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STATE

eion as to when a question does or does not involve spiritual matter, either purely or in part, rests with the Church. It cannot he with the State, whose jurisdiction, because of the inferiority of its ultimate end and proximate purpose, has not such judicial faculty in regard to the subject-matter of a jurisdic- tion which is as far above its own as the ultimate end and proximate purpose thereof is above that of the State. In analogous fashion every higher court is always judge of its own jurisdiction as against a lower.

All the above is matter of principle, argued out as a question of objective right, and it supposes that the jurisdiction is to be applied through the respective subjects of the same. In point of fact the duty of submission in a citizen of a State to the higher juris- diction of the Church does not exist where the citizen is not a subject of the Church, for over such the Church claims no governing power. It may also be by accident subjectively obscured in one who, though in point of right the Church's subject, in good faith fails, through an erroneous conscience, to recognize this fact, and, by consequence, the Church's right and his own duty. The subject of the State has been made fairly clear by human law and custom; but the frequent rebellion, continued through centuries, of great numbers of the Church's subjects has confused in the mind of the non-Catholic world the notion of who is by revealed law a subject of the Church. The juridical subject of the Church is every human being that has vahdly received the Sacrament of Baptism. This birth into the Church bj- baptism is analogous to the birth within the territory of a State of the off spring of one of its citizens. However, this new-born subject of the State can, under certain circumstances, renounce his allegiance to his native State and be accepted as the subject of another. Not so one born into the Ch>u-ch by baptism: for baptism is a sacra- ment leaving an indelible character upon the soul, which man cannot remove and so escape legitimate subjection. Yet, as in a State, a man may be a sub- ject without full rights of citizenship; may even, while remaining a subject, lose those rights by his own act or that of his parents; so, analogously, not every subject of the Church is a member thereof, and once a mem- ber, he may lose the social rights of membership in the Church without ceasing to be its subject. For full membership in the Church, besides valid baptism, one must by union of faith and allegiance be in fellow- ship with her, and not be deprived of the rights of membenship by ecclesiastical censure. Hence, those validly baptized Christians who Uve in schism or, whether by reason of apostasy or of initial education, profess a faith different from that of the Church, or are excommunicated therefrom, are not members of the Church, though as a matter of objective right and duty they are still her subjects. In practice the Church, while retaining her right over all subjects, does not — except in some few matters not of moment here — insist upon exercising her jurisdiction over any but her members, as it is clear that she cannot expect obedience from those Christians who, being in faith or government separated from her, see no right in her to command, and consequently recognize no duty to obey. Over those who are not baptized she claims no right to govern, though she has the indefeasible right to preach the Gospel among them and to endeavour to win them over to become members of Christ's Church and so citizens of her ecclesiastical polity.

III. Mutual Corpor.\te Rei-ation op Church AND State. — Every perfect society must acknowledge the rights of every other perfect society; nmst render to it all duties consequent upon such rights; must respect its autonomy; and may di'inand the recog- nition of its own rights and the fuliilmeiit of obli- gations arising therefrom. Whether one may .also command such recognition and fulfihnent is another question: one docs not involve the other; thus, for in-

stance, the United States may demand its rights of England, but cannot command England to acknowl- edge them, as the United States has no authority over England or any other nation. Prescinding from this for the moment, the Church must respect the rights of the State to govern its subjects in all purely tem- poral matters, and, if the subjects of the State are likewise subjects of the Church, must hold the latter to the fulfilment of their civil duties as an obligation in conscience. On the other hand, in principle, as a matter of objective duty, the State is bound to recog- nize the juridical rights of the Church in all matters spiritual, whether purely so or of mixed character, and its judicial right to determine the character of mat- ters of jurisdiction, in regard, namely, to their spirit- ual quality. The State, furthermore, is bound to render due worship to God, as follows from the same argument from the natural law which proves man's obligation to external worship, namely, that man must acknowledge his dependence upon God and his subjection to Him in every capacity in which he is so dependent, and therefore not only in his private capacity as an individual but also in that pubhc, corporate capacity whereby he and his fellow citizens constitute the State. Due worship, in the present economy, is that of the religion of Christ, entrusted to the care of the Church. The State must also protect the Church in the exercise of her functions, for the reason that the State is bound to protect all the rights of its citizens, and among these their religious rights, which as a matter of fact would be insecure and fruit- less were not the Church protected. The State is even under obligation to promote the spiritual inter- ests of the Church; for the State is bound to promote whatever by reaction naturally works for the moral development of its citizens and consequently for the internal peace of the community, and in the present condition of human nature that development is neces- sarily dependent upon the spiritual influence of the Church.

There being, then, an obligation upon the State as such, arising out of the Natural and the Divine Posi- tive Law, to render public Divine worship in accord- ance with the guidance of the Church, in whose charge Christ has placed the worship due in the present order of things, an obligation also to protect the Church and to promote her interests, the Church clearly has a per- fect right to demand the fulfilment of these duties, since their neglect would infringe her right to the benefit proceeding from the fulfilment. To have the further right to command the State in their regard im- plies that the Church has a right to impose the obli- gations of her authority in their regard, to exact them authoritatively from the State. Now in purely tem- poral matters, while they remain such, the Church cannot command the State any more than she can command the subjects of the State, even though these are at the same time her own subjects. But in spiritual and mixed matters calling for corporate action of the State, the question depends upon whether the jihysical persons who make up the moral personality of the State are themselves .■subjects of the Church. In case they are, then the (^hurch has in consequence jurisdiction therein over the State. The reason is that owing to the supremacy' in man's life purposes of his eternal hajipiness, man in all his ca- pacities, even of a civil nature, must direct his activi- ties so that they shall not hinder this end, and where action even in his official or civil capacity is necessary for this ultimate purpose he is bound to place the ac- tion: moreover, in all these activities -so bearing on this end, since they are theretiy si)iritual matter, every subject of the Church is under the jurisdiction of the Church. If, then, the physical persons constituting the moral per.son of the State are the subjects of the Church, they are still, in this joint capacity, subject to her in like matters, namely, in the fulfilment of all