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CONIMBRICENSES

mains merely sufficient, in the sense that the second, or free, stage may be, but is not, reached in that case ; whereas, in the case of efficacious grace, the second or free stage is actually attained.

Hereupon the question arises: what is the precise reason why, of two motions which may be supposed to be similar in every respect as far as their intrinsic con- stitution is concerned — to be of the same intensity as well as of the same kind — one does not last beyond the critical point where freedom begins, whereas the other does? It is of the essence of Molinism that this is due in part to the will itself continuing to act under the Divine grace or not continuing. To which Bellarmine adds that grace which proves efficacious is given by God to one who, He foresees, will use it freely ; whereas He foresees no less surely, when giving a grace which remains merely sufficient, that it will not last in the recipient beyond the initial or necessary stage of its duration. Congruism further insists that the motion passes into the free stage when the circumstances are comparatively favourable (congruous) to it; but when they are comparatively adverse (not congruous), it will not continue, at least as a rule. The circum- stances are to be deemed favourable or imfavourable not absolutely, but comparatively, that is, in propor- tion to the intensity of the grace; for it is plain that, no matter how adverse they may be, God can overcome them by a strong impulse of grace such as would not be needed in other less stubborn cases; and, vice versa, very powerful Divine impulses may fail where the temptation to sin is very great. Not that in the neces- sary stage of the motion there is not sufficient energy, as we may say, to continue, always supposing freedom ; or that it is not within the competence of the will, when the crucial point has been reached, to discon- tinue the motion which is congruous or to continue that which is not so. The will can continue to act or can abstain in either case; as a rule, however, it con- tinues to act when the circumstances are favourable to that precise form and intensity of motion, thereby be- coming efficacious; and does not continue when the circumstances are unfavourable, thereby proving a merely sufficient grace.

To anyone who reflects on the way in which the will is influenced by motives it must be obvious that any movement or tendency that may arise towards a par- ticular object, whether good or evil, is more or less likely to continue according as it harmonizes or con- flicts with other motions or tendencies towards objects which are incompatible with the first. The whole theory of reflection or meditation is based on this truth. Concomitant states, in sympathy with the motions of grace, make the favourable or congruous circumstances in which these motions operate; just as a tendency towards vice, if accompanied by other ap- petites favourable to its working, must be deemed con- gruous or fortunate as regards the circiunstances in which it intervenes. Jansenists, Augustinians, Molin- ists, Determinists, all should and do agree, therefore, in admitting the strengthening influence of a number of confluent motions and. conversely, the weakening effect on any tendency of a simultaneous tendency in an opposite direction. So far all are Congruists; the difference being that whereas Jansenists and Deter- minists do not admit that the will is free to resist the stronger combination of motives; and while Augustin- ians proclaim this in words but seem to deny it in real- ity; all Molinists maintain that the will can effectually cease to tend towards an object, even though it .should be proposed as nmrc perfect than what is seen to be in- compatible with it; jjrovidod always this more perfect object is not presented as absolutely or infinitely per- fect in even,- way. The will is likely to be drawn, and almo.st invariably is drawn, by the stronger, i. e. more congruous, iiiotivo; it is not, liowcvcr. drawn of neces- sity, nor even quite invariably, if .Molinism is true. In this, which is the only psychologically intelligible sense

of Congruism, Molina, Lessius, and all their followers were Congruists just as much as Suarez or Bellarmine.

All true Molinists admit and contend that, antece- dently to the concession of grace, whether merely suffi- cient or efficacious, God knows by scicntia media whether it will actually result in the free action for which it is given, or will remain inefficacious though sufficient. AH likewise admit and proclaim that a specially benevolent Proviilence is exercised towards the recipient of grace when, with His knowledge of conditional results, God gives graces which He fore- sees to be efficacious, rather than others which He foresees would be inefficacious and which He is free to give. Bellarmine (De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio, Bk. I, ch. xii) seems to accuse Molina, unjustly, of not admit- ting this latter point. Difference of opinion among Molinists is manifested only when they proceed to in- quire into the cause of the Divine selection: whether it is due to any antecedent decree of predestination which God means to carry out at all costs, selecting purposely to this end only such graces as He foresees to prove efficacious, and passing over or omitting to se- lect, no less purposely, such as he foresees would be without result if given. Suarez holds that the selec- tion of graces which are foreseen to prove efficacious is consequent on and necessitated by such an antecedent decree, whereby all, and only, those who will actually be saved were infallibly predestined to salvation, and this antecedently to any foreknowledge, whether of their actual or merely conditional correspondence with the graces they may receive. The great body of the theo- logians of the Society of Jesus, as well as of other fol- lowers of Molina, while admitting that indi\iduals, such as St. Paul, may be, and have been, predestined in that way, do not regard it as the only, or even the ordinary, com'se of Divine Providence. (See Predes- tination.)

Though this difference of opinion has really nothing to do with Congruism, it is probably the main reason why Billuart and other opponents of Molinism have maintained that Suarez and Bellarmine differ from Molina and Lessius not merely as regards predestina- tion, but also as regards the nature of efficacious grace ; that the opinion of .Suarez is the only true Congruism as distinguished from the pure Molinism of the others ; and that Congruism in this sense was made obligatory on all the schools of the Society by Acquaviva, the fifth general (1613). The precise bearing of his decree has been rather hotly disputed, Father Schneemann, Cardinal Mazella, and others maintaining that it did not in any way command a departure from the teach- ing of Molina. Pore de Regnon candidly, and rightly, admits that it did ; not as regards the nature of effica- cious grace but only as regards predestination. (See

CoNGREG.\TIO DE AUXILIIS; CiR.iCE; PnEDESTIN.4.TI0N ;

Molina; Suarez.)

On Congruism proper the best author is probably Suarez. De Gratia, Bk. V, ch. xxi, nos. 4 sqq.; Idem, ibid., Appendix Prior, De vera inlelliqentid, etc.; Idem, Opitsc. I de attxiliijf, etc.. Blc. III. ch. xiv. Of recent writers see Mazzella, De Gratiii Christi (3rd ed., Rome, 1S82), nos. 677 sqq.; Ch. Pesch. De Gratid (Freiburg, 1S97), Prop, xxii; Schneemann, Conlroversi- arum de Div. Gratid, etc. (Freiburg, 1881), sect. 1, no. 16; La- HOUSSE, De Gratid Divind, nos. 213 sqq.; de Regnon, Banez el. Molina (Paris, 1SS3), Bk. II, sect. 8.— On the predestination as- pect see Fr-\nzeun, De Deo Vno (Rome, 1876), Th. Iv, Ux- Ixvi; RiiL.T, 71- n.n (Frato, 1S93\ pp. 268 sqq.— .\s to whrtii' '■ ,- i' inipliesa departure from the principles

of M ' nnt; of Acqua\iva's decree see on the

on. ' r ratid et Lib. Arb., Bk. I, ch. xii, .xiii ;

Bii I ' ■ 11-^ V, art. 2, .sect. 3: Gr-\veson, Epis-

tota- ui-iH. -!>!■!. 'I'-'!' mu-T I iiassano, 1785), Classis I, n. 1, pp. 5 sqq.; Gazzaniga, Uc (irnltd. Pt. I, di.ss. V, ch. ii, no. 110. For tiie views of tlie other side see Mazella, op. cit., nos. 717 sqq.; ScHiFFixl, De Gratid (Freiburg, 1901), IV, no. 275; Schnee- mann, Controversiarum, etc., sect. 16; de Hkgnon, op. oil., loc.

cit. Walter McDonald.

Conimbricenses (or Collegh'm CoNiMnuicENSE), the name by which the Jesuits of the University of Coimbra (q. v.) in Portugal were knov\Ti. On the reg- ister of the college at various times appeared the names