Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 3.djvu/698

 CHARLES

628

CHARLES

of Valois. Family alliances were proposed with this end in view. A war which Francis nevertheless began proved abortive, and in 1539 the rivals met at Nice, and peace seemed likely. Visiting the Netherlands and Germany, Charles soon found that new troubles awaited him, once more fomented by France. In 1538 the line of the Counts of Guelders had become extinct; but the last of that line had provided that, after his death, the countship should pass to the Dukes of Cleves-Julich, the strongest temporal prin- cipality on the Lower Rhine. Guelders, accordingly, resisted annexation by Burgundy, and Charles would not consent to its annexation to the Duchy of Cleves- Julich, which was favoured by Francis I and the Smalkaldic League. Moreover, Henry VIII of Eng- land, having married Anne, daughter of the Duke of Cleves, threatened to join this coalition.

In Hungary, meanwhile, the Turks were again active, and preparations were being made to unite the French and Turkish fleets in the Mediterranean. Francis sought the aid of the Danes and Scandina- vians. Charles thought it best to avoid hostilities until he could break up the too formidable coalition of his enemies. He succeeded in detaching Henry of England from the alliance, and during the Diet and religious conference at Ratisbon, in 1541, where he was present in person, he brought Philip of Hesse, the leading spirit of the Smalkaldic League, under his control. He turned then upon the Turks. He in- tended that the imperial army should operate in Hungary while he attacked Algiers; but both plans failed. The year 1542 was an unfortunate one for him ; the French entered the Netherlands, and the Smalkaldic League, with Hesse, attacked Henry of Brunswick, Charles' only ally in North Germany, and occupied his territories. The patriotism of the Netherlands held the French in check. Charles re- turned from Spain and, in 1543, attacked Cleves. A few days sufficed to make Guelders a part of Bur- gundy, which was thus protected on the side of Ger- many, though still exposed on its French frontier. It was to remedy this weakness that Charles estab- lish! '(1 a line of fortresses which for centuries barred the way against French invasion. In 1544 he in- vaded France. The strength of Francis was ex- hausted, and, as Charles, too, was weary of war, a peace was concluded at Crespy (17 September, 1544).

Charles had now to consider whether he would allow liberty of action to the Protestant princes of Germany, to whom, under pressure of war, he had made concessions, especially at the Diet of Spires in 1544. Up to this time he had let affairs take their own course in Germany, and his brother Ferdinand had been unable to exert effectual pressure. The power of the feudatory princes, steadily increasing since 1521, was now established on a solid basis. In the emperor's absence they had, on their own initia- tive, found means to suppress several disturbances which might otherwise have plunged Germany into the horrors of civil war — first the League of the Knights, then the Peasants' War, then the disorders of the turbulent clergy who had embraced Lutheran- ism and led the masses astray, and lastly the rebellion of tin- Anabaptists (q. v.). By supporting Luther againsl Charles, the princes secured tin' means of maintaining the power which they had acquired by their resistance to the emperor. Charles perceived the gravity of the situation at least sufficiently to lead him to resolve upon open war against the princes. To deprive them of their religious leverage, he awaited the opening of the Council of Trenl I 1545). In the summer of L546 he opened hostilities. Be began by conquering South Germany, then pushed forward into Saxony, and defeated and captured the Elector at Muhlberg, 24 April, 1547. Soon after this he im-

Crisoned Philip of Hesse. (The charges of treachery rought against Charles on this account, are not well

sustained.) Charles now believed the princes to be sufficiently humbled to permit him to reorganize the empire with their help at a Diet at Augsburg, as he had previously reorganized Spain and the Nether- lands. The settlement of religious difficulties was to be the basis of this reconstruction. He insisted that the council was to have the final decision in matters of doctrine; but until this decision was pronounced he wished for peace and was willing to make certain con- cessions to the Protestants (the Interim). His sense of justice, however, reserved from these concessions both the retention of the ecclesiastical property seized by the Reformers and the temporary abrogation of episcopal authority in the reformed districts. In con- sequence of this resolution the Interim lost all its at- traction for the Evangelical princes. In dealing with the political reconstruction of the empire, Charles was ready to recognize the condition of Germany so far as it was the result of historical development. He required the feudatories to promise obedience to the imperial power only in specific cases affecting the general welfare, to bind themselves by certain recog- nized formula?, and not to seek individual profit under pretext of the welfare of the empire. He therefore made here concessions like those already made to his Spanish subjects — namely, a certain degree of au- tonomy to the several States, in return for their aid in the unquestioned necessities of the empire. No open opposition was made at the Diet, but nothing was done. The Catholics demanded that the Interim should apply to them also; that instrument now no longer made for harmony, and the Protestants resisted it more strenuously than before. On the other hand, the German princes were as selfish and provincial as the hidalgos of Castile, and less patriotic. They procrastinated until affairs took an unfavourable turn for the emperor.

But Charles was now ready to dispose of his earthly possessions. His recent campaigns had so undermined his strength as to render it advisable for him to make his will. Warned by the grasping policy of Francis I, he determined to keep the possessions of his family together. He would not, however, leave them all to one heir, knowing how impossible it had been for even him to govern all to his own satisfaction. What his plans were is unknown, but while he was considering them the Turks and the French king (now Henry II) once more began hostilities against him (1551). In the following year some of the German Protestant princes, led by Maurice of Saxony, unexpectedly attacked the imperial forces, while Charles lay sick at Innsbruck, and Henry II occupied the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. Charles escaped, but abandoned his plan for the reorganization of the im- perial government. He empowered Ferdinand to conclude the Treaty of Passau with the insurgents in April, 1552, which finally gave the ascendency in the German Empire to the princes. His attempt to retake Metz, in the autumn of 1552, failed, and the war was transferred to the Netherlands, where it was waged without decisive result. In North Africa, also, and in Italy, where the Turks, the French, and some Italian States were attacking the emperor, mat- ters became critical. Still the emperor hoped to win a final victory. For in 1553 the accession of Mary Tudor to the throne of England suddenly excited his hope that he might extend his influence in that king- dom. Mary Tudor was ready to marry his son Philip, and in 1554 this alliance became a fact. When their marriage proved childless, the emperor gave up the tight and decided to turn over the conclusion of peace to Philip and Ferdinand. Ferdinand insisted that the authority of princes in the empire, as settled by

the agreement of Passau. should be legally recognized by a decree of the Diet, and the equality of the ( atho-

licand Lutheran religions accepted. This was done at Augsburg in 1555. Charles then requested the