Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 4.djvu/565

 CRITICISM

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CRITICISM

The scholar who enters conscientiously upon the work of critic will always feel it a strict duty to warn his T'lilors whenever he quotes a text from a translation.

I I IS well known that to interpret a term correctly it is

III I I'nough to know its meaning at a particular epoch, wliuh wc are accustomed to regard as classic, in the I I nonage to which it belongs. We need only open any 1 fiLie Latin lexicon, e. g. Forcellini's or Freund's (es- [Hcially if we keep in view the corresponding page of !::•• Latin "Glossarium" of Du Cange), to appreciate
 * ii once the very remarkable modifications of meaning

iiiicicrgone by Latin terms in different periods of the l:uii;uage, eitherfrom the substitution of new meanings f' r older ones or by the concurrent use of both old and I ■ \v. In his efforts to fix the age of a text the critic v. M. therefore, be occasionally obliged to exclude a nicauing that had not yet arisen, or had ceased to be in u-'- when the te.xt in question was composed; some- times he will be left in a condition of uncertainty or suspense, and obliged to abstain from conclusions
 * ii;neable enough but unsafe. Again, in order to

i;i;i.s[i correctly the sense of a text it becomes necessary ' ' understand the political or religious opinions of the

I ithor, the peculiar institutions of his age and country, I ■ general character of his style, the matters which he til ats, and the circumstances under which he speaks. Tliese things considered a general expression may take on quite a particular sense which it would be disas- trous for the critic to overlook. Often these details can only be understood from the context of the pas- sage under discussion. In general, whenever there is occ:ision to verify the exactness of a quotation made in support of a thesis, it is prudent to read the entire chapter whence it is taken, sometimes even to read the whole work. An individual testimony, isolated from all its surroundings in an author's work, seems often quite decisive, yet when we read the work itself our faith in the value of the argument based on such par- tial quotation is either very much shaken or else dis- appears entirely.

Authoritt/. — What is now the value of a text rightly understood? Every historical statement or testimony naturally suggests two questions: Has the witness in question a proper knowledge of the fact concerning which he is called to testify? And if so, is he altogether sincere in his deposition? On an impartial answer to these questions depends the degree of confidence to be accorded to his testimony.

Concerning the knowledge of the witness we may a.sk: Did he live at the time when, and in the place where, the fact occurred, and was he so circumstanced that he couki know it? Or, at least, are we sure that he obt;unetl his information from a good source? The more guarantees he gives in this respect the more, all else being ecjual, does he prove himself trustworthy. As to the question of sincerity it is not enough to be satisfied that the witness did not wish to utter a delib- erate lie ; if it could be reasonalily shown that he had a personal interest in warping the truth, grave suspi- cions would be raised .as to the veracity of all his state- ments. Cases of fomial and wilful mendacity in his- torical sources may be regarded as rare. Much more frequently prejudice or passion secretly pervert the natural sincerity of a man who really respects himself and esteems the respect of others. It is possible, and that with a certain good faith, to deceive both one's self and others. It is the duty of the critic to enumer- ate and weigh all the influences which may have altered more or less the sincerity of a witness — persf)nal likes or dislikes, social or oratorical proprieties, self-esteem or vanity, as well as the influences which may affect the clearness of a writer's memory or the uprightness of his will. It by no means follows that the authority of a witness is always weakened by the process de- scribed above; often quite the contrary happens. When a witness has overcome influences that usually powerfully affect a man's mind and dissuade him from

yielding to the natural love of truth, there is no longer any reason to doubt his veracity. Moreover, when he asserts a fact unfavourable to the religious or political cause which he otherwise defends with ardour; when he thus gains no particular advantage, but on the con- trary subjects himself to serious disadvantage; in a word, whenever his statements or avowals are in mani- fest opposition to his interests, his prejudices, and his inclinations, it is clear that his evidence is far weightier than that of a perfectly disinterested man. Again, the preceding considerations apply not only to the im- mediate witnesses of the fact in question, but also to all the intermediaries through whom their evidence is transmitted to us. The trustworthiness of the latter must be established as well as that of the authorities to which they appeal.

Given the necessity of observing so much caution in the use of historical texts, it may appear very difficult to reach complete certainty regarding the facts of his- tory. How may we be sure, especially in dealing with ancient times, that our witness presents every de- sirable guarantee? Often he is scarcely known to us, or quite anonymous. How many facts, once held to be established, have been eliminated from the pages of history. And for how many more must we indefi- nitely suspend our judgment for lack of sufficiently con- vincing authority. Historical certitude would indeed be difficult to reach if for each fact we had but one iso- lated piece of evidence. Full certainty would then be possible only when it could be shown that the charac- ter and position of a witness were such as to preclude any reasonable doubt as to the exactness of his state- ments. But if the veracity of the witness is guaran- teed only by negative data, i. e. if we are merely aware that no known circumstances warrant us in suspecting carelessness or bad faith, there arises in us a more or less vague belief, such as we easily accord to any quite unknown person who seriously relates an event vv^ich he says he has seen, while on our part we have no rea- son to suppose either that he himself is deceived or that he is deceiving us. Strictly speaking, our belief in such a witness cannot be called a halting faith. On the other hand it differs considerably from a belief that is based on more solid foundations. We shall not, therefore, be much surprised if the occurrence be later described in an entirely different manner, nor shall we object to abandoning our former belief when better in- formed by more reliable witnesses. Were it otherwise, our passions would be to blame for causing us to hold to a belief, flattering perhaps, but unsupported by suf- ficient evidence. We frankly admit, therefore, the possibility of a more or less wavering mental adhesion to facts that rest on a single testimony and whose value we are unable properly to appreciate. It is otherwise in the case of facts confirmed by several wit- ncs.ses placed in entirely different conditions. It is very difficult, nay generally speaking morally impossi- ble, that three, four, or even more persons, not subject to any common influence, should be deceived in the same manner, or should be parties to the same decep- tion. When, therefore, we find a fact established by several statements or narratives taken from different sources, yet all concordant, there is scarcely any fur- ther room for reasonable doubt as to the entire truth of the fact. At this stage, however, we must be very certain that the historical sources are truly different. Ten or twenty writers who copy the narrative of an ancient author, without any new source of knowledge at their disposal, in general add nothing to the author- ity of him from whom they have gleaned their infor- mation. They are but echoes of an original testi- mony, already well known. It may happen, however, and the case is by no means rare, that narratives based on flifferent sources exhibit more or less disagreement. How then shall we fomi our judgment?

Right here an important distinction is necessary. The various narratives of a fact often exhibit a perfect