Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 14.djvu/668

 THEOLOGY

608

THEOLOGY

underBtandings. In order to elucidate the accusa- tions brought against casuistry, we use the wholly unjustifiable criticism which Hirscher launched against Scholastic theology in general in his work of 1832, "On the Relation between the Gospel and Theological Scholasticism"; it is quoted approvingly by DoUinger and Reusch (Moralstreitigkeiten, 13 sqq.) :—

(1) "Instead of penetrating into the spirit which makes vti-tue what it is and underlies everything that is good in this world, in other words, instead of beginning with the one indivisible nature of all goodness, they begin with the material of the various moral precepts and prohibitions without adverting to where these originate, on what foundation they rest, and what is their hfe-giving principle." This moans that Scholastics and casuists know only intli\idual things, see nothing universal and uniform in the virtues and duties.

(2) "Instead of deriving these precepts and pro- hibitions from the one, individual essence of aU goodness and thereby creating certainty in the moral judgments of their audience, they, rejecting principles, string 'shalt' to 'shalt', provide them with innumerable statutes and clauses, confuse and oppress the hearer by the overflowing measure of duties, half-duties, non-duties." In other words, the Scholastics oppress and confuse by an unneces- sary multiplication of duties and non-duties.

(3) "It is more in accordance with the spirit of Mosaism than with that of Christianity when Christian morality is treated less as a doctrine of virtues than of laws and duties, and when by adding commandment to commandment, prohibition to prohibition, it gives us a full and shaken measure of moral rules instead of building up on the Christian spirit, deriving everything from it and pointing out all particular virtues in its light." Or briefly, casuistry promotes exterior sanctimoniousness with- out the interior spirit.

(4) "Those who treat morals from the standpoint of casuistry, assign an important part to the dis- tinction between grave and hght laws, grave and light duties, serious and shght transgressions, mortal and venial sins. . . . Now, the distinction between grievous and venial sins is not without a solid foun- dation, and if it is chiefly based on the different qual- ities of the will, and if, besides, the various degrees of goodness and malice are measured by the presence, e. g., of a purely good and strong will, of one less pure and less strong, of a weak, inert, impure, mali- cious, perverted will, then nobody will raise his voice against it. But it is wholly different when the dis- tinction between mortal and venial sins is taken objectively, and based on the gravity and lightness of the commandments. . . . Such a distinction between mortal and venial sins, founded on the material differences of the commandments and the prohibi- tions, is a source of torment and anxiety for many. . . . True moraUty cannot be advanced through such an anxiety. . . . The mass of the people will derive only this one profit from such a method: many will refrain from what is forbidden under pain of mortal sin and will do what is commanded under the same penalty, but they will care little for what is commanded or forbidden under i)ain of venial sin only; on the contrary they will seek a compensation in the latter for what they sacrificed to the grave commandments. But can we call the lives of such men Christian?" In other words, casuistry falsifies the consciences by distinguishing objectively between mortal and venial sins, leads to a contempt of the latter, and renders a genuinely Christian life impos- sible.

It is not difficult to refute all these accusations. One glance at the "Summa theologica" of St. Thomas will prove how incorrect is the first charge that

Scholasticism and casuistry know only individual good acts and individual virtues, without inquiring into the foundation common to all virtues. Before treating the individual virtues and the individual duties, St. Thomas gives us a whole volume of dis- cussions of a general nature, of which we may note the profound speculations on the last end, the good- ness and malice of human actions, the eternal law.

The second accusation, that the Scholastic casuis- try confuses the mind by its mass of duties and non-duties, can only mean that the Scholastic casuis- try sets these up arbitrarily and contrary to truth. The complaint can only refer to those works and lectures which aim at the instruction of the clergy, pastors, and confessors. The reader or hearer who is confused or oppressed by this "mass of duties etc." shows by this very fact that he has not the talent necessary for the office of confessor or spiritual guide, that he should therefore choose anotlier voca- tion.

The third charge, directed against Judaical hj^joc- risy which neglects the fostering of the interior life, is refuted by every work on casuistry, however meagre, for every one of them states most emphati- cally that, without the state of grace and a good intention, all external works, no matter how difficult and heroic, are valueless in the sight of God. Can the necessity of the internal spirit be brought out more clearly? And even if, in some cases, the external fulfilment of a certain work is laid down as the minimum demanded by God or the Church, without which the Christian would incur eternal damnation, yet this is not banishing the internal spirit, but designating the external fulfilment as the low-water mark of morality.

Lastly, the fourth charge springs from a very grave theological error. There can be no doubt that, in judging the heinousness of sin and in distinguishing between mortal and venial sins, the subjective element must be taken into consideration. How- ever, every compendium of moral theology, no matter how casuistical, meets this requirement. Every manual distinguishes sins which arise from ignorance, weakness, mahce, without, however, labelling all sins of weakness as venial sins, or all sins of mahce as mortal sins; for there are surely minor acts of maUce which cannot be said to cause the death of the soul. Every manual also takes cognizance of sins which are committed without sufficient dehber- ation, knowledge, or freedom: all these, even though the matter be grave, are coimted as venial sins. On the other hand, every manual recognizes venial and grievous sins whidi are such by the gi'avity of the matter alone. Or who would, abstracting from everything else, put a jocose lie on a par with the denial of faith? But even in these sins, mortal or venial according to their object, the casuists lay stress on the personal dispositions in which the sin was actually committed. Hence, their universal principle: the result of a subjectively erroneous con- science may be that an action which is in itself only venial, becomes a mortal sin, and vice versa, that an action which is in itself mortally sinful, that is, con- stitutes a grave violation of the moral law, may be only a venial sin. Nevertheless, all theologians, also casuists, consider a correct conscience a great boon and hence endeavour, by their casuistic dis- cussions, to contribute towards the formation of correct consciences, so that the subjective estimate of the morality of certain actions may coincide, as far as pos.'^ible, with the objective norm of morality.

When, lastly, various opponents of the casuistical method object that the moralist occupies himself exclusively with sins and their analysis, with the "dark side" of human life, let them remember that it is physically impossible to say e\erything in one breath, that, just as in many other arts and sciences,