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DOUGLAS

Pastor, "History of the Popes", chapters on the Re- naissance.) It helped to prepare the way, however, for the Reformation, which, beginning with a revolt against ecclesiastical authority, called all the doctrines of Christianity in question, rejecting those which failed to gain the approval of the different leaders of the movement. Thus among Protestants in general there is great variety of opinion on religious doctrines, those which are firmly held by some being considered doubt- ful by others, and by others again, rejected as false. Anglicanism, especially, leaves open many of the tenets which the Catholic Church holds as of faith, and thus endeavours to comprehend within its boundaries persons who differ widely from one another on impor- tant subjects. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, pronounces authoritatively as to the truth or falsehood of opinions, by means of general councils, professions of faith, infallible decisions of the supreme pontiff, and the ordinary teaching of her pastors. As St. Avitus, in the sixth century, declared, "it is the law of the councils that if any doubt have arisen in matters which regard the state of the Church, we are to have recourse to the chief priest of the Roman Church" (Ep. xxxvi in P. L., LIX, 253). Doubt as to the Faith is thus impossible in the Catholic Church without infringing the principle of authority on which the Church itself depends. The field, however, which is open to a variety of opinions on questions not directly involving the essential doctrines of the Faith is still a very wide one ; and though its extent may be further limited by future dogmatic decisions, it is probable on the other hand that it will be increased in the future, as in the past, by the emergence of doubtful que.stions as to the exact bearing of dog- matic truth upon fresh discoveries or theories of all kinds.

It will be evident from what has been said that doubt cannot coexist either with faith or knowledge in regard to any given subject; faith and doubt are mutually exclusive, and knowledge which is limited by a doubt, becomes, in regard to the subject or part of a subject to which the doubt applies, no longer knowl- edge but opinion. A moral certainty — that is, one which is founded on the normal course of human action — does not strictly exclude doubt, but, as ex- cluding prudent doubt, must be considered a sufficient practical guide (cf. Butler, ".^alogy of Religion", introduction, and pt. II, ch. vi). Thus doubt is some- times said to imply belief; though such beUef or prac- tical certainty cannot properly be held to rise above the most proljable kind of opinion. The rhetorical conception of the faith that "lives in honest doubt" (Tennyson, In Memoriam) must be taken to signify that truthful and serious habit of mind which refu.ses to submit to deception on motives furnished by intel- lectual sloth or the desire of worldly advantage. Catholic philosophy is entirely opposed both to the Pyrrhonist doubt of external reality and to that form of Idealism which is closely connected with the Kan- tian method on its sceptical side, and which seeks to reduce all dogma to the mere expression of subjective religious conceptions, relegating the objective facts with which dogma is concerned to the domain of sym- bol and parable. In the view of the Scholastic system, human experience is a true perception of ex- ternal reality through the senses and the intellect; phenomena being the object both of the senses, which they directly affect, and, after a different manner, of the' intellect, which apprehends through sensible im- pressions the true nature and principles of the reality which causes those impressions. The facts of revela- tion to which the Church bears witness are in this sense real and objective, and may neither be explained away nor set aside by any system of historical or scientific criticism. Such is the purport of the En- cyclical "Pascendi Dominici gregis" (1907), which both controverts and condemns the attempt to evac-

uate dogma of its true significance made by the method of religious speculation known as Modernism.

PR.\CTic.^i Doubt, or doubt as to the lawfulness of an action is, according to the teaching of moral theology, incompatible T\'ith right action; since to act with a doubtful conscience is obviously to act in disregard of the moral law. To act with a doubtful conscience is, therefore, sinful; and the doubt must be removed before any action can be justified. It frequently happens, however, that the solution of a practical doubt is not attainable, while some decision is neces- sarj'. In such cases the conscience may obtain a "reflexive" certainty by adopting an approved opin- ion as to the lawfulness of the action contemplated, apart from the intrinsic merits of the question. The question has been much discussed among different schools of theologians whether the opinion so followed must be of greatly preponderating authority in favour of liberty in order to justify an action the lawfulness of which appears intrinsically doubtful, whether it must be merely more probable than the contrary one, or equally probable, or merely probable in itself, even though less so than its contrary. (See Moral Thbol,- ogt; Probabilism.) The last, however, is the the- ory now generally accepted for all practical purposes; and the principle that lex dubia non obligat — i. e. that a law which is doubtful in its application to the case in hand does not bind — is universally admitted. It must be ob.served, however, that where the question is one not merely of positive law but of securing a cer- tain practical result, only the "safer" course may be followed. Xo opinion, however probable, is allowed to take precedence of the most certain means of secur- ing such ends; e. g. in providing for the validity of the sacraments, in discharging obligations of justice, or in avoiding injury to others. Thus doubtful baptisms and ordinations must be repeated conditionally. (See Agnosticism; Certitude; Episte.mology; Faith; Heresy; Inf.u.libilitt; Sckpticis.vi.)

For doubt in ancient philosophy see Zelleb. Phil, der Griechm (Tubingen. 1S55-62); Idem. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, tr. Reichel (London, 1868); Ueberweg. History of Philosophy, tr. Morris (New York, 1872). For doubt in Scholastic philosophy and moral theology: Reinstadler, Ele- menta Philosophic Scholasticm (Freiburg, 1904); Lehmkdhl, Theol. Mar. (Freiburg. 1903). General: Nicholas of Cusa, De Docid Iffnoranlia and De Conjecturis in Opera (Basle, 15G5; Ger. tr., Fieiburg, 1871); Bacon, Novum Organum; Hobbes, Leviathan: Hume, Human Understanding and Essays; Mon- taigne, Essais (Paris, 1580; tr. London, 1603 and 1906); Descartes, Prindpia Phil. (Amsterdam, 1644); Male- BRANCHE, Recherche-s de la verite (Paris. 1837); Pascal, Pen- srcs; Bayle, iDtW. Hisl.et Crit. (Rotterdam, 1697; tr. London, 1738); Kant, Kritik der reirum Vemunft and Kritik der prak- lischen Vemunft (tr. London, 1844-8); Glanvill, Scepsis Sci- entifica (London, 1665); Lamenn.us. Essai sur V indifference en matiere de Religion (Paris. 1827); Victor Cocsin, Fragments Philosophiques (Brussels. 1840); Hamilton, Lectures on Meta- physics (Edinburgh. 1871), v; Newman, Grammar of AssctU (London. 1870); Balfodr, Defence of Philosophic Doubt (Lon- don, 1879); HcxLET, Lectures and Essays (1902); Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology, etc. (1904); James. Pragmatism (1907); Schiller. Humanism (1903); Idem. Studies in Humanism (1907); Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory (1904); Diderot AND d'.^lembert, Encyctopcdie (1755), s. v. Doute; Blunt (.Anglican ). Diet, of Theol., s. v. Doubt: Krug, Enc>/clopadisch- philosophisches Lexikon (Leipzig, 1834), s. v. Zweiiel.

A. B. Sharpe.

Douglas, Gavin, Scottish prelate and poet, b. about 1474; d. 1522;he was the third son of Archibald, Fifth Earl of Angus, known as " Bell-the-Cat". Edu- cated for the Church at the universities of St. An- drews and Paris, he held for some years a benefice in East Lothian, and during this period composed most of the poetical works which have made his name fa- mous. In 1501 he became provost of the collegiate church of St. Giles, Edinburgh, and subsequently, through the influence of Queen Margaret, who had married his nephew, the young Earl of Angus, he obtained the abbacy of Arbroath and later the Bishopric of Dunkeld. The queen's efforts to have him promoted to the primacy were unsuccessful ; and when the popular indignation at her marriage with