Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 4.djvu/756

 DEFINITOR

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DEFINITOR

authority in the Church decides a question appertain- ing to faith or morals, and which binds the whole Church. From this explanation it will be seen that four conditions are required for a theological defini- tion.

(1) // must be a decision by the supreme teaching au- thority in the Church. — There are two organs of su- preme doctrinal authority, viz.: the pope, speaking in his official capacity of pastor and teacher of all Chris- tians, and the bishops of the Catholic Church dis- persed throughout the world or assembled in a general council. The pope, as successor of St. Peter, has de- finitive authority, in the exercise of which he speaks neither as a private individual, nor as a mere theolo- gian, nor as Bishop of the Diocese of Rome, nor as Metropolitan of the Roman Province, nor as Primate of Italy, nor as Patriarch of the Western Church, nor as head of any Roman Congregation, but as supreme pastor of the whole Church. The bishops of the Cath- olic Church assembled with the pope in a general coim- cil have the same doctrinal authority with which the pope is endowed; and so have the bishops dispersed throughout the Catholic world when, in conjunction with the pope, they teach a doctrine of faith or morals to be irrevocably held by all Christians. These two supreme teaching authorities are the organs of active infallibility from which alone a theological definition can proceed.

(2) The decision must concern a doctrine of faith or morals. — Faith means the speculative doctrines of revelation; morals, the practical doctrines of revela- tion. Faith is what we have to believe, morals what we have to do, in order to obtain eternal life. Both faith and morals are parts of the deposit which Christ left for the guidance of His Church ; so far as the obli- gation of assent is concerned, there is no difference be- tween them; the distinction is made for the sake of convenience rather than for the sake of any substan- tial difference between them so far as they are the ob- jects of active infallibility. Doctrines of faith or morals which are formally revealed are called the di- rect object of infallibility, while doctrines which are only virtually revealed, or are only intimately con- nected with revelation, such as dogmatic or moral facts, are called the indirect object of infallibility. The Church has authority to issue definitions in con- nexion with both the direct and the indirect objects of active infallibility. It is not, however, de fide that the Church has infallible authority over the indirect doc- trines of faith and morals, though it cannot be denied without theological censure.

(3) The decision must bind the Universal Church. — Decrees which bind only a part of the Church are not definitions ; but only those which command the assent of all the faithful. It is not, however, absolutely necessary that the decree should be directly sent or ad- dressed to the whole Church ; it is quite sufficient if it is made clear that the supreme teaching authority means to bind the Universal Church. Thus, St. Leo addressed his famous dogmatic definition to Flavian, yet it was rightly considered as binding the Universal Church; and Pope Innocent sent his decree to the African Church alone, yet St. Augustine exclaimed: Causa finita est, utinam aliquando finiatur error! (Serra. ii, de Verb. Ap., c. vii).

(4) The decision must be irrevocable or, as it is called, definitive. — Arguments contained in conciliar defini- tions are proposed by the supreme teaching authority in the Church, they concern faith and morals, and they bind the Universal Church; yet they are not defini- tions, because they lack this fourth condition — they are not definitively proposed for the assent of the whole Church. Two things are implied by the state- ment that a decree, to be a definition, must be final and irrevocable. The decree must be the last word of su- preme teaching authority ; there must be no possibil- ity of re-opening the question in a spirit of doubt; the

decree must settle the matter for ever. The decree must also, and in consequence of its final nature, bind the whole Church to an irrevocable internal assent. This assent is at least an assent of ecclesiastical faith ; and in doctrines which are formally revealed it is also an assent of Divine faith. When the definition com- mands an irrevocable assent of Divine faith as well as of ecclesiastical faith, the defined dogma is said to be de fide in the technical sense of this phrase. It is well to note that the definitive nature of a decree does not prevent the defined doctrine from being examined anew and defined again by the pope or a general coun- cil ; what it excludes is a re-opening of the question in a spirit of doubt about the truth of the doctrine which has been already definitively settled.

It has been sometimes said that it is impossible to know whether or not a theological definition has been issued; but very few words are needed to show that the assertion is without foundation. At times, doubt will remain about the definitive nature of a decree, but as a rule no possibility of doubt is consistent with the terminology of a definitive decree. Thus in the doc- trinal teaching of a general council, anathema attached to condemned errors is a certain sign of an infallible definition. Words also like those in which Pius IX .solemnly defined the doctrine of the Immaculate Con- ception of the Blessed Virgin give irrefutable proof of the definitive nature of the decree: " By the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ and of the Blessed Apostles Peterand Paul, and by Our own authority, We declare, pronounce and define the doctrine ... to be revealed by God and as such to be firmly and immutably held by all the faithful." No set form of words is necessary; any form which clearly indicates that the four requisite conditions are present suffices to show that the decree is a definition in the strict sense. It should be noted that not everything contained in a definition is infal- libly defined. Thus, arguments from Scripture, tradi- tion, or theological reason, do not come under the ex- ercise of definitive authority. Incidental statements, called obiter dicta, are also examples of non-definitive utterances. Only the doctrine itself, to which those arguments lead and which these obiter dicta illustrate, is to be considered as infallibly defined. (See Infal- libility; Censures, Theological; Dogmatic Facts ; Be.\tification and Canonization ; Faith.)

Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology (New York, 1896), I; WiLHELM AND ScANNELL, A Manual of Catholic Theology (New York, 1898), I; Denzinger, Enchiridion (Freiburg, 1899).

J. M. Harty.

Definitor (in Canon Law), an official in secular deaneries and in certain religious orders. Among regulars, a definitor is appointed as a counsellor of the provincial or general superior with certain determinate powers. (See Definitors in Religious Orders.) Dioceses are usually divided into deaneries, and these deaneries are again sub-divided into districts which are sometimes called definitiones. Over each district is placed an official styled definitor, who oversees the administration of ecclesiastical property and also gives aid to the dean in the more important duties of his office. Such definitors are elected by the rural chapters with the bishop's approval, or in some cases are directly appointed by the ordinary. Anciently, their principal duty was to care for and divide the revenues of a prebend between the heirs of the de- ceased and the new occupant, and likewise to deter- mine what proportion of income belonged to outgoing and incoming beneficiaries of a church. The definitor acts as the representative of the dean when the latter is absent or incapacitated by illness or irregularity. It is his duty to announce to the bishop, likewise, the death of the dean and conduct preparations for the election of a successor. It is to be observed that definitors are in no sense necessary officials of a dio- cese, and that the duties here assigned to them are

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