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 UNIVERSALS

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UNIVERSALS

More marked in its success and wider in the range of its influence was the propaganda of the Rev. Hosea Ballou (1771-1852), whose Unitarian views triumphed in the denomination over the SabeUian conception of the Trinity taught by Murray. His teaching of universal salvation immediately after death, however, did not meet with unanimous approval, and caused the secession of eight ministers and some members who, under the name of Restorationists, founded a separate sect. But the existence of this new creation was short-lived (1831-41), while the parent body spread during Ballou's lifetime not only in the United States but also to Canada. Its progress was retarded by the Civil War, but the propaganda subsequently carried on, chiefly under the dhection of the board of trustees and the state conventions, was crowned with some success, and the denomination is now represented in almost every state of the Union. The statistics for 1910, however, indicate a decrease of 9 churches and 268t) communicants. Foreign missionary work has recently been inaugurated, and is carried on mainly in Japan, where the first station was founded in 1.890. The church maintains chari- table institutions in New York, Philadelphia, Minne- apolis, and Boston. It supports a publishing house in the latter city, with a branch in Chicago. It controls the following educational institutions: Tufts College (founded in 1852), Medford, INIass.; Lombard College (1852), Galesburg, lUinois; St. Lawrence University (1856), Canton, New York; Buchtel College (1872), Akron, Ohio. A school of divinitj' is connected with the first three institutions named. Academies are maintained at Frankhn, Massachusetts (Dean Academy); Barre, Vermont (Goddard Seminary); and Portland, Maine (West- brook Seminary). Statistics for the United States in 1911, according to Dr. H. K. Carroll in the "Christian Advocate", New York, 25 Jan., 1912: 709 ministers, 886 churches; 52,150 communicants.

Ballou, A Treatise on Atonement (14th ed., Boston, 1902); Thayer. Theology of Universalism (Boston, 1862, 1891); ATWoon, The Latest Word of Universalism (Boston, 1880); Eddy, Univer- salism in America (Boston, 1884-86); Idem, History of Univer- salism in Amer. Church Hist. Series, X, 251-493 (New York, 1894); Adams, Fifty Notable Years (Boston, 1882): Thomas,^ Century of Universalism (Boston, 1872); also the biographies of Ballou by Whittemore (Boston, 1854-55) and Safford (Boston, 1889); of Murray by his wife (Boston, 1860), and Adams, Hosea Bal- lou and the Gospel Renaissance (Boston, 1903),

N. A. W'eber.

Universals. — I. Meaning of the Term. — The name refers on the one hand to the inclination towards uniformity (uiii-versus) existing in difTerent things, in virtue of which dilTerent things may be represented by a single idea applicable to all in the same way; and on the other hand to this one idea which is applicable to the different things {unum versus alia).

II. Definition. — Universals are those ideas which, while excluding whatever constitutes the difference of things of the same genus or species, represent that which is necessary to their constitution, is essential, and is therefore common to all, remaining fixed in all vicissitudes {universalia post rem, in re). Universals are thus merely an expression of those Divine ideas which are concerned with the universal {universalia ante rem). Universal ideas are opposed to sense impres- sions, which represent that which is merely individual and contingent in a concrete phenomenon, and thus that which changes with circumstances in corporeal things of the same kind. These sense impressions correspond to those Divine ideas which are concerned with the corporeal individual.

III. Subdivision. — In so far as the nature of a thing is the object of a direct act of perception, it contains no relation to individuals, but is recognized in itself only according to its essential parts. When, how- ever, the intellect has represented to itself the essen- tial form of a thing (whether this be a substance or an accident), it can by reflexion make this representa-

tion of the essence the object of its perception. It can apply the idea to various individuals of the same kind, can compare it with other ideas, and thus deter- mine relationship and differences. The universale directum thus appears as an embryo, which is devel- oped, ever more clearly arranged, and constantly more nearly perfected by reflexion and various logical operations. It is but another way from the imperfect idea which a great investigator of ants formed when as a boy he first saw an ant, to that perfected idea of the animal which he now possesses as the result of all his investigations and studies.

The means to arrive at a perfect idea and an exact definition is the clear distinction between the parts of a thing, which are grasped directly, if obscurely, by the perception. It should here be remarked that our intellect proceeds from the more general and thus less precise ideas to the less general and more precise. In the direct recognition of a corporeal being, it grasps first its reahty, the idea of existence. This is the most universal of all ideas, but it is no true universal, since existence pertains to different things in different ways, and consequently cannot be predi- cated equivocally of all of them. W'hile the senses are grasping what is individual in the phenomena, the intellect presses onward to the essence or nature of the thing, and grasps especially that which is most universal, its independence, and forms the idea of substance. It simultaneously seizes the notes of existence pertaining to and borne by the substance (accidents), which in the individual phenomenon are the object of the senses. Meanwliile it does not escape the intellect that quality and ciuantity are possessed by the substance which they determine in an entirely different way from the actio (action) and passio (passion), and these again in an entirely different way from the iibi (where) and quando (when), and that relation stands on the extreme border of accidental existence. In short, it grasps the various modes of existence of the above-mentioned accidents in the first substance. It thus conies that the idea of an accident is only analogous, like that of substance, and that it has no greater claim than this to be con- sidered a true universal. The case is otherwise with the idea of substance and the ideas of the individual accidents mentioned above. They are the most universal of universals in the true sense of the word.

If these ideas be applied with the help of reflexion to individuals, they become the highest predicates (categories) of concrete substance, and prove also the highest ideas of genera. The intellect is not yet satisfied. If possible, it proceeds step by step from the highest and least determinate idea of genus to the lowest and most determinate, which represents that which is common to two immediately related kinds. Only then is it possible to form a clear and distinct idea of species. This having been accomplished, one can distinguish tlie difference constituting the species, and by noting this lowest species and this difference supply an exact definition. In very many cases, however, the intellect must remain content with the greatest possible approximation to the definition. For this pun^ose are employed description, the char- acteristics, explanation, and discussion. The final object in this is to give the lowest clearly recognizable species and that which, in the notes added to the substance, is proper (proprium, t&Mv) to all the iiuliviiluals of the same kind. Consequently, the con- nexion of the accidents with the substance must be established to discover which of those accidents neces- sarily and of themselves arise from the substance (and from this alone), as speech in the case of man. Other properties are to be referred to fortuitous exter- nal influences, as lameness in the case of individual men. We thus obtain the logical accident, which indeed must be distinguished from the metaphysical, which, in accordance with what was said above, may