Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 15.djvu/535

 VIRTUE

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VIRTUE

elusions acquired by demonstration through causes 3r principles which arc final in one class or other, rhus there are difTcrent sciences, mathematics, phys- ics etc., but only one wisdom, the .supreme judge of ill. Understanding is defined as the habit of first Drinciples; as a habit or virtue it is to be distinguished, it least logically, from the faculty of intelligence. It s also called intuition, as it has for its object truths
 * hat are self-evident, the perception of which requires

lo discursive process. It is to be observed that these tirtues differ from the gifts of the Holy Ghost, desig- nated by the same name, inasmuch as they are quafi-
 * ies of the natural order, while the gifts are intrinsic-

lUy supernatural. The practical intellectual virtues ire two, namely, art and prudence. Art, according
 * o the Schoolmen, signifies the right method with

■egard to external productions (recta ratio factibilnim). lust as science perfects and directs the intellect to •eason correctly with regard to its proper object in ,'iew of the attainment of truth, so also art perfects ind directs the intellect in the application of certain •ules in view of the production of external works, vhether these be of a useful or aesthetic character. Hence the division into useful and fine arts. Art las this in common with the three speculative intel- ectual habits, that they are aU virtues only in a •e.stricted sense. Hence they constitute a man good )nly in a qualified sense, e. g. a good geometrician or I good sculptor. For the proper function of science md art, as such, is not to confer moral goodness, but

direct the intellect in its scientific or artistic proc- !sses.

As art is the right method of production, so pru- lence, as defined by St. Thomas, is the right method )f conduct (recta ratio agihilium). It differs from all he other intellectual virtues in this, that it is a virtue n the absolute sense, not only conferring a readiness or well-doing, but causing one to u.se that readiness •ightly. Considered more specifically, it is that vir- ue which directs one in the choice of means most apt, mder existing circumstances, for the attainment of a hie end. It differs from the moral virtues as it re- iides not in the appetitive powers but in the intellect, ts proper act being, not the choice of apt means, but he direction of that choice. But although prudence s essentially an intellectual virtue, nevertheless, under

1 certain respect (matrrialitcr) it may be considered I moral virtue, since it has as its subject matter the icts of the moral virtues. For that alone is true pru- lence which is directive of means in pursuit of a good n accordance with right reason, which good is the )roper object of the moral virtues. For if the end be ricious, though a certain astuteness be manifested in he discernment of means, such astuteness is not real )ruflence, but the semblance of prudence. (See

^RfDENCE.)

B. Moral Virtues. — Moral virtues are those which )erfect the appetitive faculties of the soul, namely, he y.-\\\ and the sensuous appetite. Moral virtue is o called from the word mna, which signifies a certain latural or quasi-natural inchnation to do a thing, iut the inclination to act is properly attributed to the ippetitive faculty, whose function it is to move the ither powers to action. Consequently tha,t virtue is ailed moral which perfects the appetitive faculty, 'or as appetite and reason have distinct activities, t is necessary that not only reason be well disposed )y the habit of intellectual virtue, but that the appe- itive powers also be well disposed by the habit of noral virtue. From this necessity of the moral artuea we see the falsity of the theorj- of Socrates, vho held that all virtue was knowledge, as he held hat all vice was ignorance. Moreo\'er, the moral 'irtues excel the inteller-tual, prudence excepted, in his, that they give not only the facility, but also the ight use of the facility, for well-doing. Hence moral rirtues are virtues absolutely; and when we say with-

out qualification that a man is good, we mean morally good. As the proper function of the moral virtues is to rectify the appetitive powers, i. e. to dispose them to act in accordance with right reason, there are princi- pally three moral virtues: justice, which perfects the rational appetite or will; fortitude and temperance, which moderate the lower or sensuous appetite. Prudence, as we have observed, is called a moral vir- tue, not indeed essentially, but by reason of its subject matter, inasmuch as it is directive of the acts of the moral virtues. Justice, an essentially moral virtue, regulates man in relations with his "fellow-men. It dispo-ses us to respect the rights of others, to give each man his due. (See Justice.) Among the virtues arme.xed to justice are: (1) rehgion, which regulates man in his relations to God, disposing him to pay due worship to his Creator; (2) piety, which disposes to the fulfilment of duties which one owes to parents and country (patriotism); (3) gratitude, which inclines one to recognition of benefits received; (4) liberality, which restrains the immoderate affection for wealth from withholding seasonable gifts or expenses; (5) affability, by which one is suitably adapted to his fellow-men in social intercourse so as to behave towards each appropriately.

All these moral virtues, as well as justice itself, regulate man in his dealings with others. But besides these there are moral virtues which regulate man with regard to his own inner passions. Now there are passions which impel man to desire that which reason forbids and those which hold him back when reason impels him forward; hence there are principally two moral virtues, namely, temperance and fortitude, whose function it is to regulate those lower appetites. Temperance it is which restrains the undue impulse of concupiscence for sensible pleasure, while fortitude causes man to be brave when he would otherwise shrink, contrary to reason, from dangers or difficulties. Temperance, then, to consider it more particularly, is that moral virtue which moderates in accordance with reason the desires and pleasures of the sensuous appetite attendant on those acts by which human nature is preser\'ed in the individual or propagated in the species. The .subordinate species of temperance are: (1) abstinence, which dispo.ses to moderation in the use of food; (2) sobriety, which inchnes to modera- tion in the use of spirituous liquors; (3) chastity, which regulates the appetite in regard to sexual pleas- ures; to chastity may be reduced modesty, which is concerned with acts subordinate to the act of repro- duction. The virtues annexed to temperance are: (1) continence, which according to the Scholastics, restrains the will from consenting to violent move- ments of concupiscence; (2) humihty, which restrains inordinate desires of one's own excellence; (3) meek- ness, which checks inordinate movements of anger; (4) modesty or decorum, which consists in duly order- ing the external movements of the body according to the direction of reason. To this virtue may be reduced what Aristotle designated as rulrapelia, or good cheer, which disposes to moderation in sports, games, and jests, in accordance with the dictates of rea.son, taking into consideration the circumstances of person, sea.son, and place. As temperance and its annexed virtues remove from the will hindrances to rational good arising from sensuous pleasure, so forti- tude removes from the will those obstacles arising from the difficulties f)f doing what reason requires. Hence fortitude, which implies a certain moral strength and courage, is the virtue bj' which one meets .and sustains dangers .and difficulties, even death itself, and is never through fe.ar of these de- terred from the pursuit of good which reason dictates. (See FoHTiTtTDE.) The virtues annexed to fortitude are: (1) Patience, which disposes us to bear present evils with equanimity; for as the brave man is one who represses those fears which make him shrink from