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 PROBABILISM

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PROBABILISM

there has not been the requisite manifestation of the mind of the legislator. Hence, wlien there is a soUdly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law is not a law in the full and strict sense, and does not impose any obligation (,cf^ Lehmkuhl, "Theologia Moralis", I, nn. 17t)-8J.

jEquiprobabilists reply that, when there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law is prob- ably not sufficiently promulgated, and the question remains whether a law that is probably not sufficiently promulgated imposes any obhgation in conscience. It would be begging the question to assume that no obligation is imposed simply because there is a prob- ability that the law has not been sufficiently promul- gated. Moreover, if the safe opinion happens to be the true opinion, a material sin is committed by the person who, acting on probability, performs the prohibited action. But, unless the law is promul- gated, a material sin cannot be committed by its violation, since promulgation is a necessary condition of a binding law (cf. McDonald, "The Principles of Moral Science", p. 245).

(b) An obligation, concerning whose existence there is invincible ignorance, is no obligation. But, so long as there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of lib- erty, there is invincible ignorance about the obligation imposed by the law. Hence a law does not impose an obligation so long as the less safe opinion is solidly probable (cf. Lehmkuhl, "Theologia Moralis", I, n. 179).

-Equiprobabilists reply that there is not invincible ignorance in regard to a law when the safe opinion is also the more probable opinion, because in these cir- cumstances a person is bound by ordinary prudence to give assent to the safe opinion. Although it is true that an obligation concerning whose existence there is invincible ignorance is no obligation, this is not true when one is compelled to give assent to an opinion as the more probable opinion (cf. Wouters, "De Minus- probabilismo", p. 121).

(c) According to the axiom: lex dubia non obligat, a doubtful law does not bind. But a law is doubtful when there is a solidly probable opinion against it. Hence it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty (cf. Tanquerey, "Theologia Fundamentalis", n. 409).

jEquiprobabilists in reply say that the axiom lex dubia non obligat holds when the law is strictly doubt- ful, i. e. when the reasons for and against the law are equal or nearly equal. A fortiori the law does not bind when the safe opinion is more probable than the less safe opinion. It would, however, be begging the question to assume that the axiom holds when the less safe opinion is clearly less probable than the safe opinion.

(d) According to ^quiprobabilists, it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion, when it is more probable than the safe opinion. But they must admit that Probabilism is more probable than ^Equiprobabilism, since the vast majority of theologians favour the milder view, and ^Equiprobabilists do not reject ex- ternal authority. Hence on their own principles they ought to admit the practical truth of Probabilism.

^Equiprobabilists reply that extrinsic authority is of no avail when the arguments on which the authority rests have been proved to be invalid; and they claim that they have proved the invalidity of the Probabilist arguments. Moreover, a reflex principle is useless un- less its truth is proved with certainty, since its sole utility is to change speculative uncertainty into prac- tical certainty. But greater probability does not give certainty. .Accordingly, even if jEquiprobabilists were to admit the greater probability of Probabilism, that admission would be useless for Probabilists. The case is different with .Equiprobabilism, which has practical certainty, since nearly all theologians now- adays admit the lawfulness of following the less safe

opinion regarding the existence of a law, when it is equally or almost equally probable with the safe opinion.

(e) Many Probabilists lay stress on a practical argument in favour of their opinion, which is derived from the difficulty of distinguishing between various grades of Probability. It is impossible in practice, especially for ordinary people, to tell when one solidly probable opinion is more probable than another sol- idly probable opinion. But a moral system, to be of any serious utihty, must be universal, so that not merely experts in moral science but also ordinary people can utilize it. Hence the systems which de- mand a knowledge of the various degrees of prob- ability must be discarded as practically useless, and Probabihsm alone must be accepted as a working sys- tem.

^Equiprobabilists reply that their system merely asks, that if after due investigation it is found that the less safe opinion is notably and certainly less probable than the safe opinion, the law must be observed. The necessary investigation has frequently been already made by experts; and others, who are not experts, are safe in accepting the conclusions to which the experts adhere.

C. Arguments against Probabilism. — In addition to some arguments to be explained in connexion with the other modern moral systems, it is necessary to mention a few difficulties which have been urged directly against Probabilism.

(1) When the less safe opinion is notably and cer- tainly less probable than the safe opinion, there is no true probability in favour of liberty, since the stronger destroy the force of the weaker reasons. Hence Probabilists cannot consistently maintain that it is safe in practice to act on the less safe opinion which is also the less probable.

Probabilists reply that the greater probability does not of necessity destroy the solid probability of the less probable opinion. When the foimdations of the opposing probabilities are not derived from the same source, then at least the opposing arguments do not detract from one another; and even when the two probabilities are based on a consideration of the same argument, one opinion will retain probability in so far as the opposing opinion recedes from certainty.

(2) A moral system, to be of any use, must be cer- tain, since an uncertain reflex principle cannot give practical certainty. But Probabilism is not certain, because it is rejected by all those theologians who up- held one or another of the opposing views. Hence Probabilism cannot be accepted as a satisfactory solu- tion of the question at issue.

Probabilists reply that their system can be of no use to those who do not look on it as certainly true; but the fact that many theologians do not accept it does not prevent its adherents from regarding it as cer- tain, since these can and do believe that the arguments urged in its favour are insuperable.

(3) Probabilism is an easy road to Laxism, because people are often inclined to regard opinions as really probable which are based on flimsy arguments, and because it is not difficult to find five or six serious authors who approve of opinions which right-minded men consider lax. The only siu'e way to safeguard Catholic morals is to reject the opinion which opens the way to Laxism.

Probabilists reply that their sj'stem must be pru- dently employed, and that no serious danger of Laxism arises if it is recognized that an opinion is not .solidly probable unless there are arguments in its favour which are sufficient to gain the assent of many prudent men. As for the authority of approved authors, it must be remembered that five or six grave authors do not give solid probability to an opinion unless they are notable for learning and prudence, and indepen- dently adhere to an opinion which has not been set