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CATEGORICAL

the exorcists, and then the priest signed them with the Cross and laid hands upon them. It is interesting to note that the words at present used in baptism "Ergo, maledicte diabole" etc. belonged to the exorcism, and the words "^Eternam ac justissimam pietatem" etc. belonged to the laying on of hands. The third scrutiny was of a specially solemn charac- ter, for it was then that the candidates received the Gospel, the Symbol (Creed), and the Our Father. Each of these was accompanied by a short explana- tion. For example, St. Augustine has left four ser- mons (lvi-lix) " De Oratione Dominica ad competen- tes" (P. L., XXXVIII, 377 sqq.), and three on the delivery of the Symbol (ibid., 1058 sqq.). In our present Missal the Mass of the Wednesday of the fourth week in Lent has a lesson in addition to the ordinary Epistle, or rather lesson. The former is taken from the thirty-sixth chapter of Ezechiel, the hitter from the fiftieth of Isaias; and both (together with the Introit and the two Graduals, and the Gos- pel, the healing of the man born blind, John, ix) have obvious reference to the "great scrutiny". The seventh scrutiny took place on Holy Saturday, apart from the Mass, as indeed there was formerly no Mass for that day. The priest himself performed the exorcism and the ceremony of the Ephphetha (Mark, vii). Then followed the anointing on the breast and back. The candidates pronounced the threefold re- nunciation of Satan, and recited the Creed. The actual initiation (baptism, confirmation, and Com- munion) took place at the Paschal .Mass, at which the neophytes assisted for the first time, being now no longer mere catechumens. But until the Sunday after Easter they were considered as "infants", re- ceiving further instruction especially on the sacra- ments which had lately been conferred upon them (see Doctrine, Christian). Finally, on Low Sun- day (Dominica in Albis depositis) when the Introit of the Mass speaks of the "new-born babes" (I Pet., ii, 2), they put off their white garments, and were hence- forth counted among the regular " faithful".

Funk (ed.1, Didache (Tubingen, 1887); St. Justin, Apol. I, in P. G.. VI, 328 sqq.; Tertullian. De Baptismo. P. L.. I. 1197 sqq.; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Caterheses, P. G., XXXIII, 369 sqq.; St. Augustine. De Catech. Rudibus. P. £,., XL, 309; Sermones ad Competentes, lvi-lix, P. /.., XXXVIII. 377 sqq.; In Tradilicme et Redditiunc Si/mlmli. P. L.. XXXVIII. 10nS sqq.; Martene. DeAnliquis Ecclesia- Riiih,,* (Rouen, 1700\ torn. I, 29 sqq.; Cmardon. Hist Sacraments in Migxe, Cutsus

TheologicF Complelus. XX; In. hi.-m. tlripincn du culle Chre- tien (Paris. 1S9S). IX; Tin u-r.'V L,„l and Hula Week (Lon- don, 1904), 169 sqq.; Kupper in K ireh.nler ., s. v. KatechUr menat; Bareille in Diet, de thiol, cath.. s. v. Catechumenat. T. B. Sc'ANNELL.

Categorical Imperative, a term which originated in Immanuel Kant's ethics. It expresses the moral law as ultimately enacted by reason and demanding obedience from mere respect for reason. Kant in his ethics takes his point of departure from the concept of a good will: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it that can be called good with- out qualification except a good will." But that will alone is good which acts not only conformably to duty, but also from duty. And again the will acts from duty when it is determined merely by respect for the law, independently of inclination, and without regard to the agreeableness or the consequences of the action prescribed. Therefore the first fundamental principle of morality is: " Let the law be the sole ground or mo- tive of thy will." Kant further finds that the law is capable of inspiring respect by reason of its univer- sality and necessity, and hence laysdown the following general formula of the moral law: "Act so that the maxim [determining motive of the will] may be capa- ble of becoming a universal law for all rational be- ings." Necessity and universality, he declares, can- not be derived from experience, whose subject matter

is always particular and contingent, but from the mind alone, from the cognitive forms innate in it. Hence the moral law originates in pure reason and is enunciated by a synthetical judgment a priori — a priori because it has its reason, not in experience, but in the mind itself; synthetical, because it is formed not by the analysis of a conception, but by an exten- sion of it. Reason, dictating the moral law, deter- mines man's actions. Yet it may do so in a twofold manner. It either controls conduct infallibly, its dic- tates being actually responded to without conflict or friction — and in this case there is no obligation neces- sary or conceivable, because the will is of itself so con- stituted as to be in harmony with the rational order — or it is resisted and disobeyed, or obeyed only reluc- tantly, owing to contrary impulses coming from sen- sibility. In this case determination by the law of reason has the nature of a command or imperative, not of a hypothetical imperative, which enjoins actions only as a means to an end and implies a merely con- ditional necessity, but of a categorical imperative, which enjoins actions for their own sake and hence in- volves absolute necessity. While for God, Whose will is perfectly holy, the moral law cannot be obligatory, it is for man, who is subject to sensuous impulses, an imperative command. Accordingly, the categorical imperative is the moral law enacted by practical rea- son, obligatory for man, whose sensibility is discord- ant from the rational order, and demanding obedience from respect for its universality and necessity.

Kant essays to prove the existence of a categorical imperative a priori from the idea of the will of a ra- tional being. Will is conceived as a faculty deter- mining itself to action according to certain laws. Now it is only an end that serves as an objective principle for the self-determination of the will, and only an end in itself that serves as a universal principle holding for all rational beings. But man, and indeed every rational being, is an end in himself, a person, and must in all actions, whether they regard self or others, be respected as such. Thus arises a supreme practical principle, objective and universal, derived not from experience, but from human nature itself; a principle from which, as the highest practical ground, all laws of the will are capable of being derived. Tin's, then, is the categorical imperative, to be enunciated in the following terms: Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in others, always as an end, and never merely as a means.

Hence Kant infers, first that the will of every ra- tional being, by commanding respect for humanity as an end in itself, lays down a universal law, and is there- fore a law unto itself, autonomous, and subject to no external lawgiver; secondly, that morality consists in obedience to the lawof ourown reason, and immorality, on the contrary, in heteronomy, that is, in obedience to any, even Divine, authority distinct from our own reason, or in action from any other motive than respect for our reason as a law.

The merits of Kant's categorical imperative are said to consist in this: that it firmly establishes the reign of reason; elevates the dignity of man by subjecting in him sensibility to reason and making rational na- ture free, supreme, and independent; overcomes ego- ism by forbidding action from self-interest; and up- holds morality by the highest authority. But the theist philosopher and the Christian theologian must needs take another view. .Man is not an end in him- self, but is essentially subordinate to God as his ulti- mate end and supreme good; nor is he autonomous, but is necessarily subject to God as his supreme Lord and lawgiver. Man, conceived as a law unto him- self and an end in himself, is emancipated from God as his master and separated from Him as his supreme good; conceived, moreover, as autonomous and inde- pendent of any higher authority, he is deified. This is not building up true and lofty morality, bu> is it?