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 PERSONALITY

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PERSONALITY

of the whole personality in spite of the constant dis- intenration and rebuilding of the body. Though not therefore the only constituent of personality, the soul is its formal principle. Finally, for the complete constitution of personality this composilum must exist in such a way as to be "subsistent" (see Person).

(2) NON-8cHOLASTIC THEORIES OF PeHSONALITT.

— Slany modern schools of philosophy hold that per- sonality is constituted not by any underlying reality which self-consciousness reveals to us, but by the self-consciousness itself or by intellectual operations, Locke held that personality is determined and consti- tuted by identity of consciousness. Without denying the existence of the soul as the substantial principle underlying the state of consciousness, he denied that this identity of substance had any concern with per- sonal identity. From what has been said above it is clear that consciousness is a manifestation, not the principle, of that unity of being which constitutes per- sonality. It is a state, and presupposes something of which it is a state. Locke's view and kindred theories are in conflict with the Christian revelation, in that, as in the Incarnate Word there are two in- tellects and two "operations", there are therefore two consciousnesses. Hence accepting Locke's defini- tion of personality there would be two persons.

From Locke's theory it was but a step to the denial of any permanent substance underlying the perceived states. For Hume the only knowable reality consists in the succession of conscious thoughts and feelings. As these are constantly changing it follows that there is no such thing as permanence of the Ego. Conse- quently, the impression of abiding identity is a mere fiction. Subsequent theorists however, could not ac- quiesce in this absolute demolition; an explanation of the consciousness of unity had somehow to be found. Mill therefore held personality to consist in the series of states "aware of itself as a series". Ac- cording to James, personality is a thing of the mo- ment, consisting in the thought of the moment: "The passing thought is itself the thinker". But each thought transmits itself and all its content to its immediate successor, which thus knows and includes all that went before. Thus is established the "stream of consciousness" which in his view constitutes the unitj' of the Ego. Besides the fundamental difficul- ties they share in common, each of these theories is open to objections peculiar to itself. How can a num- ber of states, i. e. of events ex hypothesi entitatively distinct from one another, be collectively conscious of themselves as a unity? Similarly, in the theory of James, successive thoughts are distinct entities. As therefore no thought is ever present to the one preceding it, how does it know it without some underlying principle of unity connecting them?

Again, James does not believe in unconscious states of mind. In what sense then does every thought "know" all its predecessors? It is certainly not con- scious of doing so. But the objection fundamental to all these theories is that, while pretending to account for all the phenomena of self-consciousness, its most important testimony, namely that to a self who is not the thought, who owns the thought, and who is immediately perceived in the act of reflexion upon the thought, is treated as a mere fiction. Against any such position may be urged all the arguments for the permanent and unitary nature of the self. The modern school of empirical psychologists shows a certain reaction against systems which deny to personality a foundation in substance. Thus Ribot: "Let us set aside the hypothesis which makes of the Ego 'a bundle of .sensations', or states of conscious- ness, as is frequently repeated after Hume. This is ... to take effects for their cause" (Diseases of Personality, 8.5). For them the vmity of the Ego rests merely on the unity of the organism. "The organism, and the brain, as its highest representation.

constitute the real personality " (op. cit., 154). A sys- tem which ignores the existence of the human soul fails to account for the purely intellectual phenomena of consciousness, abstract ideas, judgineiit, and infer- ence. These require a simple, i. e. non-cxteiuled, .and therefore immaterial principle. The variou.s theories we have been considering make the whole personality consist in what is really some part of it. Its substan- tial constituents are soul and body, its accidental con- stituents are all the sensations, emotions, thoughts, volitions, in fact all the experiences, of this com- positum.

(3) Abnormalities of Consciousnesb.^ — We may here review briefly some forms of what are known as "disintegrations of personahty", and consider to what extent they affect the scholastic theory of the constitu- tion of the person. In double or multiple personality there are manifested in the same individual two or more apparently distinct series of conscious states. There is a break not merely of character and habit, but of memory also. Thus in 1887 a certain Ansel Bourne disappeared from his home at Coventry, Rhode Island, and two weeks later set up business as A. J. Browne, a baker, at Norristown, Pennsyl- vania. This new " pensonality " had no knowledge of Ansel Bourne. After eight weeks he one morning woke up to find himself again Ansel Bourne. The adventures, even the existence, of A. J. Browne were a vanished episode. Subsequently under hypnotic influence the latter "personality" was recalled, and recounted its adventures. The phenomena of double personality may also be recurrent apart from hyp- nosis. In such cases the two states reappear alter- nately, each having the chain of memories proper to itself. The instance most frequently cited is that of "Felida X", observed for many years by Dr. Azam. Two states of consciousness alternated. In state II she retained memory of what happened in state I, but not vice versa. Her character in the two states was widely different. Frequently in such cases the character in the second state tends to become more Uke the character in the original state, appearing finally as a blend of the two, as in the case of Mary Reynolds (cf. "Harper's Magazine", May, 1860).

In "multiple personality" the most extraordinary abnormalities of memory and character occur. In the case of " Miss Beauchamp " (Proceedings of the Society for Psychical R esearch, xv, 466 sq . ), besides the original personality, there were no less than four other states periodically reappearing, different from one another in temperament, and each with a continuous memorj'. Owing to a mental shock in 1893 Miss Beauchamp's character changed, though memory remained con- tinuous. Thisstate was afterwards called B I. Under hypnotism two other states manifested themselves B II, and B IIL Of these B III ("Sally") practically developed an independent existence, and continually manifested itself apart from hypnotic suggestion. B I had no memory of B II or B III. B II knew B I, but not B III, while B III knew both the others. Eventually in 1899 after another mental shock there appeared a fourth "personality" B IV, who.se memory presented a complete blank from the "disappearance" of the original Miss Beauchamp after the first shock till the appearance of B IV after the second, six years later. Her character was, however, very unlike that of the original personality. B III had memory of all that happened to B IV, but did not know her thoughts. Furthermore, B III was exceedingly jealous both of her and of B I, and plajed spiteful tricks on them. In connexion with these phenomena, the theory has been proposed that the original personality became "disintegrated" after the first shock, and that B I and B IV are its components, while B II and B III are varying manifestations of the "subHminal self".

Sometimes again the phenomena of "double per- sonality" are manifested in an individual, not in alter-