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PERSONALITY

hand, is not perfected, and so remains a person. Op- posing theologians, however, hold that this notion of totality reduces on analysis to the Scotistic negative. Lastly the nco-Thomists, Terrien, Billot, etc., con- sider personality to be ultimately constituted by the esse, the actual existence, of an intelligent substance. That which subsists with its own esse is by that very fact incommunicable. The human nature of Christ is possessed by the Word and exists by His infinite esse. It has no separate esse of its own and for this reason is not a person. The suppositum is a supposi- litm as being ens in the strictest sense of the term. Of all Latin theories this appears to approach most nearly to that of the Greek fathers. Thus in the " Dialogues of the Trinity " given by Migne among the works of St. Athanasius, the author, sjieaking of per- son and nature in God, says: 'H yap virbixTaai.s rb ehai aitixalvti 7) 5i eedrri! ri) t( ehai (Person denotes esse, the Divine nature denotes the quiddity; M. 28, 1114). An elaborate treatment is given by St. John Damascene, Dial. xlii.

(2) The use of the word persona and its Greek equiva- lents in connexion with Ike Trinitarian disputes. — For the constitution of a person it is required that a reality be subsistent and absolutely distinct, i. e. incom- municable. The three Divine reahties are relations, each identified with the Divine Essence. A finite rela- tion has reality only in so far as it is an accident; it has the reality of inherence. The Divine relations, however, are in the nature not by inherence but by identity. The reality they have, therefore, is not that of an accident, but that of a subsistence. They are one with ipsum esse subsistens. Again every relation, by its very nature, implies opposition and so distinc- tion. In the finite relation this distinction is between subject and term. In the infinite relations there is no subject as distinct from the relation itself; the Pater- nity is the Father — and no term as distinct from the opposing relation; the Filiation is the Son. The Divine realities are therefore distinct and mutually incommunicable through this relative opposition; they are subsistent as being identified with the subsistence of the Godhead, i. e. they are persons. The use of the word persona to denote them, however, led to contro- versy between East and West. The precise Greek equivalent was irpSsojwov, likewise used originally of the actor's mask and then of the character he repre- sented, but the meaning of the word had not passed on, as had that of persona, to the general signification of individual. Consequently tres persona', rpia. Trpiswira, savoured of Sabellianism to the Greeks. On the other hand their word inr6(7Ta<Tis, from invb-'larrjiii, was taken to correspond to the Latin substantia, from sub-stare. Tres hypostases therefore appeared to conflict with the Nica?an doctrine of unity of substance in the Trinity. This difference was a main cause of the Antiochene schism of the fourth century (see Mele- Tius OF Antioch). Eventually in the West, it was recognized that the tiTie equivalent of inrdcrraffis was not substantia but siibsistcntia, and in the East that to understand Trpbiunop in the sense of the Latin persona precluded the possibility of a Sabellian inter- pretation. By the First Council of Constantinople, therefore, it was recognized that the words u7r6trTa(ri!, Trp6<Tuirov, and persona were equally applicable to the three Divine realities. (See Incarnation; Nature; Substance; Trinity.)

BnETHlus. De Persojia et Dunbus Naturis. ii, iii, in P. L., I.XIV. 1342 sqq.; Rickaby, General Melaphysics. 92-102. 279- 97 (London. ISflfl); de Regnon. Etudes sur la TriniU. I, studies i, iv; St. Thomas Aquinas, III, Q. xvi, a. 12; De Polenlia, ix, 1-4: Terrien, S. Thomce Doctrina de Unione Hypostatica, bk. I, c. vii; bk. Ill, cc. vi-vii (Paris, 1894): Franzelin, De Verho Incarnato, sect. Ill, cc. iii-iv (Rome, 1874): Harper, Metaphysics of the School, vol. I, bk. Ill, 0. ii, art. 2 (London. 1879).

L. W. GEDnES.

Person, Ecclesiastical. — In its etymological .sense this expression signifies every person who forms a part

of the external and visible society which constitutes the Church, and who has not been canonically expelled therefrom. But the expression is rarely used in this sense; customarily it indicates persons whom a special tie connects with the Church, either because they have received ecclesiastical tonsure, minor, or higher orders, and are a fortiori invested with a power of jurisdic- tion; or because they have taken vows in a religious order or congregation approved by the Church. This more intimate union with the Church involves partic- ular duties which are not incumbent on the general faithful (see Cleric).

Scheher, Uandbuch des Kirchenrechts, I (Graz, 1886), 309-12.

A. Van Hove. Persona Gobelinus. See GobeI/Inus.

Personality. — It is proposed in this article to give an account (1) of the physical constituents of person- ality in accordance with the scholastic theory; (2) of concepts of personality that conflict with the theory; (,3) of abnormalities of consciousness with reference to their bearing on theories of personality.

(1) The Physical Constituents op Personal- ity. — A man's personality is that of which he has cognizance under the concept of "self". It is that entity, substantial, permanent, unitary, which is the subject of all the states and acts that constitute his complete life. An appeal to self-consciousness shows us that there is such a subject, of which thought, will, and feeling are modifications. It is substantial, i. e. not one or all of the changing states but the reality underlying tftem, for our self-consciousness testifies that, besides perceiving the thought, it has immediate perception in the same act of the subject to whom the thought belongs. Just as no motion can be appre- hended without some sort of apprehension of the object moved, so the perception of thought carries with it perception of the thinker. The changing states are recognized as determinations of the "self", and the very concept of a determination involves the presence of something determined, something not itself a determination, i. e. a substance. It is per- manent, in that though one may say, "I am com- pletely changed", when referring to a former state, still one knows that the "I" in question is still the same numerically and essentially, though with cer- tain superadded differences.

This permanence is evident from a consideration of our mental processes. Every act of intellectual memory implies a recognition of the fact that I, thinking now, am the "self" as the one who had the experience which is being recalled. My former ex- periences are referred to something which has not passed as they have passed, to my own self or person- ality. From this permanence springs the conscious- ness of self as a unitary principle. The one to whom all the variations of state belong is perceived as an entity complete in itself and distinguished from all others. Unity of consciousness does not constitute but manifests unity of being. The physical principle of this permanence and unity is the simple, spiritual, unchanging substance of the rational soul. This does not mean, however, that the soul is identical with the personal self. There are recognized as modifications of the self not merely acts of thought and volition, but also sensations, of which the immediate subject is the animated body. Even in its own peculiar sphere the soul works in conjunction with the body; intel- lectual rea.soning is accompanied and conditioned by sen.sory images. A man's personality, then, consists physically of soul and body. Of these the body is what is termed in schola.stic language the "matter", the determin.able principle, the soul is the "form", the determining principle. ' The soul is not merely the seat of the chief functions of man — thought and will; it also determines the nature and functioning of the body. To its permanence is due the abiding unity