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vows

the Sacred Congregation of Rites. (2) For the second class the forbidden days were much fewer than for the old votive ofBees; thus resorvatiim was iiiadc. only of the last eight days before C'luisliiias and (if the last two weeks of Lent beginning from Passion Sun- day. The other indults granted for votive offices alwaj'S had the same value; thus the old concessions of votive offices of the Blessed Sacrament and the Immaculate Conception continued obligatory. Indi- viduals might make use of the concession or not. If chapters or communities had decided, with the con- sent of the ordinary, that votive offices should be recited in choir (after all the members had been called upon to vote), they might not alter their deci- sion: they were not permitted sometimes to profit by the indult and sometimes not to profit by it. Ex- planatory decrees concerning the details have been given in recent years by the Congregation of Rites, and to them recourse must be had for the solution of doubts in practice.

Bernakd, Cours de lituTgie; Idem, Lemons itimentaires de tit- urgie (Paris, 1904). For ancient votive offices see also Cava- LIERI. Commeniaria in authenlica SacrtE riluum congregationis decreln. II (5 vols., fol., Bassano, 1775), 69-75.

F. Cabrol.

Vows. — I. Gener.\l View. — A vow is defined as a promise made to God. The promise is binding, and so differs from a simple resolution which is a present pur- pose to do or omit certain things in the future. As between man and man, a promise pledges the faith of the man who makes it; he promises, wishing some other person to trust him, and depend upon him. By his fidehty he shows himself worthy of trust; if he breaks his word, he loses credit, by causing the other a disappointment which is destructive of mutual confi- dence; and, hke faith, mutual confidence is important to society, for the natural law condemns all conduct which shakes this confidence. These statements do not apply to a promise made to God; it is impossible for me to deceive God as to mj' present intention, and He knows whether I shall be constant in the future: God, then, is protected against that disappointment on account of which the failure to fulfil a promise to a fellow-man is considered disgraceful. But, just as one can offer to God an existing thing, or a present action, so also one can offer Him a future action, and perseverance in the purpose of fulfilhng it. That offering of perseverance is characteristic of avow. A subsequent change in one's purpose is a want of re- spect to God: it is hke taking away something that has been dedicated to Him, and committing sacrilege in the widest sense of the word. Unlike the simple breach of a promise made to a man, a failure to give to God what has been promised Hiro is a matter of im- portance, a very serious offence.

This explanation shows us also how a vow is an act of religion, just as any offering made to God. It is a profession that to God is due the dedication of our ac- tions, and an acknowledgment of the order which makes Him our last end. By adding to our obliga- tions, we declare that God deserves more than He de- mands. Lastly we see why a vow is always made to God; for, as all our actions ought to be ultimately di- rectefl to Ilim, we cannot make a final promise of those actions to anyone but God. Promises made to the saints cannot be lightly neglected without de- tracting from the honour we owe them; hut a failure in this respect, though grave in itself, is vastly less seri- ous than breaking a vow, to which it bears some re- semblance. These promises occasionally imply a vow. God is well pleased with the honour paid to His saints, and they rejoice at the glory given to God. We may then confirm by a vow the promise made to a saint, and likewise we may honour a saint by a vow made to God, as for instance, to erect in memory of some saint a temple for Divine worship.

The vow, moreover, is approved by God, because it

is useful to man ; it strengthens his will to do what is right. The Protestants of the sixteenth century, fol- lowing Wyelif, declared themselves oppo.scd to vows; but Luther and Calvin condemneil only vows relating to acts which were not of obligation, the latter be- cause he considered all good actions as obligatory, the former because the vow of a free action was contradic- tory to the spirit of the new law. Both denied that the vow was an act of rehgion and justified it by the simple human reason of strengthening the will. Cer- tain recent tendencies have minimized the importance at least of vows made by members of religious com- munities. Errors of this kind are due to overempha- sis of the fact:, that vows, and especially the perpetual vow of chastity, of rehgious life, or of missionary la- bour, do not imply any special instability in the per- son who makes them, but only the fickleness natural to the human will; and that instead of denoting the grudging service of a slave, they imply rather the enthusiasm of a generous will, eager to give and sacri- fice beyond what is necessary, and at the same time so sincere in self-knowledge as to imitate warriors who burned their ships to cut off the possibility and even the temptation to flight. In the case of a will in- capable of change, a vow would have no meaning; it were useless to offer a perseverance that could never be found wanting; for this reason it is not suitable to Christ, or the angels, or to the blessed in heaven.

II. Moral and Theological Considerations. — A vow, even in an unimportant matter, presupposes the full consent of the will; it is an act of generosity towards God. One does not give unless one knows fully what one is doing. Every substantial error, or indeed every error which is really the cause of making a vow, renders the vow null and void. This condi- tion must be properly understood; to judge of the effect of the error, it is necessary to know the will of the person making the vow at the moment of making it. One who can say sincerely, "if I had known this or that, I would not have made the vow", is not bound by the vow. If, however, one who is aware of some ignorance on the matter of a vow, but, in spite of that, generously decides to make it, knowing its gen- eral import and that it is in itself proper and com- mendable, such as the vow of chastity, for instance, is bound by it, as it is entirely valid. Lastly, the vows which accompanj' the entrance into a state, such as the vows of religion, can only be rendered void by some really substantial error. The good of the com- munity requires this stability. For every vow whatso- ever such knowledge and liberty arc required as ren- der a person capable of committing serious sin; (hough it does not follow that at the age when one is ca- pable of committing mortal sin,one is capable of under- standing the importance of a perpetual engagement.

The object of a vow, according to the classical for- mula, mu.st be not merely something good, but some- thing better; whence it follows that no vow must be made to God of any unlawful or indifferent matter. The reason is simple: God is all holy and cannot ac- cept the offering of anything which is bad or less good in its nature. Again, the object of the vow must be .something that is humanly po.ssible, for no one can be bound to do what is impassible. No man can make a vow to avoid all manner of sin, even the slight- est, because this is morally impo.ssihle. The vow to avoid deliberate sin is valid, at least in persons who have made some progress in virtue. A vow may ap- ply to a duty already existing or to acts which are not commanded by any law. A vow, being a personal act, binds only the person who makes it ; but a supe- rior, who makes a vow in the name of his community, may, within the limits of his authority, command the fulfilment of the vow. (As to the obligation of heirs, see sect ion III of this article.) A vow binds according to the intention of the person who makes it; and this