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 DETRACTION

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DETRACTION

been stigmatized by some of its opponents as the the- ory of ''causeless volition", or "motiveless choice"; and the name, Intlefcrminism, is possibly not the best selection to meet the imputation. The oljjection is, however, not justified. The Aiiti-determinists, while denying that the act of choice Ls always merely the resultant of the assemblage of motives plajnng on the mind, teach positively that the Ego, or Self, is the cause of our volitions; and they describe it as a "free" or "self-determining" cause. The presence of some reason or motive, they ordinarily hold, is a neces- sary condition for every act of free choice, but they in- sist that the Ego can decide between motives. Choice is not, they maintain, uniformly determined by the pleasantest or the worthiest motive or collection of motives. Nor is it the inevitable consecjuent of the strongest motive, except in that tautological sense in which the word strongest simply signifies that motive which as a matter of fact prevails. Determinism and the denial of free will seem to be a logical consequence of all monistic hypotlieses. They are obviously in- volved in all materialistic theories. For Materialisnx of every type ncci'ss:irily holds that every incident in the historj' of the universe is the inevitable outcome of the mechanical and physical movements and changes which have gone before. But Determinism seems to be an equally necessary consequence of monistic Idealism. Indeed the main argument against all monist ic and pantheistic systems will always be the fact of free will. Self-determination implies separateness of intiividuality and independence in each free agent, and thus entails a pluralistic concep- tion of the universe. (See Dualism; Moni.sm.) In spite of the assertions of Determinists, no true logical distinction can be made between their \new and that of Fatalism. In both systems each of my volitions is as inexorably fated, or pre-determined, in the past conditions of the universe as the movements of the planets or the tides. The opponents of Determini.sm usually insist on two lines of argument, the one based on the consciousness of freedom in the act of deliber- ate choice, the other on the incompatibility of Deter- minism with our fmnlamental moral convictions. The notions of responsibility, moral obligation, merit, and the like, as ordinarily understood, would be illusorj- if Determinism were true. The theory is in fact fatal to ethics, as well as to the notion of sin and the fimdamental Christian belief that we can merit both reward and punishment. (See Free Will; Ethics; Fatalis.m.)

RiCKABv, Fne Will (London, 1906); Waro, Philoxophy of Theism (London, 1SS4): Jamks. Priiu-iples of Psiieholon (New York and London, 1901), II, 569-79; Maheh, rsychotogy (New York and Ix)ndon, 190S), .\dx; Noel, La consciena: du libre arhitre (Louvain, 1S99).

Michael Maker.

Detraction (from Lat. detrahere, to take away) is the unjust damaging of another's good name by the revelation of some fault or crime of which that other Ls n-ally guilty or at any rate is s(>riously believed to be guilty by the defamer. An important difference be- tween detraction and calumny is at once apparent. The calumniator says what he knows to be false, whilst the detractor narrates what he at least honestly thinks is true. Detraction in a general sense is a mor- tal sin, as being a violation of the \'irtue not only of charity but also of justice. It is obvious, however, that the subject-matter of the accusation may be so incon.spicuous or, everything considered, so little capable of doing serious hurt that the guilt is not .a.s- sumed to be more than venial. The same judgment is to be given when, as not unfrequently happens, there has been little or no advertence to the harm that is being done.

The determination of the degree of sinfulness of de- traction is in general to be gathered from the consid- eration of the amount of harm the defamatory utter-

ance is calculated to work. In order to adequately measure the seriousness of the damage wrought, due regard must be had not only to the imputation itself but also to the character of the person by whom and against whom the charge is made. That is, we must take into account not only the greater or le.sser crim- inality of the thing alleged but also the more or less distinguished reputation of the detractor for trust- worthiness, as well as the more or less nnt;il,lc ilJLjiiity or estimation of the person whose good hmhic Iims l.ccn assailed. Thus it is conceivable that a rila(l\ely smimI! defect alleged against a person of eminent .station, such as a bishop, might seriously tarnish his good name and be a mortal sin, whilst an offence of consid- erable magnitude attributed to an individual of a class in which such things frequently happen miglit consti- tute only a venial sin, such as, for instance, to say that a common sailor had been drunk. It is worthy of note that the manifestation of even inculpable de- fects may be a real defamation, such as to charge a person with gross ignorance, etc. When this is done in such circumstances as to bring upon the person so disparaged a more than onlinary measure of di.sgrace, or perhaps seriously prejudice him, the sin may even be a grievous one.

There are times, nevertheless, when one may law- fully make known the offence of another even though as a consequence the trust hitherto reposed in him be rudely shaken or shattered. If a person's misdoing is public in the sense that sentence has been pas.sed by the competent legal tribunal or that it is already no- torious, for instance, in a city, tlwii in the first case it may licitly be referred to in any place; in the second, within the limits of the town, or even elsewhere, unless in either instance the offender in the lapse of time should have entirely reformed or his delinquency been quite forgotten. When, however, knowledge of the happening is possessed only by the members of a par- ticular community or society, such as a college or monastery and the like, it would not be lawful to pub- lish the fact to others than those belonging to such a body. Finally, even when the sin Ls in no sense pub- lic, it may still be divulged without contravening the virtues of justice or charity whenever such a course is for the common weal or is estecnuHl to make for the good of the narrator, of his list<iii'rs, or even of the culprit. The right which tlie latter has to an assumed good name is extinguished in the j)resence of the bene- fit which may be conferred in this way.

The employment of this teaching, however, is lim- ited by a twofold restriction. (1) The damage which one may soberly apprehend as emerging from the failure to reveal another's sin or vicious propensity must be a notable one as contrasted with the evil of defamation. (2) No more in the way of exposure should be done than is reriuired, and even a fraternal admonition ought rather to be substituted if it can be discerned to ade(iuately meet the needs of the situ.a- tion. Journalists are entirely within their rights in inveighing against the official shortromings of public men. Likewise, they m.ay lawfully present whatever information about the life or character of a candidate for public office is necessary to sliow his unfitness for the .station lu' seeks. Hi.storians have a still greater latitude in the performance of their task. This is not of course because the dead have lost their claim to have their good name respected. ULstory nuist be something more th.an a mere calendar of dates and in- cidents; the causes ami connexion of events are a proper part of its province. This consideration, as well as that of the general utility in elevating and strengthening the public conscience, may justify the historian in telling many things hitherto unknown which are to the disgrace of those of whom they are related.

Those who abet another's defamation in a matter of moment by directly or indirectly inciting or encour-