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such, both in regard to their existence and their con- tent, belong to the mind which judges. What then is ihe relation that holds between these ideas and their objects when our judgments are true, and again when they are false? Surely both logic and criteriology imply that we know something more about such judg- ments than merely that they are difTerent.

Bert rand Kusscll. who has given in his adhesion to

"The Program and First Platform of 8ix Realists", drawn up and signed by six American professors in

luly, 1910, modifies somewhat the naivete of their t heorj' of truth. "Every judgment ", he says (Philos. I'.s.says, 181), "is a relation of a mind to several ob- jiits, one of which is a relation. Thus, the judgment,

Charles I died on the scaffold', denotes several ob- jects or 'objectives' which are related in a certain (lehnite way, and the relation is as real in this case as are the other objectives. The judgment 'Charles I died in his bed', on the other hand, denotes the ob- jects, Charles I, death, and bed, and a certain relation lictwoen them, which in this case does not relate the ' il)j(>cts as it is supposed to relate them. A judgment, 1 licrefore, is true, when the rclat if)n which is one of the "lijects relates the other objects, otherwise it is fal.se" iloc. cit.). In this statement of the nature of truth, correspondence between the miml judging and the ob- jects about which we judge is distinctly implied, and it IS precisely this correspondence which is set down as the distinguishing mark of true judgments. Russell, however, unfortimately seems to be at variance with other members of the New Realist school on this point, ti. E. Moore expresslv rejects the correspondence theory of truth ("Mind", X. S., VIII, 179 sq.), and Prichard, another English Realist, explicitly states that in knowledge there is nothing between the object ■ind ourselves (Kant's Theorj' of Knowledge, 21). Xi'vertheless, it is matter for rejoicing that in regard to t he main points at issue — the non-alteration of reality li.\ acts of cognition, the possibility of knowing it in some respects without its being known in all, the growth of knowledge by "accretion", the non- spiritual character of some of the objects of experi- ence, and the necessity of ascertaining empirically, aiiil not by a priori methods, the degree of unity which "litains between the various parts of the universe — the "Xew" Realist and the Scholastic Realist are substantially in .agreement.

III. MoR.\L Truth, or Veracity, is the corre- spondence of the outward expression given to thought with the thought itself. It must not be confused with verbal truth ircrilns locutionis), which is the cor- respondence of the outward or verbal expression with the thing that it is intended to express. The latter sujiposes on the ])art of the speaker not only the in- tention of speaking truly, but also the power so to do, i. e, it supposes (1) true knowledge and (2) a right Use of words. Moral truth, on the other hand, exists \'. henever the speaker expresses what is in his mind, ■Mil if lie facto he be mistaken, provided only that he - i\s what he thinks to be true. This latter condil ion, however, is necessary. Hence a better definition of iiioral truth would be "the correspondence of the nut- wa d expression of thought with Ihe thing as con- ceived by the speaker". Moral truth, therefore, does not imply true knowledge. But, though a deviation from moral truth would be only materially a lie, and hence not blameworthy, unle.s.s the use of words or signs were intentionally incorrect, moral truth does imply a correct use of words or other signs. A lie, therefore, is an intentional deviation from moral truth, and is defined as a lociitio rniitra menteni; i. e. it is the outw^ard expression of a thought which is in- tentionally diverse from Ihe thing as conceived by the speaker. It is important to ob.serve, however, that the expression of the thought, whet her by word or by sign, must in all eases be taken in its context; for both in regard to words an<l to signs, custom and circum-

stances make a considerable difference with respect to their interpretation. Veracity, or the habit of speak- ing the truth, is a virtue; and the obligation of practis- ing it arises from a twofold source. First, "since man is a social animal, naturally one man owes to an- other that without which human society could not go on. But men could not live together if thej' did not believe one another to be speaking the truth. Hence the virtue of veracity comes to some extent under the head of justice [rationcm debili]" (St. Thomas, Summa, II-II, Q. cix, a. 5). The second source of the obligation to veracity arises from the fact that speech is clearly of its very nature intended for the communi- cation of knowledge by one to another. It should be used, therefore, for the purpose for which it is natu- rally intended, and lies should be avoided. For lies are not merely a misuse, but an abuse, of the gift of speech, since, by destroying man's instinctive belief in the veracity of his neighbour, they tend to destroy the efficacy of that gift.

For .Scholasticism see: sctinln^Iic trcjitiscs on major logic, s. v. \'rril,is: Eludes sur la I'.r'. I'm I'"'' liiM. Une nomelle thrnrie de la coniiaissan,, [ ii,, I " ■'. % \ht. On Truth

(London. 18S9); John Hikmi, / ;, of Knowledge;

RorssELOT, Vlntcllecluah r,._ /, -!. J. ,: Ijris. 1909): ToN- QUEDEc, La notion de la lerilc dun$ la pfnlosophie nouvelle in Etudes (1907), CX. 721; CXI, 433; CXII. 68, 335; Walker, Tlieories o/ Knowledge (2d ed., London, 1911); Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge (London, 190B).

Absolutism: Br.vdley, Appearance and Renlil<i (London, 1899); Idem, Articles in Mind. .V. .S., LI, LXXI, I. XXII (1904, 1909. 1910); Joachim, The Nature of Truth ((ixf.ir.l. 1906); Tavlob. Elements of Metaphusics (London, 1903); Articles in Mind, N. S., LVII (190fi), and Philos. Rei:, XIV, 3.

Pragmatism: BERoaoN, VEvolution Creatrice (7th ed., Paris, 1911); Dewev, Studies in Loijical Theory (Chicago, 1903); James, Pragmatism (London. 19071: Ioem. The Mcanino of Truth (London, 1909); Idem, .s^" ■ /'-';.■., /' .; / . |..ii,l,,n.

1911); Moore. Pragmah I ' :■ I'M ;

Abel Rey, La theorie d' h ,.', I ' ■ rtn, -, n ;,

Axioms as Postulates in !•■< n! I [ .. :.i, ]'ni_' |i.}m. //umanism (London. 19021; IDKM, - ' li.ndon, 1907): SltiMEU Die Philosophic  //,, 1 ./..lelian Society, VII.

Leslie J. Walker.

Truth Societies, Catholic. — This article will treat of Catholic Truth Societies in the chronological order of their establishment in various countries.

In Engla.nd. — The Catholic Truth Society has had two periods of existence. It was initiated by Dr. (afterwards Cardinal) Vaughan when he was Rector of St. Joseph's Missionary College, and, in the two or three years of its existence, i.ssued a number of leaflets and penny books, some of which are still on sale; but when he became Bishop of Salford, in 1872, the society fell into abeyance .and soon practically ceased to exist. Meanwhile, and quite independently, the need of cheap, good literature impressed itself upon some priests and laymen, who raised the sum of twelve pounds, which was expended in printing some little cards of prayers for daily use, and for confession and Communion. The .scheme was brought before Dr. Vaughan, who suggested that the new body should take the name and place of the d(>funct Catho- lic Truth Society. Under that name it was formally established, .5 November, 18,84, and the second period of its existence began under the presidency of Dr. Vaughan, the Rev. W. H. (now Monsignor) Cologan and Mr. James Britten being appointed honorary secretaries. .A.t the death of Cardinal Vaughan, the present .Vrchbi.shop of Westminster, Cardinal Bourne, became president. The aims of the society .are: To spread among Catholics small devotional works; to assist the uneducated poor to ;i better knowledge of their religion; to sprciid among Protestants informa- tion regarding Catholic faith and practice; and to pro- mote the circulal ion of gooii and cheap Catholic litera- ture. These objects have been steadily kept in view