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 CONTRITION

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CONTRITION

book gave expression to ideas and feelings which, at a time of pohtical and social unrest, were growing in the popular mind. It would be interesting to deter- mine how far Rousseau influenced the framing of various modern constitutions; at any rate, he fur- nished the French Revolution with its philosophy, and his principles direct the actual political life of France. His book, says Mallet du Pan, was " the Koran of the Revolutionists", and Carlyle rightly calls Rousseau "the Evangelist of the French Revo- lution". The orators of the Constituante quoted its sentences and formulae, and if it may be believed that Rousseau would have condemned the massacres and violences of 179.3, the Jacobins, nevertheless, looked to his principles for the justification of their acts.

It is quite intelligible that the "Contrat Social" should have come to be considered by some as the gospel of freedom and democracy, by others as the code of revolution and anarchy. That it contains serious contradictions is undeniable. For instance, Rousseau assigns as the essential basis of the general will the unanimous consent of the people, yet he as- sumes that this general will is expressed in the plural- ity of suffrages; he affirms that parents have no right to engage their children by a contract, and yet chil- dren from their birth will be subject to the primitive contract; he affirms that a man has no right to alien- ate himself, yet he bases the social contract essentially on the totaralienation of personal rights and person- ality in favour of the community. If there are some true considerations and reflections in this book — as, for instance, on slavery and the dignity of man, on the ail^jplation of the divers forms of government to the cliiiacter of the people, etc. — its fundamental princi- pli - -the origin of society, absolute freedom and
 * ili-i.l\ite equality of all — are false and unnatural.

! I>- liases society on a convention, ignoring the fact I : I I I r uth so clep.rly shown both by psychology and his- 1 hat man is a being essentially social, and that, iiald says, the "law of sociability is as natural 111 as the law of gravitation to physical bodies". !li :llirms as a first principle that all men are born Inc. He calls the natural state a state of instinct,
 * iihl he defines natural freedom as the unlimited right

i'f ' :ich to do whatever he can. He opposes to this iiitind state and freedom the civil state which he i!l~ the state of justice and morality, and civil lib- which is freedom limited by the general will. ividently implies that man is born an animal lirce as its power and instinct as its guide, and n intelligent and free being. Rous.scau forgets if natural freedom is power to act, it is at the time an activity subjected to a rule and disci- Ictcrmined by the very object and conditions of 11 life; that if all men are bom with a right to 111, they are also born with a duty to direct this iin ; that, if all are born equally free — in the fun- iital sense that all have the same essential right r a human life and to attain human perfection — ^iill. this very right is determined in its mode of ex- ercise for each individual by special laws and condi- tions; in a word, that the natural state of man is both freedom and discipline in the individual as well as in the social life. Rousseau's conception of freedom leads him directly to an individualism and a natural- win which have no limits save those of brute force itself.

1 Again, he declares that all men are born naturally ipqiial. Now this principle is true if it is understood in the sense of a specific equality, the foundation of Ihuman dignity. Everj-manhasthe right. eijual in all. Ito be treated as a man, to be respected in his personal dignitya-s a man. tfl be protected and helped by author- jisfundamentally false, if. as interpreted by Rousseau, it fually equal to his father, nor the infant to the adult, IV —22.
 * ity in his effort towards perfection. But the principle
 * rneans individual e(|iiality. The son is not individ-

nor the dull to the intelligent, nor the poor to the rich, in individual needs, rights, or special duties. The natural relations between individual men, their re- ciprocal duties and rights, involve both equality and hierarchy. The basis of social relations is not abso- lute individual independence and arbitrary will, but freedom exercised with respect for authority. By his interpretation of this principle, Rousseau leads to a false individualism which ends in anarchy.

Rousseau maintains that society arises through the total alienation of the personality and rights of each associate; hence, for the absolute indiviilualism of natiu'e he substitutes an absolute socialism in the civil state. It is the general will which is the ultimate source and supreme criterion of justice, morality, property, and religion. Then we have, in spite of all the explanations advanced by Rousseau, the sup- pression of personality, the reign of force and caprice, the tjT-anny of the multitude, the despotism of the crowd, the destruction of true freedom, morality, and society. The French Revolution was the realization of these principles. Society has not its foimdation in the free alienation of personality and rights, but in the natural union of all personalities, or, rather, families, with a view to reach their perfection. Society is not the source of duties and rights of families or indi- viduals, but the protector and helper of families and individuals in the fulfilment of their duties and rights; its existence is commanded, its authority Ls limited, by this very end. Society is not formed from ele- ments all individually equal, but is organized from graduated elements. These degrees of authority, however, in the social organization are not by nature the exclusive possession of anybody, but accessible to the capacities and the efforts of all. Society is made up of authority and subjects ; and this authority, while it may be determined in its subject and manner of exercise by the )-icopIo, has not its foiuidation in their will, but in In, I v itself as God created it.

MussET Patiim, ■/ /(■ouMcoM (Paris, 1823-2S

and 1870); L,lli-,:~ . uu h Marc-Michel (Paris,

185S); Beauiioin. 7... ,.-, de J.-J. Rousseau (Pari.?,

1891); HoRNuxo, Ln uL-ls polUiquts de Rousseau (1878); LicHTENBERGER, Le sorm/i,5m« au XVIII' sitcle (1895); MoR- LEY, Rousseau (London, 1896), II, iii; Lemaitre, J.-J. Rous- seau (Paris, 1907); Brkpif, Du caractiTC intellecluel et moral de J.-J. Rous.'icau (Paris, 1906). Also, for bibliography of Rous- seau, cf. GuKEARD, La France litlcrairc. VIII, 192-230. For the influence of the Contrat Social, see (Euvres de Maximilini, Robespierre (Paris, ISIO); Carlvle, The French Revolution; Taine, Oriffines dc la France contemporaine (Paris, 1876-90), II. III. See also the Encyclicals of Leo XIII: Diutumum Illud (29 June, 1881), and Immortale Dei (1 Nov., 1893). G. M. Sauvage.

Contrition (Lat. contritio — a breaking of some- thing hardened). — In Holy Writ nothing is more com- mon than exhortations to repentance; "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ezech., xxxiii, 11); "Except you do penance you shall all likewise perish" (Luke, xiii, 5; cf. Matt., xii, 41). At times this repentance in- cludes exterior acts of satisfaction (Ps. vi, 7 sqq.); it always implies a recognition of wrong done to GocI, a detestation of the evil wrought, and a desire to turn from evil and do good. This is clearly expressed in Ps. 1 (.5-14): "For I know my iniquity. ... To thee only have I sinned, and have done evil before thee. . . . Turn away thy face from my sins, and blot out all my iniquities. Create a clean heart in me", etc. More clearly does this appear in the parable of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke, xviii, 13), and more clearly still in the storj- of the prodigal (Luke, xv, 11-.32): "P'ather, I have sinned against heaven and before thee; I am not worthy to be called thy son".

Nature of CoNiKrnoN. — This interior repentance has been called by theologians "contrition". It is defined explicitly by the Council of Trent (Se.ss. XIV, ch. iv d(! Cont rit ione) ; " a sorrow of soul and a hatred of sin committed, with a firm purpose of not sinning iis.