Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 12.djvu/579

 PROVIDENCE

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PROVIDENCE

The question of Providence in the Fathers is aknost invariably connected with the problem of evil. How can evil and suffering be compatible with the benefi- cent pro\'idence of an all-powerful God? And why especially should the just be allowed to suffer while the wicked are apparently prosperous and happy? Pa- tristic solutions to these problems may be summed up under the following heads: (1) Sin is not ordained by the will of God, though it happens with His permis- sion. It can be ascribed to Providence only as a secondarj' result (Origen, "Contra Celsum", IV, Ixviii in "P. G.", XI, 1516-7; St. John Damascene, "De fid. orth.", ii, 21 in "P. G.", XCIV, 95 sq.). (2) Sin ia due to the abuse of free will; an abuse which was cer- tainly foreseen by God, but could have been prevented only by depri\Tng man of his most noble attribute (TertuUian, "Adv. Marcion.", II, v-\'ii in "P. L.", II, 317-20; St. C^Til of Alexandria, "In Juhan.", IX, xiii, 10, 11, 18' in "P. G.", LXXIV, 120-1, 127-32; Theodoret, "De prov. orat.", IX, vi in "P. G.", LXXXIII, 662). Moreover, (3) in this world man has to learn b}- experience and contrast, and to develop by the overcoming of obstacles (Lactantius, " De ira Dei ", xiii, XV in "P. L.", VII, 115-24; St. Augustine, "De ordine", I, \-ii, n. IS in "P. L.", XXXII, 986). (-1) One reason therefore whj' God permits sin is that man may arrive at once at a consciousness of righteousness and of his own inabihty to attain it, and so may put his trust in God (Anon. epis. ad Diog., vii-Lx in "P. G.", II, 1175 sq.; St. Gregorv the Great, "Lib. moral.", Ill, h-ii in "P. L.", LXXV, 627). (5) For sin itself God is not responsible, but only for the e\Tls that result as a pimishment of sin ^Tertullian, "Adv. Marc", II, xiv, xv in "P. L.", II, 327 sq.), evils which happen without God's wiU but are not contrary to it (St. Gregorj' the Great, op. cit., VI, xxxii in "P. L.", LXXVII, 746, 747). (6) Had there been no sin, phys- ical evil would have been inconsistent with the Di\-ine goodness (St. Augustine, "De div. qusst.", l.xxxii in " P. L.", LX, 98, 99) ; nor would God permit evil at all, unless He could draw good out of evil (St. Augustine, "Enchir.", xi in "P. L.", LX, 236; "Serm.", ccxiv, 3 in "P. L.", XXXVIII, 1067; St. Gregory- the Great, op. cit., VI, xx.\ii, XVIII, xlvi in "P. L.", LXXV, 747; LXXVI, 61-2). (7) All physical e\-il, therefore, is the consequence of sin, the inevitable result of the Fall (St. John Clirs'sostom, "Ad Stagir.", I, ii in "P. G.", LXVII, 428, 429; St. Gregorv the Great, op. cit., yill, Ii, lii in "P. L.", LXXV, 8"33, 834), and regarded in this light is seen to be at once a medicine (St. Augus- tine, "De div. quEBSt.", lxx.xii in "P. L.", XL, 98, 99; "Serm.", xvii, 4, 5 in "P. L.", XXXVIII, 126-8), a discipline ("Serm.", xv, 4-9 in "P. L.", XXXVIII, 118-21 ; St. Gregorj' the Great, op. cit., V, xxx\'; VII, xxix; XIV, xl in "P. L.", LXXV, 698, 818, 1060), and an occasion of charity (St. Gregorj' the Great, VII, xxix). Evil and suffering thus tend to the increase of merit (XIV, .xxxvi, xxxvii in "P. L.", 10.58, 1059), and in this way the function of justice becomes an agency for goodness (TertuUian, c. "Adv. Marc", II, xi, xiii in "P. L.", 324 sq.). (8) Evil, therefore, ministers to God's design (St. Gregory the Great, op. cit., VI, xxxii in "P. L.", LXXV, 747; Theodoret, "Deprov.orat.", v-yiii in "P. L.", LXXXIII, 652 sq.). Hence, if the universe be considered as a whole it will be found that that which for the indi^dual is evil will in the end turn out to be consistent with Divine goodness, in conformity with justice and right order (Origen, "Contra Celsum", IV, xcix in "P. G.", XI, 1177-80; St. .\ugustine, "De ordine", I, i-v, 9; II, iv in "P L.", XXXII, 977-87, 990, 999-1002). (9) It is the end that proves happiness (Lactantius, "De ira Dei", XX in "P. L.", VII, 137 sq.; St. Ambrose, "De offic minist.", XVI, cf. XII, XV in "P. L.", XVI, 44-6, 38 sq.; St. John Chrj'sostom, "Hom. xiii in Matt." n 5 in " P. G.", LXVli, 216, 217; St. Augu.stine, "In Ps.", xci, n. 8 in "P. L.", XXXIII, 1176; Theodoret, "De XII.— 33

prov. orat.", Lx in "P. G.", LXXXIII, 727 sq.). In the Last Judgment the problem of evil will be solved, but till then the workings of Providence will remain more or less a mystery (St. .\ugustine, "De div. qusest.", Lx.x.xii in "P. L.", XL, 98, 99; St. John Clirj-s- ostom, "Ad eos qui scand.", VIII, IX in "P. G.", LII, 494, 495). In regard to poverty and suffering, however, it is well to bear in mind that in depriving us of earthly goods, God is but recalling what is His own (St. Gregory the Great, op. cit., II, .xxxi in "P. L.", LXXVli, 571); and secondly that, as Salvianus tella us ("De gub. Dei", I, i, 2 in "P. L.", LIII, 29 sq.), nothing is so light that it does not appear heavy to him who bears it unwillingly, and nothing so hea\'y that it does not appear light to him who bears it with goodwill.

The Testimony of the Councils. — From the creeds we learn that God the Father is the omnipotent creator of heaven and earth; that God the Son descended from heaven, became man, suffered and died for our salva- tion, and is to be the judge of the living and the dead; that the Holy Ghost inspired the Prophets and the Apostles, and dwells in the saints — all of which implies Providence, nat ural and supernat ural. The Profession of Faith prescribed for the Waldenses in 1208 declares God to be the governor and disposer of all things cor- poreal and spiritual (Denzinger, 10th ed., 1908, n. 421). The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. vi, a. d. 816) defines that evil is in the power of man, and that e\-il deeds are not to be attributed to God in the same sense as good deeds, but permissive only, so that the vocation of Paul is God's work in a much truer sense than the treacherj' of Judas. The Council of the Vati- can sums up past doctrine in the statement that God in His Providence protects and governs all things (Sess. Ill, c I, d. 1784).

Philosophical Developments. — The basis of all fur- ther philosophical speculations among Scholastics Lq regard to the precise nature of Providence, its relation to other Divine attributes, and of creation, was laid by Boethius in the "De consol. phil." (IV, vi sq. in "P. L.", LXIII, 813 sq.). Providence is the Divine Intelli- gence itself as it exists in the supreme principle of aU things and disposes all things; or, again, it is the evolu- tion of things temporal as conceived and brought to unity in the Divine Intelligence, which, as St. Thomaa saj'S (Summa I, G. xxii, a. 1), is the cause of all things. Providence, therefore, pertains primarily to the Intel- ligence of God, though it implies also will (I, Q. x.xii, a. 1, ad 3 tma), and hence is defined by St. John Damascene as "the will of God by which all things are ruled according to right reason" ("De fid. orth.", i, 3 in "P. G.", XCIV, 963, 964). The term "Provi- dence", however, must not be taken too literallj'. It is not merely sight, or fore-sight. It involves more than mere vision or knowledge, for it implies the active disposition and arrangement of things with a view to a definite end; but it does not involve Succession. God beholds all things together in one comprehensive act (I, Q. xxii, a. 3, ad 3 um), and by the same act pro- duces, conserves, and concurs in all things (I, Q. civ, a. 1, ad 4 um). Providence as expressed in the created order of things is by Boethius called Fate (loc cit.); but St. Thomas naturally objects to the use of thia term (I, Q. c.xvi, a. 1). Strictly only those things which are ordained by God to the production of cer- tain determinate effects are subject to necessity or Fate (I, Q. x.xii, a. 4; Q. cii, a. 3; Q. cx\'i, a. 1, 2, 4). This excludes chance, which is a relative term and im- plies merely that some things happen irrespective of, or even contrary to, the natural purpose and tendency of some particular agent, natural or free (I, Q. xxii, a. 2; Q. cvi, a. 7; Q. cxvi, a. 1); not that things happen irrespective of the supreme and universal cause of all things. But it does not exclude free will. Some causes are not determined ad unum, but are free to choose between the effects which they are capable of produc-