Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 13.djvu/25

 REVELATION

3

REVELATION

in which the right of the intellect to claim absolute independence (autonomy) is denied. "If anyone shall say that human reason is independent in such wise that faith cannot be commanded it by God — let him be anathema" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. i). This canon is directed against the position maintained as already noted by the older Rationalists and the Deists, that human reason is amply sufficient with- out exterior assistance to attain to absolute truth in all matters of religion (of. Vacant, "Etudes Theo- logiques", I, 572; II, 387).

III. Necessity op Revelation. — Can it be said that Revelation is necessary to man? There can be no question as to its necessity, if it be admitted that God destines man to attain a supernatural beatitude which surpasses the exigencies of his nat- ural endowments. In that case God must needs reveal alike the existence of that supernatural end and the means by which we are to attain it. But is Revelation necessary even in order that man should observe the precepts of the natural law? If our race be viewed in its present condition as his- tory displays it, the answer can only be that it is, morally speaking, impossible for men unassisted by Revelation, to attain by their natural powers such a knowledge of that law as is sufficient to the right or- dering of life. In other words, Revelation is morally necessary. Absolute necessity we do not assert. Man, Catholic theology teaches, possesses the req- uisite faculties to discover the natural law. Luther indeed asserted that man's intellect had become hope- lessly obscured by original sin, so that even natural truth was beyond his reach. And the Traditionalists of the nineteenth century (Bautain, Bonnetty, etc.) also fell into error, teaching that man was incapable of arriving at moral and religious truth apart from Revelation. The Church, on the contrary, recognizes the capacity of human reason, and grants that here and there pagans may have existed, who had freed themselves from prevalent errors, and who had at- tained to such a knowledge of the natural law as would suffice to guide them to the attainment of beatitude. But she teaches nevertheless that this can only be the case as regards a few, and that for the bulk of mankind Revelation is necessary. That this is so may be shown both from the facts of history and from the nature of the case. As regards the testimony of history, it is notorious that even the most civilized of pagan races have fallen into the grossest errors regarding the natural law; and from these it may safely be asserted they would never have emerged. Certainly the schools of philosophy would not have enabled them to do so; for many of these denied even such fundamental principles of the nat- ural law as the personality of God and the freedom of the will. Again, by the very nature of the ca.se, the difficulties involved in the attainment of the req- uisite knowledge are insuperable. For men to be able to attain such a knowledge of the natural law as will enable them to order their lives rightly, the truths of that law must be so plain that the mass of men can discover them without long delay, and pos- sess a knowledge of them which will be alike free from uncertainty and secure from serious error. No reasonable man will maintain that in the case of the greater part of mankind this is possible. Even the most vital truths are called in question and are met by serious objections. The separation of truth from error is a work involving time and labour. For this the majority of men have neither inclination nor opportunity. Apart from the security which Revelation gives they would reject an obligation both irksome and uncertain. It results that a rev- elation even of the natural law is for man in his present state a moral necessity.

IV. Criteria op Revelation. — The fact that Revelation is not merely possible but morally neces-

sary is in itself a strong argument for the existence of a revelation, and imposes on all men the strict obliga- tion of examining the credentials of a religion which presents itself with prima Jade marks of truth. On the other hand if God has conferred a revelation on men, it stands to reason that He must have at- tached to it plain and evident criteria enabling even the unlettered to recognize His message for what it is, and to distinguish it from all false claimants.

The criteria of Revelation are either external or internal: (1) External criteria consist in certain signs attached to the revelation as a divine testimony to its truth, e. g., miracles. (2) Internal criteria are tho-se which are found in the nature of the doctrine itself, in the manner in which it was presented to the world, and in the effects which it produces on the soul. These are distinguished into negative and positive criteria, (a) The immunity of the alleged revela- tion from any teaching, speculative or moral, which ia manifestly erroneous or self-contradictory, the ab- sence of all fraud on the part of those who deliver it to the world, provide negative internal criteria, (b) Positive internal criteria are of various kinds. One such is found in the beneficent effects of the doctrine and in its power to meet even the highest aspirations which man can frame. Another consists in the internal conviction felt by the soul as to the truth of the doctrine (Suarez, "De Fide", IV, sect. 5, n. 9.) In the last century there was in certain schools of thought a manifest tendency to deny the value of all external criteria. This was largely due to the Rationalist polemic against miracles. Not a few non-Catholic divines anxious to make terras with the enemy adopted this attitude. They allowed that miracles are useless as a foundation for faith, and that they form on the contrary one of the chief difficulties which lie in faith's path. Faith, they admitted, must be presupposed before the miracle can be accepted. Hence these writers held the sole criterion of faith to lie in inward experience — in the testimony of the Spirit. Thus Schleiermacher says: "We renounce altogether any attempt to demon- strate the truth and the necessity of the Christian religion. On the contrary we assume that every Christian before he commences inquiries of this kind is already convinced that no other form of religion but the Christian can harmonize with his piety" (Glaubenslehre, n. 11). The Traditionalists by deny- ing the power of human reason to test the grounds of faith were driven to fall back on the same cri- terion (cf. Lamennais, "Pensees Diverses", p. 488). This position is altogether untenable. The tes- timony afforded by inward experience is undoubtedly not to be neglected. Catholic doctors have always recognized its value. But its force is limited to the individual who is the subject of it. It cannot be employed as a criterion valid for all; for its absence is no proof that the doctrine is not true. Moreover, of all the criteria it is the one with regard to which there is most possibility of deception. When truth mingled with error is presented to the mind, it often happens that the whole teaching, false and true alike, is believed to have a Divine guarantee, because the soul has recognized and welcomed the truth of some one doctrine, e. g., the Atonement. Taken alone and apart from objective proof it conveys but a prob- ability that the revelation is true. Hence the Vatican Council expressly condemns the error of those who teach it to be the only criterion (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. iii).

The perfect agreement of a religious doctrine with the teachings of reason and natural law, its power to satisfy, and more than satisfy, the highest aspirations of man, its beneficent influence both as regards public and private life, provide us with a more trustworthy test. This is a criterion which has often been applied with great force on behalf of the claims of the Catholic