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a mere conception of the mind ; it cannot exist by it- self, it receives its existence in and with the individ- ual ; in and with the individual it is multiplied, in and with the individual it loses again its existence. Even God cannot separate in man the universal nature from the individuality, or in the human soul the intellectual from the sensitive part, without destroying the whole. In reality there are only individuals, in which, how- ever, we can by abstraction formally separate both the abstract human nature from the individuality and the several faculties from one another. But the separa- tion and distinction and formation of genera and spe- cies are mere processes of thought, the work of the contemplating mind.

The psychology of Scotus is in its essentials the same as that of St. Thomas. The starting-point of all knowledge is the sensory or outer experience, to which must be added the inner experience, which he desig- nates as the ultimate criterion of certitude. He lays stress on induction as the basis of all natural sciences. He denies that sense-perception, and a fortiori intel- lectual knowledge, is merely a passive process; more- over, he asserts that not only the universal but also the individual is perceived directly. The adequate object of intellectual knowledge is not the spiritual in the material, but being in its universality. In the whole realm of the soul the will has the primacy since it can determine itself, while it controls more or less completely the other faculties. The freedom of the will, taken as freedom of choice, is emphasized and vigorously defended. In presence of any good, even in the contemplation of God, the will is not necessitated, but determines itself freely. This doctrine does not imply that the will can decide what is true and what is false, what is right and what is wrong, nor that its choice is blind and arbitrary. Objects, motives, habits, passions, etc. exert a great influence upon the will, and incline it to choose one thing rather than another. Yet the final decision remains with the will, and in so far the will is the one complete cause of its act, else it would not be free. With regard to memory, sensa- tion, and association we find in Scotus many modern views.

System of Theology. — It has been asserted that according to Scotus the essence of God consists in His will; but the assertion is unfounded. God, he holds, is the ens infinitum. It is true that according to him God's love for Himself and the spiration of the Holy Gho.st by Father and Son are not based upon a natural instinct, so to say, but upon God's own free choice. Every will is free, and therefore God's will also. But His will is so perfect and His essence so infinitely good, that His free will cannot but love it. This love, there- fore, is at once free and necessary. Also with regard to created things Scotus emphasizes the freedom of God, without, however, falling into the error of merely arbitrary, unmotived indeterminism. It has been asserted, too, that according to Scotus, being can be attributed univocally to God and creatures ; but this again is false. Scotus maintains that God is the ens per essentiam, creatures are entia per participationem — they have being only in an analogical sense. But from the being of God and the being of creatures, a universal idea of being can be abstracted and predi- cated univocally of both the finite and the infinite; otherwise we could not infer from the existence of finite things the existence of God, we should have no proof of (iod's existence, as every syllogism would con- tain a qxinternio lerminorum. Between God's essence and His attributes, between the attributes themselves, and then between God's essence and the Divine Per- sons, there is a formal distinction along with real identity. For conceptually Divinity is not the same .IS wisdom, intellect not the same as will; Divinity is not identical with paternity, since Divinity neither begets, as docs the Father, nor is begotten, as is the Son. But all these realities are formally in God and

their distinction is not annulled by His infinity; on the other hand it remains true that God is only one res. The process constituting the Blessed Trinity takes place without regard to the external world. Only after its completion the three Divine Persons, as one principle, produce by their act of cognition the ideas of things. But quite apart from this process, God is independent of the world in His knowledge and volition, for the obvious reason that dependence of any sort would imply imperfection.

The cognition, volition, and activity of the angels is more akin to oiu"s. The angels can of themselves know things; they do not need an infused species, though in fact they receive such from God. The devil is not necessarily compelled, as a result of his sin, always to will what is evil ; with his splendid natural endowments he can do what in itself is good; he can even love God above all things, though in fact he does not do so. .Sin is only in so far an infinite offence of God as it leads away from Him; in itself its malice is no greater than is the goodness of the opposite virtue.

In his C'hristologj', Scotus insists strongly on the reality of Christ's Humanity. Though it has no per- sonality and no subsistence of its own, it has its own existence. The unio hypostalica and the communica- tio idiomatum are explained in accordance with the doctrine of the Church, with no leaning to either Nes- torianism or Adoptionism. It is true that Scotus ex- plains the influence of the hypostatic union upon the human nature of Christ and upon His work differently from St. Thomas. Since this union in no way changes the human nature of Christ, it does not of itself impart to the Humanity the beatific vision or impeccability. These prerogatives were given to Christ with the fullness of grace which He received in consequence of that union. God would have become man even if Adam had not sinned, since He willed that in Christ human- ity and the world should be united with Himself by the closest possible bond. Scotus also defends ener- getically the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. All objections founded on original sin and the universal need of redemption are solved. The merits of Christ are infinite only in a broader sense, but of themselves they are entirely sufficient to give adequate satisfaction to the Divine justice; there is no deficiency to be supplied by God's mercy. But there is needed a merciful acceptation of the work of Christ, since in the sight of God there is no real merit in the strictest sense of the word.

Grace is something entirely supernatural and can be given only by God, and, what is more, only by a crea- tive act; hence the sacraments are not, properly speaking, the physical or instrumental cause of grace, because God alone can create. Sanctifying grace is identical with the infused virtue of charity, and has its seat in the will ; it is therefore conceived rather from the ethical standpoint. The sacraments give grace of themselves, orexopereoperato, if man places no obstacle in the way. The real essence of the Sacrament of Pen- ance consists in the absolution; but this is of no avail unless the sinner repent with a sorrow that springs from love of God; his doctrine of attrition is by no means lax. As to his eschatology it must suffice to state that he makes the essence of beatitude consist in activity, i. e. in the love of God, not in the Beatific Vision; this latter is only the necessary condition.

In ethics Scotus declares emphatically that the mor- ality of an act requires an object which is good in its nature, its end, and its circumstances, and according to the dictate of right reason. Itisnot true that he makes Gf)d's free will decide arbitrarily what is good and what is bad; he only asserts that the Commandments of the second table of the Decalogue are not in such strict sense laws of nature as are those of the first table; because God cannot grant a dispensation from the laws of the first, whereas He can dispense from those of the second, as in fact He did when He conj-