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 to law, and that men do not prejudge the cause, or usurp the right of pronouncing on its merits; for, as the Apostle says, "it were unjust to judge another man's servant." Such an assumption may lead men to decide without a sufficient know ledge of the case; and of this we have an example in the con duct of the priests and scribes, who passed judgment on St. Stephen. The magistrates of Philippi furnish another example of the same criminal conduct: "They have beaten us publicly," says St. Paul, " uncondemned, men that are Romans, and have cast us into prison; and now do they thrust us out privately."

This commandment also requires, that the innocent be not condemned, nor the guilty acquitted; and that he who is in vested with judicial authority suffer not his judgment to be warped by interest, or biased by hatred or partiality. This is the admonition addressed by Moses to the elders, whom he had constituted judges of the people: "judge that which is just; whether he be one of your country or a stranger. There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, be cause it is the judgment of God."

With regard to an accused person, who is conscious of his own guilt, when interrogated according to the forms of judicial process, God commands him to confess the truth. By that confession he, in some sort, bears witness to, and proclaims the praise and glory of God; and of this we have a proof in these words of Joshua, when exhorting Achan to confess the truth: " My son," says he, " give glory to the Lord the God of Israel."

But, as this commandment chiefly regards witnesses, the pas tor will also give to it, in this point of view, a due share of attention. The spirit of the precept goes not only to prohibit false, but also to enforce the obligation of giving true evidence. In human affairs, to bear testimony to the truth is a matter of the highest importance, because there are innumerable things of which we must be ignorant, unless we arrive at a knowledge of them on the faith of witnesses. In matters with which we are not personally acquainted, and which, however, we have occasion to know, what so important as true evidence? on this subject we have the recorded sentiments of St. Augustine: " He who conceals the truth, and he who utters falsehood, are both guilty; the one, because he is unwilling to render a service; the other, because he has the will to render a disservice." We are not, however, at all times, and under all circumstances, obliged to disclose the truth; but when, in a court of justice, a witness is legally interrogated, he is bound to tell " the whole