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SODALITY

and, when the time came, met his fate with a caka- ness and dignity which have earned for him a high place among those who suffered unjustly for con- science sake. He was a man of great moral earnest- ness, and exemplified in his own life some of the no- blest moral virtues. At the same time, he did not rise above the moral level of his contemporaries in every respect, and Christian apologists have no difficulty La refuting the contention that he was the equal of the Christian saints. His frequent references to a "di- vine voice'' that inspired him at critical moments in his career are, perhaps, best explained by saying that they are simply his peculiar way of speaking about the promptings of his own conscience. They do not necessarily imply a pathological condition of his mind, nor a superstitious beUef in the e.xistence of a "fa- miliar demon".

Socrates was, above all things, a reformer. He was alarmed at the condition of affairs in Athens, a condi- tion which he was, perhaps, right in ;»scribing to the Sophists. They taught that there is no objective standard of the true and the false, that that is true which seems to be true, and that that is fal.se which seems to be false. Socrates considered that this theo- retical scepticism led inevitably to moral anarchy. If that is true which seems to be true, then that is good, he said, which seems to be good. Up to this time morality was taught not by principles scientifi- cally determined, but b}' instances, proverbs, and apothegms. He undertook, therefore, first to deter- mine the conditions of universally valid knowledge, and, secondly, to found on universally valid moral principles a science of human conduct. Self-knowl- edge is the starting-point, because, he believed, the greatest source of the prevalent confusion was the failure to realize how little we know about anything, in the true sense of the word know. The statesman, the orator, the poet, think they know much about courage; for they talk about it as being noble, and praiseworthy, and beautiful, etc. But they are really ignorant of it until they know what it is, in other words, until they loiow its definition. The definite meaning, therefore, to be attached to the maxim "Know thyself" is "Reahze the extent of thine own ignorance."

Consequently, the Socratic method of teaching in- cluded two stages, the negative and the positive. In the negative stage, Socrates, approaching his intended pupil in an attitude of assumed ignorance, would be- gin to ask a question, apparently for his own informa- tion. He would follow this by other questions, until his interlocutor would at last be obliged to confess ignorance of the subject discussed. Because of the pretended deference which Socrates payed to the su- perior intelligence of his pupil, this stage of the method was called "Socratic Irony". In the positive stage of the method, once the pupil had acknowledged his ignorance, Socrates would proceed to another series of quest ions, each of which would bring out some phase or aspect of the subject, so that when, at the end, the answers were aU summed up in a general statement, that statement expressed the concept of the subject, or the definition. Knowledge through concepts, or knowledge by definition, is the aim, there- fore, of the Socratic method. The entire process was called " Heuristic", because it was a method of finding, and opposed to "Eristic", which is the method of strife, or contention. Knowledge through concepts is certain, Socrates taught, and offers a firm foundation for the structure not only of theoretical knowledge, but also of moral principles, and the science of himian conduct. Carried away by his enthusiiusm for con- cept ional knowledge a-s a basis of conduct, Socrates went so far as to maintain that all right conduct de- pends on clear knowledge, that not only does a defi- nition of a virtue aid us in acquiring that virtue, but that the definition of the virtue is the virtue. A man

who can define justice is just, and, in general, theo- retical insight into the principles of conduct is identi- cal with moral excellence in conduct; knowledge is virtue. Contrariwise, ignorance is vice, and no one can knowingly do wrong. These principles are, of course, only partly true. Their formulation, how- ever, at this time was of tremendous importance, be- cause it marks the beginning of an attempt to build up on general principles a science of human conduct.

Socrates devoted little attention to questions of physics and cosmogony. Indeed, he did not conceal his contempt for these questions when comparing them with questions affecting man, his nature and his destiny. He was, however, interested in the ques- tion of the existence of God and fomiulated an argu- ment from design which was afterwards known as the "Teleological Argument" for the existence of God. "\Miatever exLsts for a useful purpose must be the work of an intelligence" is the major premise of Soc- rates' argument, and may be said to be the major premise, explicit or implicit, of every teleological ar- gument formulated since his time. Socrates was pro- foimdly convinced of the immortality of the soul, although in his address to his judges he argues against the fear of death in such a way as apparenth- to offer two alternatives: "Either death ends all things, or it is the beginning of a happy life." His real conviction was that the soul sur\'ives the body, unless, indeed, we are misled bj' our authorities, Plato and Xenophon. In the absence of primarj- sources — Socrates, appar- ently, never wrote anything — we are obliged to rely on these ^Titers and on a few references of Aristotle for our knowledge of what Socrates taught. Plato's portrayal of Socrates is idealistic; when, however, we correct it by reference to Xenophon's more practical view of Socrates' teaching, the result cannot be far from historic truth.

For Sources, Ritter and Preller, Hist. PhilosophuE Gtceoe (Gotha. 1S8S), 192 sq.: B.ikewell. Source Book in Ancient Phi- losophy (New York, 1907), SO sq. Consult Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, tr. Reichel (London. ISSo) : Piat. Socrate (Paris, 1900); Tcrxer. Hist, of Philosophy (Boston, 1903), 7" sq.

William Turner.

Sodality. — I. The sodalities of the Church are pious associations (see Associ.\tioxs, Pious) and are included among the confraternities and archcon- fraternities (q. v.). It would not be possible to give a definition making a clear distinction between the sodalities and other confraternities; consequently the development and history of the sodalities are the same as those of the religious confraternities. A general sketch of these latter has been already given in the account of the medieval confraternities of prayer (see Purg.^torial Societies). They are also mentioned in the article Sc.\pular. Confraternities and sodahties, in the present meaning of the word, the only ones which will be here mentioned, had their beginnings after the rise of the confraternities of prayer in the early Middle Ages, and developed rapidly from the end of the twelfth century, i. e. from the rise of the great ecclesiastical orders. Proofs of this are to be found in the Bulhiria and annals of these orders, as those of the Dominicans, the Carmelites, and the Servites. [Cf..\rmellini, "Lechiesedi Roma" (2nd ed., Rome, 1S91). '20 sqq.; "Historisch-poU- tische Blatter", cxhiii (Mimich, 1911), 759 sqq.,_8'23 .sqq.; Ebner, "Die acht Briider.schaften des hi. Wolf- gang in Regensburg" in Mahler, " Der hi. Wolfgang" (RatLsbon, 1894), lS2sq.; Villanueva, "Viagehterario a las Iglesias de Espana", VIII (Valencia, 1821), 258 sqq., .\p6ndice XXIII; ibid., XI (Madrid. 1850), 185 sq., Ap(5ndice IV; Gallia Christ., XI, instr. 253 sq., n. XXVII; ibid., VI, instr. 366, n. XXXIV; Mabillon, ".Vnnales Ordinis Bencdicti", VI, Lucca, 1745,361sqq.,adan.ll45;Martene, "Thes.aurusnovu3 anecdotorum", IV (Paris, 1717), 165 sqq. "Confrater- nitas Massiliensis an. 1212 instituta"; "Monumenta