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 PROBABILISM

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PROBABILISM

cal career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, especially in a treatise entitled "Dis- sertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opin- ionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris " (1749, 1755), and finally, about 1762, embraced iEquiproba- bilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and cer- tainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his " Moral Theology " he again expressed these views, and indeed towards the end of his life frequently de- clared that he was not a Probabilist.

Probaljilists sometimes hold that St. Alphonsus never changed his opinion once he had discarded Probabiliorism for Probabilism, though he changed his manner of expressing his view so as to ex- clude Laxist teaching and to give an indication of what must be regarded as a solidly probable opinion. As a matter of fact, as can be seen from a comparison between the "Moral Theologies" of moderate Probabilists and of ^quiprobabilists, there is little practical difference between the two sys- tems, so far at least as the uncertainty regards the existence as distinguished from the cessation of a law. Since the time of St. Alphonsus the pre- vaihng moral systems have been Probabilism and .(Equiprobabilism. Probabiliorism has to a great ex- tent disappeared, and even many Dominican theo- logians have espoused the cause of ^Equiprobabilism. During the nineteenth century the principal Ji^qui- probabilists have been Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, de Caigny, Gaud(5, and Wouters. Quite re- cently Ter Haar and Wouters have been engaged in controversy with Lehmkuhl who, especially in his " Probabilismus Vindicatus" (1906) and in the elev- enth edition of his "Theologia Moralis" (1910), has strongly supported the Probabilist thesis which has been accepted during the nineteenth century by the vast majority of theologians.

In late years the system of Compensationism has arisen, which holds that a compensating reason, pro- portionate to the gravity of the law and to the degree of probability in favour of the existence of the law, is required in order that a person might lawfully act on the less safe opinion. This theory was proposed by Mannier, Laloux, and Potton; but it has gained little support and has not yet become a rival of the old theories of Probabilism, jEquiprobabilism, or even Probabiliorism.

III. Prob.\bili8M. — A. Teaching of Probabilists. — The central doctrine of Probabilism is that in every doubt which concerns merely the lawfulness or unlaw- fulness of an action it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, even though the opposing view is more probable. Probabilists apply their theory only when there is question merely of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action, because in other cases certainty might be demanded on various grounds, as happens when the validity of the sacra- ments, the attainment of an obligatory end, and the established rights of another are concerned. They apply their doctrine whether the doubt about the law- fulness or unlawfulness of an action be a doubt of law, or a doubt of fact which can be reduced to a doubt of law. Thus if it is solidly probable that Friday morning has not yet set in, there is a doubt of fact which can be reduced to a doubt of law as to whether it is lawful in the circumstances to take meat. They also apply their doctrine not merely to human but also to Divine and natural laws, on the ground that the Divine legis- lator is not more exacting than a human legislator. They apply their principles whether the existence or the cessation of a law is concerned, since, in their esti- mation, liberty is always in possession. They also apply their doctrine even though the person whose

action is in question believes that the safe opinion is the more probable opinion. If, however, he looks on the safe opinion as morally certain, he cannot lawfully use the opinion of others who differ from him. Nor can a person on the same occasion use opposing prob- abilities in his favour in reference to several obliga- tions of which one or another would be certainly violated; thus a priest cannot lawfully take meat on the probability that Friday has already elapsed, and at the same time postpone the reading of Complin on the probability that Friday will not elapse for some time. Finally, Probabilists insist that the opinion in favour of liberty must be based on solid arguments and not on mere flimsy reasons which are insufficient to gain the assent of prudent men.

B. Arguments for Probabilism. — (1) External argu- ments: (a) Probabilism, if untrue, is seriously detri- mental to the spiritual life of the faithful, since it per- mits actions which ought to be forbidden, and the Church cannot tolerate or give approval to such a moral system. But the Church during many cen- turies has tolerated Probabilism, and has given it approval in the person of St. Alphonsus. Hence Probabilism is not a false system of morals. That the Church has tolerated Probabilism is shown from the numerous approved authors, who, since the time of Medina, have defended it without interference on the part of ecclesiastical authority. That the Church has given positive approval to Probabilism in the person of St. Alphonsus is proved from the fact that his works including his treatises in favour of Probabilism, re- ceived official sanction from the Decree of 18 May, 1803, the reply of the Sacred Penitentiary of 5 July, 1831, the Bull of Canonization of 26 May, 1839, and the Apostolic Letters of 7 July, 1871 (cf. Lehmkuhl, "Theologia Morahs", I, nn. 165-75).

^Equiprobabilists reply that this argument proves too much for Probabilists, since the Church has also tolerated ^quiprobabilism, and has given it positive approval in the person of St. Alphonsus, whcse works in favour of ^quiprobabilism received the sanction of the Holy See in the official documents of 1803, 1831, 1839, and 1871. If .'Equiprobabihsm is false, it is seriously detrimental to the spiritual life of the faith- ful, since it imposes burdens which ought not to be impo.sed. Hence, if any argument can be derived for Probabilism from the toleration or approval of the Church, a similar argument can be derived therefrom for iEquiprobabilism.

(b) In interpret ing her own laws the Church applies the principles of Probabilism, since amongst the rules of law in "Sexto Dec-rctalium" we read: "Odia restringi, et favores convenit ampliari" (r. 15); "In obscuris minimum est sequendum" (r. 30); "Contra eum qui legem dicere potuit apertius, est interpre- tatio facienda" (r. 57); "In poenis benignior est interpretatio facienda" (r. 89). What is true of the Church is equally true of other legislators, because God is not a more exacting Legislator than His Church, nor is the State to be presumed more strict than God and the Church (cf. Tanquerey, "Theologia Moralis fundamentalis", n. 413).

iEquiprobabilists reply to this argument that when the less safe opinion is certainly less probable than the safe opinion, the former has lost solid probability and consetiuently cannot, so far as conscience is con- cerned, obtain the privileges which the Divine Legis- lator, the Church, and the State concede in the case of really doubtful laws. Moreover, many of these rules of law directly apply to the external forum and ought not, without duo limitation, be transferred to the forum of conscience.

(2) Internal arguments: (a) a law which has not been promulgated is not a law in the full and strict sense, and does not impose an obligation. But when there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law has not been sufficiently promulgated, since