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 CRITICISM

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CRITICISM

might learn to be more cautious by recalling a series of curious historical facts. It is enough to remind our readers that when St. Augustine was created auxiliary Bishop of Hippo (391) he did not know, on his own avowal, that the sixth canon of the Council of Nice (325) forbade any consecration of this kind.

Conjecture in Hlstory. — Conjecture or hypothe- sis occurs in history when the study of documents leads us to suspect, beyond the facts which they directly re- veal, other facts, so closely related to them that from a knowledge of the former we may proceed to that of the latter. Such facts are most f req uent ly related as cause and effect. Let an important event happen. How shall we explain it? How was it brought about? Evi- dently by another fact or a group of other facts which constitute its cause or sufficient reason. These new facts are revealed in no historical documents, or at least no one has hitherto perceived them. At once the investigator sees that here it is possible to discover more than is known from the extant documents. With this hope he begins to read extensively, to set afoot various researches, to interrogate in every sense a great many works and all the monuments relating to the fact with which he has been keenly impressed, to study the per- sons concerned in it, or the age in which it took place; all this in order to recover the often almost invisible thread which connects this fact with details that were originally unnoticed or set aside as unimportant. Ab- sorbed in intense meditation, sometimes made needless through a sudden illuminating insight which reveals at once the right path, he seeks with earnestness the truth that the positive evidence before him still withholds; he passes from one hypothesis to another; he calls to his aid all the treasures of his memory ; thus reinforced he turns again to the study of the documents, and col- lects with minut« care every hint or indication that may avail to demonstrate their accuracy or falsity. From such close verification it sometimes appears that the path first struck out was misleading and must be abandoned ; often the investigator is led by this hard toil to modify more or less his original ideas; on the other hand, he sometimes meets with striking confir- mation of them. Feeble rays which seemed at first quite uncertain grow in power and number until they seem a torch that pours a flood of light before which all uncertainty must vanish. In this way, also, many new aspects are revealed to the enraptured eyes of the investigator and make known to him a vast field of knowledge of the highest interest.

As already stated conjecture enables us to conclude from effect to cause, but it may also follow an inverse method and help us to conclude from cause to effect. This process, however, is generally less reliable in his- torical research, and calls for more caution and reserve than when it is applied to physical facts. In the latter case the agents are necessary causes ; once their mode of operation is known it is possible to predict with almost absolute certainty their results in given condi- tions, and conjecture avails us merely to arouse the idea of an effect certain to follow, but which we have not yet seen produced. Moreover, generally speak- ing, in the physical sciences it is easy to imagine a variety of methods by which an hypothesis may be tried and its accuracy verified. In historical science the situation is not quite the same. It deals largely with the moral laws that regulate the actions of free beings, and these are far from being as invariable in their application as physical laws. Much caution is therefore requisite before risking any judgment as to what a man must have done in given circumstances, all the more as his acts may have been influeticed by the free acts of others, or l)y a number of accidental circumstances now unknown to us, but which may have notably modified in a given case the ideas and ordinary sentiments of the person in question. Pru- dence is not less necessary when the hypothesis is principally based on analogy; i. e, when, to complete

our knowledge concerning a fact, certain details of which are not known to us from historical documents, we have recourse to another fact strikingly similar to the one under consideration and conclude thence, in favour of the first, to a sLmilarity of details that are known to us with certainty only in respect of the sec- ond fact. Nevertheless we must not reject absolutely this method of investigation ; skilfully treated it may render valuable service. A conjecture appeals to the mind all the more convincingly when it solves at once a number of problems hitherto obscure and lacking correlation. Frequently enough, a given hypothesis, taken separately, yields only slight probability. On the other hand, full certitude often results from the mora! convergence of several plausible solutions, all of which point in the same direction. Let it be added that in historical research we shall not easily obtain too many hints nor exceed the limit in verification; also that we must be ever watchful against our own preconceptions that easily tempt us to exaggerate the strength of a conclusion favourable to our hypothesis. Nor must we refuse to consider the arguments that tend to weaken or eliminate the latter. On the con- trary, it is precisely these arguments that we must study with most care and sift in every sense so that, given their truth, we may abandon opportunely our too seductive conjecture, or at least modify it, again and again if needful, until eventually it acquire such accuracy and precision as to satisfy the most exacting, and be admitted by all as a scientific acquisition both new and solid. A final recommendation, meant to forewarn against the seductions of historical conjec- ture certain adventurous and inexperienced writers, will not be out of place here. Let them not yield to an illusion only too common among their kind, namely that by their imaginative power and their genius they are destined to advance notably the cause of historical science without acquiring by hard and painful school- ing that large and varied and accurate knowledge which men call erudition. Not every learned historian makes brilliant discoveries on the basis of lucky hypoth- eses; but learning is generally requisite for such dis- coveries. In historical scholarship, as in all other walks of life, toil and patience are the usual price of sucfcess. The a Priori Argument. — Historical criticism has at its disposition one other source of truth, the a priori argument, a delicate weapon, indeed, but very useful when confided to a well-trained hand. As used in his- tory, this argument is based on the intrinsic nature of a fact, leaving aside for the time being all evidence for or against it. In presence of the fact thus bared of all extrinsic relations the a priori process undertakes to show that it does or does not conform to the general laws which regulate the world. These laws fall into three principal classes. The first comprises funda- mental or metaphysical laws, e. g. the principle of con- tradiction, according to which there cannot co-exist in the same subject elements absolutely contradictory of one another, also the principle of causality, accord- ing to which no being exists without a cause or suffi- cient reason for its existence. The second class in- cludes physical laws which govern the phenomena of the world of nature and the activity of the beings which compose it. To this class also belong the laws which govern spiritual natures and faculties that are independent, or in as far as they are independent, of the action of free will. The third class, finally, com- prises the moral laws that govern the activity of free beings, considered as such. No one who has acquired, under good guidance, a little experience of the human heart. \\'ill deny tlie existence of this cla,ss of laws, i. e. that in given conditions and under certain influences we can forecast in free beings certain habitual activi- ties. Thus, one well-ascertained moral law is that no man will love and follow evil for itself, save only when it appears to him in the guise of good; another such law is that a man, unless he be a monster of perversity,