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 VIRTUE

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VIRTUE

meeting dangers which reason dictates he should encounter, so also the patient man is one who endures present evils in such a way as not to be inordinately cast down by them. (2) Munificence, which disposes one to incur great expenses for the suitable doing of a great work. It differs from mere liberality, as it has reference not to ordinary expenses and donations, but to those that are great. Hence the munificent man is one who gives with royal generosity, who does things not on a cheap but magnificent scale, always, however, in accordance with right reason. (3) Mag- nanimity, which implies a reaching out of the soul to great things, is the virtue which regulates man with regard to honours. The magnanimous man aims at great works in every line of virtue, making it his purpose to do things worthy of great honour. Nor is magnanimity incompatible with true humility. "Magnanimity", says St. Thomas, "makes a man deem himself worthy of great honours in considera- tion of the Divine gifts he possesses; whilst humility makes him think little of himself in consideration of his own short -comings". (4) Perseverance, the virtue which disposes to continuance in the accomplishment of good works in spite of the difficulties attendant upon them. As a moral virtue it is not to be taken precisely for what is designated as final perseverance, that special gift of the predestined by which one is found in the state of grace at the moment of death. It is used here to designate that virtue which disposes one to continuance in any virtuous work whatsoever. (For a more detailed treatment of the four principal moral virtues, see Cardinal Vietces.)

C. Theological Virtues. — All virtues have as their final scope to dispose man to acts conducive to his true happiness. The happiness, however, of which man is capable is twofold, namely, natural, which is attainable by man's natural powers, and supernatural, which exceeds the capacity of unaided human nature. Since, therefore, merely natural principles of human action are inadequate to a supernatural end, it is necessary that man be endowed with supernatural powers to enable him to attain his final destiny. Now these supernatural principles are nothing else than the theological virtues. They are called theological (1) because they have God for their immediate and proper object; (2) because they are Divinely infused; (.3) because they are known only through Divine Revela- tion. The theological virtues are three, viz. faith, hope, and charity. Faith is an infused virtue, by which the intellect is perfected by a supernatural light, in virtue of which, under a supernatural move- ment of the will, it assents firmly to the supernatural truths of Revelation, not on the motive of intrinsic evidence, but on the sole ground of the _ infallible authority of God revealing. For as man is guided in the attainment of natural happiness by principles of knowledge known by the natural light of reason, so also in the attainment of his supernatural destiny his intellect must be illumined by certain super- natural principles, namely, Divinely revealed truths. (See Faith.)

But not only man's intellect must be perfected with regard to his supernatural end, his will also must tend to that end, as a good possible of attainment. Now the virtue, by which the will is so perfected, is the theological virtue of hope. It is commonly defined as a Divinely infused virtue, by which we trust, with an unshaken confidence grounded on the Divine assis- tance, to attain life everlasting. But the will must not only tend to God, its ultimate end, it mii.st also be united to Him by a certain conformity. This spiritual union or conformity, by which the soul is united to (!od, the sovereign Good, is effected by charity. Charity, then, is that tlieological virtue, by which God, our ultimate end, known liy super- natural light, is loved by reason of Ilis own intrinsic^ goodness or amiability, and our neighbour loved on

account of God. It differs from faith, as it regards God not under the aspect of truth but of good. It differs from hope inasmuch as it regards God not as our good precisely {iiobis bonum), but as good in Himself {in se honum). But this love of God as good in Himself does not, as the Quietists maintained, exclude the love of God as He is our good (see Quiet- ism). With regard to the love of our neighbour, it falls within the theological virtue of charity in so far as its motive is the supernatural love of God, and it is thus distinguished from mere natural affection. Of the three theological virtues, charity is the most excellent. Faith and hope, involving as they do a certain imperfection, namely, obscurity of light and absence of possession, will cease with this life, but charity involving no essential defect will last forever. Moreover, while charity excludes all mortal sin, faith and hope are compatible with grievous sin ; but as such they are only imperfect virtues; it is only when in- formed and vivified by charity that their acts are meritorious of eternal hfe (see Love, Theologicai. Virtue of).

IV. Cau.ses of Virtues. — To the human intellect the first principles of knowledge, both speculative and moral, are connatural; to the human will the tendency to rational good is connatural. Now these naturally knowable principles and these natural tendencies to good constitute the seeds or germs whence the intel- lectual and moral virtues spring. Moreover by rea- son of individual natural temperament, resulting from physiological conditions, particular individuals are better disposed than others to particular virtues. Thus certain persons have a natural aptitude with regard to science, others to temperance, and others to fortitude. Hence nature itself may be assigned as the radical cause of the intellectual and moral virtues, or the cause of those virtues viewed in their embryonic state. In their perfect and fully developed state, however, the aforesaid virtues are caused or acquired by frequently repeated acts. Thus by multiplied acts the moral virtues are generated in the appetitive faculties in so far as they are acted upon by reason, and the habit of science is generated in the intellect under the determination of first principles (see Habit). The supernatural virtues are immediately caused or infused by God. But a virtue may be called infused in two ways: first, when by its very nature (per sc) it can be effectively produced by God alone; secondly, accidentally (per accidens) when it may be acquired by our own acts, but by a Divine dispensation it is infused, as in the case of Adam and Christ. Now besides the theological virtues, according to the doc- trine of St. Thomas, there are also moral and intel- lectual virtues of their very nature Divinely infused, as prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These infused virtues differ from the acquired virtues (1) as to their effective principle, being immediately caused by God, whilst the acquired virtues are cau.scd by acts of a created vital power; (2) by reason of their radical principle, for the infused virtues flow from sanctifying grace as their source, whereas the acquired virtues are not essentially connected with grace; (3) by reason of the acts they elicit, those of the in- fused virtues being intrinsically supernatural, those of the acquired not exceeding the capacity of human nature; (4) whilst one mortal sin destroys the infused virtues, with the acquired virtues acts of mortal sin are not necessarily incompatible, as contrary acts are not directly opposed to the corresponding contrary habit.

V. Properties of Virtues. — A. Mean of Vir- tues. — One of the properties of virtues is that they consist in the golden mean, that is to .say, in what lies between excess ami defect. For as the perfection of things subject to rule consists in confiirmily with that rule, .so also evil in those same things results from deviation from that rule either by excess or defect.