet sufficiently explored to furnish a safe basis for a definite theory of matter. Further, the necessity of admitting an actio in distans is also considered as an objection against some forms at least of dynamism.

Dynamism is opposed to the objective dualism of matter and energy, and also to mechanical material- ism, according to which, matter, endowed with exten- sion, is of itself an inert and indifferent vehicle of mo- tion. It is not opposed to atomism in general, but only to some forms of it. Some dynamists, like Kant, admit the continuity of the forces constituting matter, but the majority admit centres or atoms of forces acting on one another. Atomism, therefore, is either material or dynamic, and dynamism may admit atomism or continuity. How far even dynamism is irreconcil- able with hylomorphism (q. v.) in its most general meaning, it is difficult to determine. Leibniz speaks of primary matter and of substantial form, or ente- lechy. And the common elements of all things must be conceived as being only in polinlid with regard to the actual diverse substances which they constitute. Again, the dynamic elements may be purely physical, or, as with Leibniz, they may have, in various degrees, a psychical nature, thus implying a sort of panpsy- chism. Leibniz also considers them as essentially dif- ferent; commonly they are considered as identical in nature. Dynamism in general may be adapted to ami modified by such philosophical systems as determin- ism or freedom, substantialism or phenomenalism, idealism or realism, monism or theism, etc. In itself, it is not inconsistent with any essential Catholic doctrine.

In conclusion, it may be interesting to note the con- trast between the modern and the Aristotelean ter- minology. Aristotle's dvvaius and ivtpyaa (see Actus ET Potentia) are essentially opposed. To-day, they have come to be almost sjiionymous, and energetism is one of the dynamic views of matter.

Leibniz, CEuvres philosophiques {Paris, 1867), especially Mona- dologie; Principes de la nature et de la grAce; Syst^me nouveau de la nature; Thiodicie; Nouveaux essais sur V eyitendement; Wolff, Cosmologia generalis (new ed. Frankfort and Leipzig, 1737). especially sees. 176 sqq., 221 sqq.; Bosco\ich, Theoria philQsophi<s naiuralia (Venice, 1763); Kant, Werke (Berlin, 1902), especially Mpnadologia physica, I. 473 and Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwi&senschaft, IV, 465; Faraday, £l- perimental Researches in Electricity (London, 1839—1855), espe- cially Thoughts on Ray-vibrations, III, 448 and .4 Speculation touching Electric Conduction and the Nature of Matter, Ih 284, both reprinted from Philosophical Magazine, XXIV, XXVIII; OaTWALD, Vorlesungen iiber Naturphilosophie (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1902): Mabilleau, Hist, de la phil. atomistique (Paris, 1895); Nys, Cosmologie (2nd ed. Louvain. 1906). Cf. also histories of philosophy, works on radio-activity by Curie, Rutherford, Lodge. Thomson, Le Bon, etc. and the less technical presenta- tion of Duncan, The New Knowledge (New York, 1906) and Jones. The Electrical Nature of Matter and Radio-activity (New York, 1906): Eisler, WOrterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (2nd ed. Berlin, 1904), s. v. Monade, Materie, etc.

C. A. DUBRAY.

Dysibod. See Disibod, Saint.